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ABSTRACT 
The foreign policy of a country is never determined by 
one single factor. A cluster of factors exercise their 
Influence over the formulation and implementation of the 
foreign policy at different periods, through different means 
and in various circumstances. Therefore, the foreign policy 
is subjected to both continuity and change. Iran is no 
exception. The Islamic Revolution brought a remarkable shift 
in the foreign policy of Iran. The present work is an 
attempt to understand the aims, objectives and goals of the 
foreign policy of Islamic government of Iran. The work is 
broadly divided into three parts: (a) Foreign policy under 
laroam Khomeini (1979-89), (b) Foreign Policy after Khomeini 
(since 1989), (c) conclusion. The first part is further 
divided into six chapters. 
Chapter I briefly deals with those factors which by and 
large exercise their impact over the formulation of the 
foreign policy in Iran. A brief profile of Iran concerning 
the political system, topography, economy, natural resources 
and culture are described. The revolutionary ideology. Imam 
Khomeini's views on Islamic government and the nature of an 
Islamic Republic are briefly presented. The foreign policy 
before the Islamic Revolution as a historical factor and 
basic principles of the foreign policy as enshrined in the 
constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, beside some 
important factors which had been influencing the decision 
Baking of the foreign policy and diploroacy at. different 
periods are also covered in this chapter. 
The one of the important features of the Is J ami c 
Revolution have been to denounce the superpower domination 
and totally eliminate their interference. In order to 
achieve this aim Imam Khomeini, the leader of the 
revolution, gave the slogan of 'Neither East Nor West* and 
adopted it as basic goal, and main objective of the foreign 
policy. This aspect of the foreign policy of the isjamic 
Republic of Iran is discussed in the second chapter. The 
policy of 'Neither East Nor West' has many similarities with 
the aims, objectives and principles of Non-aJigned movement. 
These similarities and differences between the two 
ideologies are also analysed. The areas of conflict and 
accommodation in Iran-U.S. relations are also studied with a 
view to understand their implications. Iran was under the 
direct influence and domination of the United States since 
the reinstallation of Reza Shah Pahlvi as monarch of Iran in 
1953. Islamic Republic out rightly rejected the domination 
and interference of the United States in its affairs and 
refused to act as an agent of the United States in the 
region. If any country which seemed adversely effected by 
the Iranian Revolution was no one but the United States. The 
militarisation of Iran together with its support to the so 
called Islamic fundamentalism and the alleged support to 
terrorism abroad has given Washington sleepless mights. The 
American interest in the region was badly damaged by the 
Iranian Revolution. The the islamic Republic of Iran joined 
the Non-aligned Movement, withdrew itself from the CENTO, 
abrogated the 1959 treaty with the United States and 199J 
treaty with the Soviet Union. The strong anti-American stand 
taken by the Islamic Republic was due largely to the Iran's 
long experience with American imperialism, the United States 
continuous support to Shah throughout the period of 
revolution and above all its support and encouragement to 
anti-revolutionary forces in Iran with the aim of subverting 
the revolution. 
The worsening of relations with the United States to 
some extent affected Iran's relationship with the countries 
of the Western Europe. Although the seizure of the American 
embassy which resulted into economic sanctions did adversely 
influence her relations with the countries of the Western 
Bloc. 
In the third chapter, Iran-Soviet relations and 
relations between Iran and the countries of Eastern Europe 
are discussed. There was a clear chance for Iran to come 
closer to the Soviet Union after severing relations with the 
United States. However, Iran equally criticised Soviet Union 
and decided to maintain equidistance from both the power 
blocs. But Soviet Union was not as much objectionable to 
Iran as the United States. There were many reasons to come 
closer to the Soviet Union such as: Soviet Unions support to 
the Revolution; it was a neighbouring superpower and shared 
a long common boundary with Iran and, it might become an 
laportant supply route for Iran. Despite all these positive 
factors there were many reasons to maintain distance from 
the Soviet Union such as: Russian's long record of 
imperialism in Iran particularly during the two world wars; 
Soviet Union's continuous support to Iranian leftists and 
ethnic minorities; and, above all the Soviet Union's 
Intervention in Afghanistan which was regarded as a direct 
threat to the sovereignty and integrity of Iran. 
But the Iran-U.S. rifts and Iran-Soviet rifts provided 
opportunity to improve relations with the countrie^ L- of the 
Eastern Europe. Iran remarkably improved its economic 
relation with a number of the East European countries during 
the Iran-Iraq war. 
Chapter IV deals with the Iran's policy towards the 
Persian Gulf region and the Muslims world. The basic issues 
and problems involved in Iran's relations with the Muslim 
countries and regional states are analysed in this chapter. 
Iran's policy towards region has been guided by many 
considerations such as: it give priority to the regional 
peace and security; oppose all types of outside interference 
in the region; advocates for the unity of the Muslim people 
and countries of the region; denounce the superpowers 
domination and imperialism in the region; severely 
criticises those countries who are closely allied with the 
superpowers; asked the Muslim people and countries to follow 
the principles of Islam in running the government and 
provoked the people to overthrow their governmenjts and 
' T^57^ 
establish governments of Iranian model in their respective 
countries as other governments are not according to the laws 
of the Islam. The Iranian revolution posed a great threat 
to the rulers of many countries in the region as they were 
afraid of an Iranian type of revolution in their countries. 
The fear of an Iranian type of revolution was also one of 
the main reasons of Iraqi attack over Iran. 
Through out the Iran-Iraq war Iran's regional policy 
was directed by the war considerations. Its relations with 
most of the regional states, particularly the members of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council were adversely affected. Despite 
many differences Iran developed political and economic 
relations with the countries of the Steadfastness Front 
(Algeria, Libya, Syria, P.L.O., Peoples Democratic Republic 
of Yemen). Other than Iraq, with her three neighbours --
Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan (with whom Iran shares 
common boundaries)-- Iran improved relations with Turkey and 
Pakistan while relations with Afghanistan deteriorated due 
to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Turkey and Pakistan 
both did not fit in the ideological frame work of Iran but 
the war with Iraq, hostages crisis, economic sanctions, 
deteriorating relations with countries of Western Europe, 
Persian Gulf region and the Soviet Union, compelled Iran to 
improve relations with Turkey. The main reason of coming 
closer to Pakistan was the presence of Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan. 
In chapter V, Iran's attitude towards Zionism as weJJ 
as Arab Israel conflict is explained. Imam Khomejnj from 
the very beginning had been opposing the ideology and 
principle of Zionism. He always extended support to the 
Palestinians. Imam Khomeini never hesitated to criticise 
Shah for his friendly attitude towards Israel. That was the 
reason that immediately after the Islamic RevoJution, Iran 
severed diplomatic relations with Israel and stopped selling 
oil to that country. Khomeini considered Israe3 as an agent 
of imperialist power to create problems for the regiona.1 
Muslim countries. Thus he considered IsraeJ as enemy of 
Islam and Muslims. 
The deterioration of relations with most of the Western 
countries left Iran to improve relations with the countries 
of the third world. Improving relations with the developing 
countries of the Asia, Africa and Latin America is one of 
the basic principles and objective of Iran's foreign poJicy. 
Iran improved diplomatic relations with most of the third 
world countries and established fresh diplomatic reJations 
with many of them. 
Part II, Chapter VII, deals with the po.liticaJ 
developments in Iran after the death of Imam Khomeini and 
its implications for foreign policy. Many observers expected 
a radical change in the domestic and foreign policy of Iran 
after the death of Imam Khomeini. They also hoped that 
Iran's relations with the United States would improve. But 
all their speculations failed as the new Jeadership in Iran, 
by and large, continued to follow the earlier po3icJes. In 
the post Khomeini era, Iran's main emphasis has been to 
reconstruct the economy of the country which was badJy 
shattered during the prolonged war. For this purpose Iran 
signed contracts with a number of countries throughout the 
world including the countries of the Western Europe. During 
this period the Persian Gulf States experienced the Gulf War 
due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iran adopted a 
reasonable approach towards the conflict. While on the one 
hand, Iran denounced the Iraqi invasion, on the other hand, 
it also opposed the stationing of multinational forces in 
the region and did try to resolve the problem peacefu31y 
through negotiations in regional perspective. 
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PREFACE 
This study is a modest attempt to understand and explain 
the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its 
post-revolutionary period. The Iranian revolution has had some 
unique distinction which resulted not only in the change of a 
political regime but also transformed the entire socio-
economic and cultural fabric of Iran. An important dimension 
of the revolution has been that it was spear-headed by the 
religious clerics with mass support from the middle and poor 
strata of the Iranian society. The revolution heralded a new 
era in Iran's relations with the rest of the world and totaJly 
changed its foreign policy orientations. There appeared a 
total departure in the foreign policy objectives whjch not 
only carved a new Iran in global politics but also made it an 
important force in world politics thereby projecting Iran as 
the vanguard of a global Islamic movement. 
This thesis Is divided into three parts covering eight 
chapters beside a preface. The first part deals with the 
foreign policy of Iran during Khomeini regime (1979-89), the 
second part covers the post Khomeini era (1989 onwards) while 
the third part is dedicated to some concluding remarks. The 
first part is covered under six chapters. Chapter one briefly 
deals with all those factors which largely shaped Iran's 
foreign policy. It also attempts at understanding the dynamics 
of the Islamic Revolution leading to the emergence of an 
•Islamic government* in Iran. 
Chapter two is about Iran's policy of 'Neither Fast Nor 
West'. In this chapter an attempt has been made to asseBs the 
policy of 'Neither East Nor West' and study the sjmjlarities 
and differences between the principles, objectives and goals 
of Non-alignment pursued by Iran in realising its 'Neither 
East Nor West' policy. This chapter also attempts to 
understand the areas of conflicts and accommodation in Iran-
U.S. relation's with a view to understand their implications. 
A brief account of Iran's relations with the countries of 
Western Europe is also included in this chapter. The third 
chapter deals Iran's policy towards Soviet Union and its 
relation's with the countries of the Eastern Europe. 
Chapter fourth seeks to understand Iran's poJJcy towards 
the Persian Gulf region and the Muslim states. The basic 
issues and problems involved in Iran's relation's with the 
Muslim countries and regional states are analysed in this 
chapter. This chapter also focuses on Iran's relations with 
the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Members of 
JI 
stead Fastness Front and its three neighbours - Turkey, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan with whome Iran shares common 
boundaries. 
Opposition to Israel and support to Palestinian cause has 
been one of the basic objectives of Iran's foreign policy. 
Chapter V deals with the approach of revolutionary Jeaders 
towards Zionism and Iran's stand viz-a-viz Arab-Israel 
conflict. 
Iran's anti-super power rhetoric and her poJJcy of 
decreasing dependence on Western countries brought her close 
to the third world countries. Consequently, strengthening 
relations with the third world countries became the basic 
objective of Iran's foreign policy. Chapter six aims at 
understanding Iran's relations with third world countries in 
general and her special relations with India in particular 
being an important actor in third worJd politics. One of the 
important objectives of Iran's foreign policy has been to 
support the liberation movements and denounce oppression 
throughout the world particularly in the countries of the 
third world. Chapter six also stresses the role of Iran In 
achieving these foreign policy objectives. 
Ill 
The second part of the thesis is covered under chapter 
seven which largely deals with the political developments in 
Iran after Imam Khomeini and its impact on the foreign policy 
of Iran. Iran's domestic and global compulsions leading to 
shift in her foreign policy in this era is also discussed in 
this chapter. 
The present work is largely descriptive and analytical jn 
nature is based on available data contained in Books, 
articles, newspapers, periodicals and the statements and 
speeches of the leaders of the revolution and the persons who 
held positions of authority in Iranian government. 
This modest attempt on a vast and complicated subject 
like the foreign policy of Iran would not have been possible 
without the guidance and support of my supervisor Prof. S.A.H. 
Bilgrami. His consistent encouragement and scho]ar]y insights 
at various Jevels of the work have been an invaluable source 
of inspiration to me. For all this I am highly indebted to 
Prof. Bilgrami and reserve a pantheon for him. I am thankful 
to Professor Shan Muhammad, Chairman, Department of 
Political Science, A.M.U., Aligarh, for his cooperation in 
submitting the thesis. I am grateful to Prof. Z.A. Ni^ami, 
Head Department of Politica] Science and Director Academic 
IV 
staff College, Jamia MilJia Islamia for his cortimious 
encouragement and cooperation throughout the completion of 
this work. My thanks are clue to Prof. S.J.R. Bilgrami and 
Prof. Z.M. Khan, Department of Political Science, Jamia Mi]lia 
Islamia for their suggestions and insights which helped me 
largely in the completion of this work. T am equally indebted 
to Mr, M. Mujtaba Khan, Reader, Department of Political 
Science, J.M.I. New Delhi for his valuable advice and 
guidance. I am thankful to Mr. Jawed Habeeb for providing me 
with many relevant books needed in this work. I am also 
thankful to all my friends and colleagues for their good 
wishes and encouragements. I am highly thankful to Mr. Atiqur 
Rehman Siddiqui for having done the proof reading efficiently 
and competently. I also extend my thanks to Mr. Najm 7da Naqvi 
for his cooperation. 
It is beyond my ability to express my fee.lings of 
gratitude to my parents. I shall be failing in my duty if T do 
not thank my wife, Subuhi and Son, Shariq Ali, without whose 
cooperation this work could never have been completed. 
I am also thankful to the staff members of the following 
libraries: Maulana Azad Library, A.M.U., Aligarh, Centre of 
West Asian Studies Library, A.M.U., Aligarh, Dr. Zakir Husain 
Library Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, I.C.W.A. Library, New 
Delhi, and Iran Culture House Library, New DeJhi. 
V 
I am thankful to Mr. Moinuddin Alvi of Blessing Computer 
Centre for efficiently managing the typing of this work and 
Mr. Muneer Uddin Khan for typing the manuscripts. 
For the short comings, however I alone am responsibJe. 
Mohd. Tariq Sayeed 
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CHAPTER - I 
IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: A GEO-HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PROFILE 
The Foreign policy of a country is determined by a 
cluster of factors. A variety of factors shape the foreign 
policy in different forms, in different contexts and 
circumstances. There are a number of internal and external 
factors which determine the foreign policy of a country. 
There are some factors which are more stable and 
determine the foreign policy in every condition at all 
times, apart from this there are a number of other important 
variables as well. By and large the foreign policy of a 
country is formulated keeping in mind both short term and 
long term objectives and goals. It is also subject to both 
continuity and change. This study of foreign policy of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran is mentioned in the light and 
background of a number of variables. The Monarchy in Iran 
was replaced by the "Islamic Republic" through a successful 
revolution led by religious leaders and mainly followed by 
the poor and middle strata of the society. With the change of 
the government, a major shift was obvious in the foreign 
policy. An understanding of the foreign policy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, required an understanding of the different 
internal and external variables as well as the foreign policy 
at different stages prior to the formulation of Islamic 
Republic. 
The motivating factors and forces responsible for 
the decision making of the foreign policy at different stages 
such as the geographic location, natural resources, 
economy,the nature of the political system, internal 
situation, ideology, culture, regional and international 
political environment etc. are important ingredients. The 
ideological sprit and causes behind the Islamic Revolution 
of Iran and its impact also adds an important dimension to her 
foreign policy. 
A PROFILE OF IRAN 
The Islamic Republic of Iran covers an area of 
636,300 square miles (1648000 square kilometer) in South 
Western Asia. It is bounded on north by the former Soviet 
Union and the Caspion Sea, on the east by Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, on the south by Persian Gu]f, and on the 
west by Turkey and Iraq. Iran also controls about a dozen 
islands in the Persian Gulf. More than 30 percent of its 
4,770 mile ( 7,580 Kilometers ) long boundary is sea coast, 
Iran has played an important ro]e in the MiddJe feast, 
as an imperial power and as a factor in rivalries between the 
East and West. Its strategic position and its vast 
resources, including petroleum and natura] gas, make it a 
nation to Jbe reckoned with the modern world. 
Traditionally, the country has been sharply divided 
along cultural, ethnic and linguistic lines. The people of 
each region are associated with specific attributes. For 
example Isfahan,is known for shrewd businessman, wizy and 
industrious, Yazdi as a hard working agricuJturist, 
Azerbaijan produces soldiers and merchants. Kurds are 
known as religiously independent and fanatic fighter and a 
Shirazi poet by nature and temperament. 
Before the revolution of 1979, English and French 
were widely used by the scholars, however Russian and German 
were also used but in lesser degree. Since 1979 Arabic 
has been given priority because of its religious 
significance. 
The vast majority of Iranians are Musiira and mostly 
Shia. The Kurds and Turkmen are Sunni Muslims. Major 
religious minorities are christian, Jews and Zorostrians. 
THE ECONOMY : 
In 1949 a planned economic development was started 
which was terminated in 1978 and a new economic policy was 
started in 1982. However, war with Iraq was a major cause of 
1. Nrw Fn<- -rJni^ed,\-> B? itar.icr,, 1987 edition, PP 854-862 
hindrance in the progresB of economic development of Iran. 
The management of the economy is subject to islamic criteria 
and formulated by the council of Guardian and approved by 
the legislature. The constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran establishes specific guidelines for the 
administration of economic and financial affairs of the 
country. Article 43 to 55 of the constitution deals with the 
principle and guidelines for economic and financial 
affairs. Article 43 directs to provide all the essentia.! 
needs i.e. House, Food, Cloth, health, education and 
necessary requirements for establishing the family of all the 
citizens; to provide the opportunity to work to all persons 
who are able to work and to achieve fuJ] employment. To 
prevent foreign domination over the economy of the country is 
also a major objective of Iran's economic and foreign policy. 
The ultimate objectives are economic independence, full 
employment and a comfortable standard of Jiving. The economy 
is divided into three sectors; Public, Co-operative and 
Private. The public sector consists of aJ.l large and major 
industries, foreign trade, large mines, banking, 
insurance, energy programes, Jarge dams. Irrigation, 
communication network, shipping, railways etc. The 
ownership of these remains with the Government. The co-
operative sectors includes production and distribution of 
goods and services, companies and enterprises. The 
private sector consists of those parts of agriculture, 
industry, animal husbandry trade and service which 
compliments co-operatives and Governments economic 
. . . 2 
activities. 
Few laws of the former Government were declared nu.1.1 
and void as they violated the principles of Islamic 
laws. Tax policies were changed according to Js.lamic 
Shariah and taxes are now collected on voluntary basis. These 
includes income tax (Khums) which is one fifth of the income. 
Zakat, Land tax (Kharaj) and Usher (10 % of the value of the 
crop). 
RESOURCES 
Iran's most important natural resources are oil 
and natural gas. Iran earns maximum foreign exchange with 
the sale of crude and refined oil than any other sources. 
About 10 percent of the world's oil reserves is in Iran, It 
comes on number six among the world producer of oil end on 
number four in rank in the world as an oil exporter. Tts Abadan 
2. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry 
of Islamic Guidence, Tehran, 1985, P P - 33-39 
3 
oil refinery is one of the biggest refineries of the world. 
There are also some smaller refineries in Rsfahan, 
Shiraz, Tehran and Tabriz. Natural gas is found in the south 
as well as in the Elburz Mountains and in Khorasan. In south 
there are also some petrochemical industries which produce 
ammonia, phosphates, sulfur, and other products. 
THE REVOLUTION 
The Iranian Revolution of 1978 had an all round impact 
on global politics. Tensions, . strains, uncertainties and 
conflicts at local, regional and international levels Iran's 
polarised domestic policies. War with Iraq, hostage crisis, 
breaking of diplomatic relation and economic warfare 
between Iran and United States were some of the 
repercussions 
There were a number of factors which influenced the 
revolution in Iran. Out of which two factors are very 
important: increasing alienation from the monarchia.l 
regime and perceived foreign domination. This 
alienation was largely due to the adverse effect of the 
previous domestic and foreign policy decisions of the 
3. Encyclopedia Americana, International edition. Vol.15,1966 
PP.305g. 
ruling elite. There was a strong anti-American sentiment 
mainly due to Washington's close association with the Shah's 
regime eversince Shah returned to power in August J 953. 
The revolution had the support of many disparate groups, 
classes and individuals. Factory workers, traditional 
shopkeeper, Urban and rural cleaners, snow removers, 
kerosene peddlers members of various guilds and artisans as 
well as Bazaar merchants, lawyers, teachers, professors, 
intellectuals, civil servants, etc., supported the 
revolution. Shortly before the actual seizure of power by 
revolutionary forces armed personnels technicians and 
thousands of deserted soldiers joined hands with common 
opposition to Shah's regime. Coalition between religious 
and nationalist leaders have been a hall mark of every 
Iranian crisis. For example Ayatollah Abolhasan Kashani and 
Dr.M.Musaddiq formed an £iiiir.-nc<f eft- convenienc-e- during 
the oil nationalisation crises of 1951-53. In the same 
manner Ayatollah Khomeini formed a coalition with national 
front leader Dr.Karim Sanjabi in France and they Jointly 
declared that the revolution marked the convergence of the 
religious and national movements. However since the 
beginning the religious leaders had an upper hand. 
4. Ramzani, R.K., Iran's Revolution: Pattern, Problems and 
prospects, intr-f-nat lon^i Affv^ir-.^^, Summer, 1980 PP.443-57. 
The history of the 1978 Revolution can be traced to early 
1960's when Imam Khomeini confronted the Shah. He was the 
only religious leader of Qum who publicly extended support to 
the students who were campaigning against the opening of 
liquor stores. In 1962 he opposed the Shah's ordinance 
concerning modification in the quaJification of the 
candidate for local assembly elected. Consequently, Shah was 
forced to withdraw his orders. In 1963 the Shah initiated 
certain steps to reshape the political, social, and economic 
life in Iran what has been termed as 'White Revolution'. An 
approval of people was obtained on this issue through a 
referendum on January 26, 1963. Imam Khomeini moved 
immediately to denounce the 'White Revolution' and 'exposed' 
the motive behind the 'White Revolution' through a series of 
sermons from Fayziya Madarsa in Qxim that had a nationwide 
impact. He believed that the Shah wanted to impose 
American domination over Iran through this change. The 
Shah's regime responded by sending paratroopers to attack 
Fayziya Madarsa on March 22, 1963. A number of students 
were killed and the Madarsa was ransacked. For Imam Khomeini 
this event marked the beginning of a new period of determined 
struggle that was directed not only against the errors and 
excceses of the regime but against its very existence. 
Throughout the spring of 1963, Imam Khomeini continued to 
denounce the Shah's regime. He concentrated his attack on 
the tyrannical nature of the regime, it's subordination to 
the United States, and it's expanding collaboration with 
Israel. The confrontation reached a new height in June when 
on the tenth day of Muharram Imam Khomeini delivered a 
historic speech in Qum, repeating his denunciation to Shah's 
regime and warning Shah not to behave in siich a manner as 
people force him to leave. Two days later he was arrested and 
taken to confinement in Tehran. The arrest of Imam 
Khomeini brought popular disgust with the Shah's regime to a 
climax and a major uprising shook the throne. In Qum, 
Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Kashan and other cities 
large demonstrations took place. In those demonstrations a 
large number of people were killed by The RoyaD Army. But 
this was the turning point in the politics of Iran. By 
that time Imam Khomeini was established as a national Jeader 
and spokesman for popular aspirations of the struggle 
against Shah. He started a mass political movement under 
religious leadership and side lined the secular parties that 
had been discredited with the overthrow of Mussaddiq. The 
uprising was suppressed, but the general public and the 
religious scholars refused to tolerate the imprisonment of 
Imam Khomeini. Besides a country wide agitation, the 
religious leaders gathered at. Tehran to press the release of 
Imam Khomeini and agreed to refrain from political 
activities as a condition for his release. However this was 
immediately rejected by Imam. In the meantime in October 
1964, immunity was granted by the Government of Iran to 
American personnel for all offenses committed in Iranian 
territory. On October 27, Imam Khomeini denounced it and 
described it as a clear violation of Iranian Sovereignty 
and independence. Consequently on Nov.4, 1964 Imam Khomeini 
was arrested and sent into exile in Turkey. In October 1965 
Imam Khomeini went to Najaf,(Iraq) where he lived thirteen 
years in exile. But while he was in exile he maintained his 
influence and popularity in Iran. A number of important 
Iranian personalities and Muslim leaders visited him. He 
also issued periodical proclamations on the development and 
situation in Iran which were smuggled to Iran and secretly 
distributed among people. It was then entirely naturaJ that 
Imam Khomeini should emerge as the leader and guide of the 
Revolution of 1978-79. In order to contain his activities, 
in September 1978 Shah requested the Iraqi Government to 
expel Imam Khomeini. In October 1978 Imam Khomeini went 
to France and guided the revolution from there till the 
victory was achieved in 1979. 
.10 
CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT 
After a successful 'Islamic Revolution' the Shah was 
forced to leave Iran in January 1979. The Shah asked Dr. 
Shahpore Bakhtiar, a member of NationaJ Front, to form a 
government which was accepted by Dr. BakhtJar but denounced 
by Khomeini and National front. On Feb. 1,1979 Khomeini 
returned to Iran. He was given a warm welcome at Tehran 
airport. On Feb.5, Ayatollah Khomeini announced that 
Dr.Mehdi Bazargan had been appointed Prjme Minister of a 
Provisional Government. 
On April 3,1979, Khomeini declared the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran after a referendum. He 
declared; "I announce the Islamic Republic of Iran on this 
blessed day, the day of the leadership of the community,the 
day of the victory of the people, I announce the World 
that such a referendum has never been experienced in the 
history of Iran? He then extended thanks to the peop.le 
5. Khomeini, Ayatollah, I&iamic Government (Translated by 
Hamid Algar) Published by Islamic foundation Press, 
Kerala, India, 1988, PP.13-21. 
6. Kees iris's Cont emp^orsry Arohives-. July 2 7, J 97 9, 
PP.29741-29743. 
7. Selected messBntes and sp-eeche-s a-f Imam Khomejlni, The 
Ministry of National Guidance, Tehran, Iran P.-l 
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of Iran for participating in the referendum and giving 
overwhelming support. He further said that the People of Iran 
wanted to apply the principle of the holy Quran in Iran, He 
claimed that the people of Iran had voted for Islam and not. 
anything else. And a Republic of Islam couJd onJy save 
the Islamic cause. In his view the Republic of Islam and 
its progressive law were higher than all laws which existed 
p 
in other sections and school of thoughts. 
He urged the Government of Iran to work without fear 
of the East or the West, with independence, will and thought 
and to clean out the remains of the 'tyrannjca]' regime 
q 
whose remains had roots throughout the country . 
Imam Khomeini who led the revolution and promised to 
establish an Islamic Government said that a body of Laws 
alone was not sufficient for a society but reform shouJd be 
made to ensure the happiness of man. There must be an 
executive power and an executor. For this purpose God 
Almighty,in addition to revealing a body of laws (ie. the 
ordinances of the shariat) has laid down a particu3ar form 
of Government together with executive and administrative 
institutions. The most Noble messenger (peace and bJessing be 
8. Ibid,, p.5-6 
9. Ibid., p.4 
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upon him) headed the executive and administrative 
institutions of Muslim Society. In addition to conveying the 
revelations and expounding and interpreting the articles of 
faith and the ordinances and Institution of Islam, he a]so 
understood the implementation of law and the establishment 
of the ordinances of Islam, He did not contend himseJf 
with the promulgation of law; rather, he implemented it 
at the same time. After the most noble messenger, (PBUH) his 
successor had the same duty and function. After the Prophet 
the Muslim still needed some one to execute .laws and 
establish the institution of Islamic society,so that they 
might attain happiness in this world and thereafter. After 
Prophet (PBUM) his successor, was appointed not only for the 
purpose of expounding articles of faith and law but aJ so for 
the implementation of law and the executions of His 
ordinances. It was this function, the execution of ]aw and 
the establishment of Islamic Institutions, that made the 
appointment of a successor an important matter. 
Imam Khomeini said,"By this very nature, infact law 
and social Institutions require the existence of an executor, 
Islam has therefore established an executive power in the same 
way that it has brought laws into being. The person who 
10. Ayatollah Khomeini, Islsmic. Go\^'et-nh::ent op.cit pp.40-41 
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boJds this executive power is known as the Vali-anir or Wali-
FaQih. Islamic Government was a government of law. Wherever 
sovereignty belongs to God alone and law was His decree and 
command. In Law of Islam, devine command has absolute 
authority over all individuals and the Islamic Government. 
Describing the power of the Wali-Faqih or Vali-Amr 
he said, "God has conferred upon Government in the present 
age ,the same powers and authority that were held by the 
Most Noble Messenger (PBUM) and the Imams with respect to 
equipment and mobilising armies, appointing governors and 
officials and levying taxes and expending them for the 
welfare of the Muslims." Clarifying the position of the 
faqih he said that we say that faqih has the same authority 
that the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams had, do not 
imagine that the status of the 'Willayat-Faqih' is identical 
(P6.UH) 
to that of the Imams and the Prophet(fflSl). Further we 
are not speaking of the status but rather of functions. By 
authority we mean Government , the Administration of the 
country and the implementation of the sacred laws of the 
Sharia. Basically, it is the people who elect their Faqih. 
This fact in itself manifest democracy. The Imam 
(Faqih)'s sharia authority manifests itself when induced by 
11. JWtV. ,p-50 
Id 
peoples decisive cominitment adherence to Islam as a 
distinctive school of thought and as an equally well-
defined ideology. The people corroborate his jurisdiction \ 
and repose confidence in his special competence to 
discern the Islamic nature and content of other's 
performances ^ 2. 
'ISLAMIC REPUBLIC : 
Thus, Iran was declared an "JsJamJc Republic", 
This new term attracted the attention of the people as 
well as Intellectuals. 
The two terms "Republic" and "Islamic" refer to a type 
of government and its ideological content respectively. The 
term "Republic" is used for a type of government jn which 
people have the right to elect their ruler. Tt does 
not involve any discrimination on grounds of one's beliefs, 
race, sex, etc. There is only one general requirement that 
voters should be adult. The term "Islamic" signifies the 
nature and the content of a government. It suggests that 
the government should be one based on Islamic pr.incip]es and 
regulations. Thus "Islamic republic" means a form of the 
government in which the president is elected by popular 
vote for a temporary period, and the ideological content 
12. i6jV.i,p-60 
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of which IS Islamic . 
GOVERNMENT : 
As envisaged in the constitution of 1979, Iran is 
an Islamic Republic, with a president (the head of the 
State) a cabinet, a Unicameral Legislature (Majlis) and 
a separate judicial branch. The Valiya-e-Faqih, the supreme 
spiritual leader chosen for his knowledge of Islamic 
theology, is considered to be the representative of the 
twelve Imam and as such has final authority in a.l] 
executive legislative and judicial matters. After the death 
of Willayat-e-feqih, experts elected by the people consult 
and select his successor; The president is elected for four 
years. 
The 270 members Majlis is also elected for four years 
by a secret ballot. Recongnised minorities are also given a 
token representation in Majlis. A 12 member council of 
Guardians, six theologians appointed by Vally-e-Faqih and six 
Islamic jurists nominated by high command of the judiciary and 
approved by Majlis, is constituted to review the laws passed 
by the Majlis and to judge their constitutional and Islamic 
validity. 
13. Mutahhari, Murtada, Th^e aoncecyt of ls.t^mic Rep>ub.Hc, Pub. by 
Bonyad BE'THET, Foreign Department, Tehran, Iran, 1982, PP 
11-12 
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The judiciary consists of Supreme Court, a Supreme 
Judicial Council and lower courts. The chief justice and the 
proeecuier general jnust be a mujtahid. Individual*^  right such 
as freedom of press, assembly, and expression are guaranteed 
with in the framewor* of the sharia (Islamic Law). In 1982 any 
portion of the law of monarchy that in the opinion of the 
supreme court did not confirm with Islamic law were declared 
null and void. 
The provinces (ostans) are subdivided into Counties 
(Shahrestan), districts (bakhshs) and villages (dehestans). 
Governor Generals for provinces and governors for Counties are 
nominated by Minister of Interior and appointed by the 
President. At each level there is a Council, and the Supreme 
Council of provinces is formed from representatives of the 
provincial councils. The Ministry of the Interiors appoints 
each city's mayor. Members of city council are locally 
elected. Villages are administered by a village master advised 
14 by elders . 
Constitution also provides presidential election after 
every four years. All the citizens who have acquired 16 year 
of age and entitle to vote. Constitution also provides the 
provision for referendum on important matters. Elections for 
14. New> EncyclO'f:>ed3.ia Bnitanics, oP'..c3.t:, P-854-62. 
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the post of president and members of legislature are held on 
party lines. Parties nominate their representative. The most 
influential party Is Islamic Republican party. The MuslJro 
Peoples Party which had popularity earlier gradually has lost 
its influence after 1981. Similarly other parties IJke Tudeh 
party (communist). Mujahideene Khalq Party and the Democratic 
Party of Iranian Kurdistan had also last their influence. 
At all level of government religious scholars or Ulemas 
exercise a great deal of influence either through directly 
participating in political process or due to their influence 
1 s 
over the public opinion . 
FOREIGN POLICY 
The Geographic location of Iran has always been an 
important factor influencing Iran's foreign policy. As a 
bridge between the south and the west Asia, between Russia and 
the gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and between Russia and the 
Arab World acquired Iran a significant economic and strategic 
position for centuries for traders, conquerors and defenders 
of imperial interests. The conflicting ambitions of Russia and 
the Ottoman Empires in Transcaucasia and North western Iran in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exerted remarkable 
influence on Iran's foreign policy. In post 1941 period the -
15. Ibid. 
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great power rivalry due to its geographic location continued 
to exert significant impact on Its foreign policy. 
In the beginning of twentieth century the discovery of 
Oil in commercial quantity in Iran further enhanced the 
strategic and economic importance of Iran for great power 
rivalry and created new problems for the policy makers. Jn 
early 1920's Oil concessions were offered to American oil 
companies in the hope of countering British and Russian 
pressures and securing financial aids from the United 
States.^^ 
Religion was a dominant factor in the foreign 
policy of Iran during the sixteenth and a part of the 
seventeenth century. As the time passed it was overshadowed 
by monarchial absolutism. Nevertheless, it continued to exert 
some influence on foreign policy in the nineteenth century 
particularly during the period of Fateh Ali Shah. Muslim 
Ulemas played an important role during the constitutional 
movement in Iran. However, the old age monarchy had always 
been the most important foreign policy making institution in 
16. Ramzani, R.K, The foreign piy.iicy of Ir^sn 3500-1940: A 
de\.^i-T'Jop-in9 Nation in the tJorlcf Affairs, University press of 
Virginia,Charlotteseville, 1966,P.301-2 
17. Ihid. , P.304 
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Iran ^^. 
The constitutional movement and the concept of 
Nationalism was the most significant factor influencing the 
foreign policy of Iran in the period from 1905 to 1941. One 
of the aims of constitutional movement was to eliminate the 
Anglo-Russian control. It was the constitutional movement 
that introduced the concept of National interest into the 
Iranian foreign policy. The policy makers since then started 
19 to think and speak m terms of national interest . 
Irredentism had also been a factor in the Iranian foreign 
policy during the last few centuries. The policy of 
irredentism caused many wars with small and big powers. 
Iranian claim on Georgia influence the two wars with Russia 
and its claim on Herat caused was with Afghanistan. The 
prolonged boundary dispute with Turkey, Russian and 
Afghanistan showed Iran's determination to recover its 3est 
territories. Irredentism was not a factor only for traditional 
policy makers but also in the modern time. Raza shah declared 
its claim on Bahrain Islands^ . Even in the post World War-TI 
period Iran continued its policy of irredentism and repeated 
its claim on Bahrain Islands. 
1 8 . Thid.. , P 3 0 4 - 5 . 
1 9 . Ibid,, 
2 0 . Tbid, , p . 306-7 
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The impact of glorious ancient civilization and an 
imperial past could be seen on Iran's foreign policy. The 
influence of perception, attitude and personal idiosyncrasies 
of individual policy makers could not be denied on Iran's 
foreign policy. Shah Ismails religious zeal. Nadir Shah's 
military ambitions and Raza Shah's abiding suspicion of 
foreign power had significant, bearing on Iran's foreign policy 
99 
at different stages . 
The Anglo Russian rivalry influenced the foreign poJicy 
of Iran before the World War-II. But the Anglo Russian 
"invasion" of Iran in 1941 brought a shift in the Iranian 
foreign policy and revised Iranian interest in United states 
as a counterweight to Soviet Union and Great Britain. The 
Soviet-American Cold War also influenced the Iranian foreign 
policy. The Cold War had a significant influence on 
Musaddiq's nationalization policy. But the cold war assisted 
the Shah's policy in 1950 and influenced the Shah's foreign 
policy of positive nationalism ^ . 
21. ihid., p.311-12, 
22.Ramzani, R.K. Irsn's F"ore.fi;rn r-^olicy 194.0-.t973 •- A s.tucty of 
For&i^n F'aiicy in r-fo.iJerni'.rim^ N&liorts, Univers i ty press of 
Virg in ia , C h a r l o t t e s e v i l l e , 1975, p. 439-40-
22.IMcf,, p . 4 4 1 . 
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The influence of political parties, groups, associations, 
lobbies or interest groups in the decision making of foreign 
policy of Iran was less seen before 1979. The shah was the 
sole and ultimate source affecting the decision of foreign 
policy. There was no interrelationship between the domestic 
politics and foreign policy for a long tjme. Although the 
impact of west particularly the United States was pervas.ive on 
Iran's foreign policy . 
FOREIGN POLICY IN RETROSPECT : 
Ever since the end of the World War-II the Iranian 
Foreign Policy reflects the transformation of power 
relationship in the Middle Eastern region and a shift in the 
international political environment as a whole. The impact of 
the major changes and developments in the Iranian political 
05 
system can be seen on the Iranian foreign policy . Since 
World War-II upto the out break of "Islamic Revo.lutjon", the 
Iranian foreign policy can be divided into five distinct 
phases : (a) the years of occupation (3941- J946); (b) Search 
for an Independent foreign policy (1946-1953); (c) Alliance 
24. Chubin, Shahram and Zabih, Sepehr, The- Foreign ReJ&tions of 
Ir'<i~fn. : A DeveJopIng Statf: in a Zone- of Sre&t Power 
Conflict, University of California Press, 3 974, p.18. 
25. Ibid. , p.l. 
with the west (1953-62) (d) Equidistance from the super powers 
(1963-J971) and {e)the quest for great power status (1972-77). 
The Anglo-Soviet occupation was a bitter experience for Iran 
and almost paralysed its independence. After the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from its territory Iran was bound to search for 
an independent foreign policy in the interest of the country. 
There were clashes of views regarding the foreign policy. Shah 
wanted to have close relation with the west as an obvious 
means to contain the Soviet Union, the Tudeh favoured alliance 
with Russia while the Musaddiq's national Front advocated to 
adopt the policy of Non-alignment. But after the downfall of 
Mussaddiq, Shah preferred to become close to the west. Shah's 
policy of alliance with West was actually motivated by its 
domestic situation because he wanted to contain National Front 
on one hand and Tudeh on other hand. By going into the western 
block shah was successful in getting military and economic aid 
from United states. Iran joined the Baghdad pact in 1955 which 
was later on renamed as CENTO and signed a bilateral security 
alliance with Washington on 5th march 1959^^. Article I of the 
bilateral security alliance says that "the imperial government 
of Iran is determine to resist aggression. In case 
26. Agwani, M.S. Foiitics in thf- Gu.lf, Vlkas Publishing house, 
New Delhi,1978, p.75-76. 
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of aggression against. Iran, the Government of the United 
States of American, in accordance with the constitution of the 
Untied states of America, will take such appropriate actJon 
including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed 
upon and as is envisaged in vToint Resolution to promotes Peace 
and Stability in Middle east in order to assist the Government 
27 
of Iran at its request . 
The Iranian alliance with west caused a deteriorating 
relation with Russia which was in the way of normalization 
after September 1962 when Russia assured Iran for not 
permitting any country to install missile base of any type on 
Iranian soil. Actually, from 1958 to 1962 Soviet government 
adopted different measures to pressurise the government of 
Iran to normalize their relations and prevent "Iran to go .into 
the Western block. In the beginning the principal aim of 
Russia was to prevent Iran to sign the bilateral agreement 
with United States in 1959. The Soviet Union considered the 
agreement as a "potential threat" to its security and Iran-
Soviet relations. However, Iranian leadership viewed it as a 
necessary supplement to Baghdad pact. But with the exchange of 
notes between government of Iran and Soviet Union in 1962 in 
which Iranian government requested for not allowing any 
27. ArtIcJe-l\ of th'e J939 A&reefnent. 
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foreign missile base on Iranian territory and Russian 
acceptance of Iranian demand, a "turning point"came in Iran-
Soviet reactions and these exchange of notes constituted a 
water-shed in postwar Iran-Soviet relations . The Shah had a 
long desire to establish a steel mill in Iran. In th.is 
direction long discussion was held with Western companies 
particularly with west Germany and United States but without 
any success. Shah wanted a steel mill in Iran as early as 
possible for political and prestige purposes. The Soviet 
sensed the opportunity and offered to help Iran to establish a 
steel mill in Iran. In the summer of 1965 when Shah visited 
Moscow a final agreement was signed to build an iron and steel 
complex at Isfahan, a machine factory plant and a gaspipe line 
to Soviet territory with Soviet assistance. In exchange Iran 
was to repay Soviet Union industrial goods. According to the 
conditions of agreements annually a seven billion cubic metres 
of gas beginning from 1975 to 1985 was to supply to Soviet 
Union by Iran^ . 
The relations between Tehran and Moscow were friendly 
with few exceptions from 1962 upto late 1977. During this 
period a number of trade and economic agreements were signed -
2 8 . Chi:bin and Z a b i n , 7"/7<? Ford-ign Rel&^tions of Ira-n o):>..cit, p . 4 7 - 5 0 
2 9 . Ibi<J., P . 8 0 - 8 1 
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between the two governments. In October 1976$ 550 million arms 
deal was signed between Soviet Union and Iran which includes 
the sale of tank-transporters armoured personnel carriers and 
SAM-7 missiles. On 2nd December 1976 a protocol of economic 
cooperation was signed between the two governments. Shortly 
afterwards, on 15 December 1976, Iran and Soviet Union signed 
a technical agreement, providing for mutual co-operation in the 
fields of science and higher education agriculture, forestry 
and environment protection. But on the other hand Iran reacted 
sharply on the secret $ 400millaon arms deal signed between 
Soviet Union and Iraq on 17 August 1976. Tehran also suspected 
that MOSCOW had encouraged Libya and the Peoples Democratic 
Republic of Yaroan in their forceful attack on Iran at the 5th 
summit conference of Non alignment at Colombo in August 3 976 
30 
Although Iran officially described its r elations with 
Soviet Union as excellent but it was deeply worried about the 
expansion of soviet influence in the region. The main issues 
of Iranian concerns were the massive purchase of soviet 
weapons by Iraq, the coup in Afghanistan the soviet nava.l 
activity in the Indian Ocean, the coup in PDRY in which the 
* In the 5th Summit Conference of NAM Qaddafi accused Iran of 
acting as a"proxy of Imperialism". 
30. r'lidrne f'^ast Cont-einpora,-y Survey, 1976-77, p.390-91. 
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"Marxist hard liners" succeeded. Apart from, all these 
distrust the day to day contacts between MOSCOW and Tehran 
proceeded smoothly. In April 1978 an agreement was also signed 
between the two governments for economic and technical 
cooperation , 
The process of de-tente', the Sino-Soviet rift, the Indo-
pak war of 1965 and the gradual diminution in the economic and 
military aid of United States were the other factors compelled 
Iran to adopt a policy of equidistance from both the super 
powers. The another cause was the Iran's growing economic 
strength during the 1960's. Thus the old ties with the United 
States was balanced by a wide ranging economic and trade 
relations with Soviet Union and other east European 
countries . 
Since the early 1970's Iran made shift in its policy of 
confining its relations with super powers and moved to develop 
friendship with all countries through out the world 
irrespective of geographical location, ideology and alignment. 
Iran developed its relations with India, China, Fgypt, Japan, 
France and Indonesia, Afghanistan and Australia . Shah also 
3 1 . /licMle East Corttemr'orany Survey. 
32. Agwani, PoJ.it-Ics in tht:- Suif c-i.^ciW p.17 
33. Ibid... p . 78 
27 
gave considerable importance to improve relations with East 
European countries as witnessed by his visit to Rumania and 
Czechoslovakia m 1977, and Bulgaria m 1978 ^ . 
Traditionally Iran's foreign policy had two major 
issues national and regional security commitments with a 
strongly western orientations. Iran had always advocated for 
higher oil prices. However, Shah faced problem when at the end 
of 1976, strong fortes in Washinton reacted against Shah's 
policy of higher oil-^ t^ rices and questioned the unlimited 
support to Shah's defence programme . Then Shah and his 
Government made several adjustments in their policy to restore 
the relations with VlS. and gain the confidence of the 
Carter's administration. In this direction the first major 
move was shah's commitment to improve Iran's human right 
record and-^  to create* a more liberal political cJimate. 
Secondly Iran cut its military budget for 1976-77 and withdraw 
from Oman. Thirdly Iiian moderated its oil policy. The U.S. 
secretary of state *CY'rus Vance visited Tehran in May 1977 to 
attend the meeting of the CENTO ministerial counciJ. In July 
1977 Shah sent the Empress to Washington to meet the President 
and his wife and in -November of the same year Shah visited 
34 , fUdd-ie E'ust Con^'^nk-u^rary Sur-vey, 1977-78 , p p . 5 0 0 - 5 0 1 
3 5 . Middle East Cont^rrftyorsr^y Survey, 1976-77 , p . 3 8 9 . 
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Washington . During his visit Shah tried to obtain a firm 
U.S. commitments to Iran's security. Referring to the 1959 
Agreement on Defence Co-operation he said that "we have a 
crucial bilateral agreement which stipulates that, after 
consultation, the US is obliged to come to our assistance If 
(we are) attacked by a communist or communist insp.ired 
country." Shah was reported to ask for 140 F-16A fighter, 
three additional radar plane of AJrborne warning and control 
system additional radar plane of Airborne warning and control 
system (AWACS) type, a number of naval patro3 craft and 3.1 F-
4G fighters fitted with electronic war fare equipments. He 
also requested for technical assistance in operating the 
American arms already present in Iran. Shah also repeated his 
demand of the F-18L which was not available even to the US 
17 
armed forced at that time . 
In return shah promjsed to try to keep oil prices down 
in order "to show sympathy and comprehension" of American 
views. Iran was regarded as the largest individual overseas 
purchaser of US arms. During the fiscal year (Oct. 1, 1976 -
Sept. 30, 1977) it had accounted for an estimated $5,500 
million of the $11,300 million foreign sales of weapons by 
3 6 . Ibid. 
3 7 . Middle East Coat&mr-'ora-r^y Su,-ver, 1 9 7 7 - 7 8 , p . 498, 
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U.S. firms, and since J972 Iran's total purchase of U.S. 
weaponry had amounted more than $18,000 million^ . But at the 
end it was reported that no definite decision was taken 
regarding the arms sales because congress requested for 
further studies on the balance of power in the persian Gulf. 
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On November 16 President Carter declared that he and shah 
bad discussed about almost every conceivable subject including 
human rights . "And reaffirmed U.S. support for a "strong 
Iran" and assured that: "Iran's security is a matter of 
highest priority" for the United States, he declared that it 
remained U.S. policy to "cooperate with Iran in its economic 
and social development programmes" and to continue the talks 
that it had met Iran's security needs". He described the talks 
that it has "solidified our strong ties of friendship and 
41 
military responsibilities . 
The Iranian media described that talks as a "trade-off" 
of U.S. arms against Iranian oil policy. On December 31, 
1977 President Carter visited Tehran where he was given a warm 
3 8 . Kees.inffs Conteff!i:.-orm-y Ar-chis.'^es, March 24. 1978, pp .? .88-94 
3 9 . Middle- Fast Contemf^orar-y SiM-vey. 1 9 7 7 - 7 8 , p . 4 9 9 . 
4 0 . !i?id. 
4 1 . Keesin^'s C-ant^^por-ary Arcti.tWe:i', March 24, 1978, p . 2 8 8 - 9 4 , 
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welcome. Talks were held between the two heads of states which 
was described by the Tehran Radio on December 31 that Shah and 
U.S. President will "continue the dialogue they opened in 
Washington last month and to review major developments on the 
international scene since the Washington meeting." The 
President reaffirms his country's commitment to Iran's 
military defence. They also resume discussion on Shah's 
decision to freeze oil prices in 1978. In connection of Iran's 
nuclear energy programme and the supply, U.S. was satisfied 
with the conditions, by assuring that it wi.ll abide by the 
nuclear non - proliferation regulations 42 However, the 
Iranian demand of F-4G aircraft with electronic warfare 
equipment was finally turned down by U.S. state department in 
August 1978^^ 
TOWARDS A NEW FOREIGN POLICY: 
After the proclamation of Islamic Republic, Imam 
Khomeini declared the basic principle of Iran's foreign policy 
which were reflected in the new constitution of Iran approved 
by the constitutional assembly on 15 November 1979. The new 
foreign policy is based on the preservation of freedom. 
42. Ayatollah Khomeini, Jslmnic Government op.clt.. pp.40-41 
43 . Ibid. 
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independence and interest of Islam and Muslims, opposition to 
all kind and form of foreign interventions in the destiny of 
other nations, opposition to be aliened with Eastern or 
Western blocs, support to all the liberation movements of the 
world and maintaining good and friendly relations with aJl the 
44 
countries of the world . 
Article 152 to 155 of the constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Iran deals with the principles of the Foreign 
Policy, which are as follows: 
The foreign Policy of the IsJamic Republic of Iran is 
based on negation of all form of domination or submission, 
preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of 
all the countries, defending the rights of all Muslims, Non-
alignment and mutual peaceful relations with non-belligerent 
states. (Article 152). 
"Conclusion of any contract involving foreign 
domination over the natural and economic resources, the 
culture, the army and other domains of nation is forbidden." 
(Article 153). 
"The Islamic Republic of Iran aspires for the happiness 
of human being within the community of manltind and recognizes 
44. Li€tht of the f>ath, Sf- Je^cte-d messages of Immm Khomeini, The 
External Liaison section of the Central office of Jihad-e-
Sazandegi,Iran, 1982. pp-81-84. 
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independence, freedom and the rule of justice as universal 
rights to be enjoyed by all people of the world. Accordingly, 
while refraining from all interference in domestic affairs of 
other nations, the Islamic Republic shall support any rightful 
struggle of deprived peoples against the oppressing classes 
anywhere on the face of the earth". (Article 154) 
The Islamic Republic of Iran may grant political asylum 
to individuals seeding refuge in Iran, excepting those who are 
recognized to be traitors and criminals according to the laws 
of Iran". (Article 155)*^ 
After the change of government and leadership in Iran 
in 1979, Iran adopted the principles and objectives in its 
foreign policy mostly in tune with the third world countries 
and the developing world. In the beginning it was confronted 
with certain problems in the formulation and implementation 
of the new foreign policy decisions mainly due to the 
difference of opinions among the leaders. For two years and 
two months after the revolution the foreign ministry was in 
the hands of four minjsters who were either nationalist or 
western liberals. It was natural that such ministers did not 
initiate any change or transformation which was necessary for 
a revolutions of an Islamic nature, either in the Ministry 
itself or in the embassies of Iran abroad.46 
45. Com. t i tut ion at th^ Isie^mi'. Rer^ublic of I/~«??n, ryp.rit. 
46. Mash Muhajeri, l^l^fttn'c Re'K•'^•ylut jion Future P&th<i .of the 
Nat Son . The external Liaison section of the central office 
of Jihad-e- Sazandegi, Tehran, 1982. 
CHAPTER - H 
POLICY OF "NEITHER EAST HOH WEST*: 
RESPONSE TO SUPERPOWERS DOMINATION 
CHAPTER - II 
Policy of "Neither Bast Nor West": Response to Superpowers 
Domination 
Soon after the proclamation of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Imam Khomeini declared that Iran would adopt a policy of 
"Neither East Nor West." In his first speech after the 
referendum which proclaimed Iran as an Ts.lamic Republic on 
3rd April 1979 he urged upon the newly formed government of 
Iran to work without the fear of the Fast or the West, with 
independence of will and thought in order to clean out the 
remains of the 'tyrannical regime' of the Shah." 
Khomeini's policy of 'Neither Fast Nor west' was not only 
the foreign policy perspective of Iran but a well planned 
propaganda campaign against the domination of the superpowers 
and an invitation to the Muslim countries and the countries of 
the third worJd to join his crusade against the superpowers 
hagemony. The underlying features of his campaign was against 
potential Superpower's threat to Islam and Muslim world. 
1. Se.i€••€tfi-d tlesseiges- and 5pe€Ci^e5 of Imsm Khomeini, The 
Ministry of National Guidance, Tehran, Iran, (Year of 
Publication not mentioned) p-4. 
2. luiiSffi Khomeini's Views on the Super-flowers, compiled, 
translated and edited by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 
Pub. by the Third Anniversary of the Victory of Islamic 
Revolution, Tehran, 1982, p-3. 
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The Imam Khomeini's poJJcy of "Neithei East nor 
West" was the natura] repercussion of the prevailing super 
power domination and Iran's long experience with TmeriaJism. 
Khomeini came to power at a tame when most of the countries of 
the world were either under the domination of one super power 
or another. Khomeina realised that one of the most determental 
plans of superpowers was to create differences among the 
friendly countries inorder to fulfill their vested political 
and economics interests. Thus Khomeini declared the negation 
of all types of domination amd advocated unity of the muslim 
countries and people as one of the basic principle and 
objectives of Iran's foreign policy". 
Khomeini described his policy of 'Neither East Nor West' 
as a policy of true non alignment. In a message to Hajj 
pilgrimage he said, that the slogan of "Neither East nor West" 
the principal motto of Islamic Revolution, staged in tJie 
midst of the world of the hungary and the oppressed - outline 
the policy of true non-alignment, a policy that would be 
accepted by all Islamic coinitries and other countries those 
believe in humanity. He was determined to follow the policy 
and urged the Islamic countries and the Muslims of the world 
not to rely either on the West, represented by Europe and 
3. Thirf. 
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America or on the Fast represented by the U.R.S.R. 
To gjve practjca] shape to the policy of 'Neither East 
nor West" soon after Khomeini's takeover in February 1979 Iran 
was proclaimed a non - aligned country. The first foreigij 
minister of the nev regime, Karim Sanjabi annuimced that "Iran 
must rem<iin non-aligned and take up a nputral stand" betwcfm 
East-West conflict. As a part of its policy of non-alignment 
Iran announced its withdrawal from CENTO on 12 March 1979. In 
June Iran formally applied for the memb«=rship of the non-
aligned movement, which was accepted. However, there was somp 
difference of opinion between Khomeini and some members of 
cabinet while interpreting the meaning of non-alignment. For 
Khomeini non-alignment means ending all dependence on great 
powers but to make Iran strong enough to lay down its own 
rules and conditions in its relation with them. To Razargan, 
Sanjabi and ya7adi it meant adequate relationi/ with both the 
superpowers in order to gain more benefits for Iran from both 
the powers. ' 
Ahmed Azizi, Under secretary in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Iran said that in establishing relations with other 
4. The Manifesto of the Islamic Revolution, Imam al-
Khomeini's Message to the Hajj Pilgrims (July 28, 1987), 
.A}~7^~,wt..-^f, Vol.V, No.l, p. 59. 
5. t"U>'-'Kne Fa^t Contei!,t-or..s > 'i-urv^.y, 1978-79, p.533. 
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rounlries, ejipecialJy jn economjcs fieJd, the government of 
the Islamic RepubJir of Iran would give priorily to those who 
do not have ties with the superpowers nor do they intend to 
impose their economic or political views on Iran. But on the 
other hand A?!?! justified the economic ties with the Eastern 
b]oc describing them rational and reasonable. He said that in 
the long run and through the transfer of technology from these 
states Iran will be able to achieve self sufficiency in the 
economic field. He announced three criterion as a basis for 
economic relationswith other countries: (a) lesser ties with 
super powers and independence, (b) non-intervention in 
political and economic sphere, (c) the Islamic Republic will 
import the quantities on the same amount at which Iran imports 
from them. 
Ali KhameinijPresident of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
urged the Non-aligned Nations to refrain themselves from the 
influence of the superpowers. He said that Iran joined the 
non-aligned movement because Non-alignment and opposition to 
world expansionism and domination has been one of its basic 
principles. The then Majlis speaker and temporary leader of 
the Friday congregational prayers of Tehran,Hashemi Rafsanjani 
said in his speech that if the non-aligned countries are 
6. f^..,yhs-\n Jnterr,.^f j'l ^n^?, Tehran, August 18, 1981. 
truly non-aligned, they should be able of out-maneuvering the 
few countrJes havjng veto power. He aJso accused the super 
poweis for infiltration into the movement as a part of their 
7 
expansive policies. 
The Prime -Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mr. 
Husaain Mussavi urged that the Non-aligned movement should 
adopt an uncompromising approach to the reactionary wor.ld 
powers and to the government's dependence on either of the 
two superpowers otherwise the movement would degenerate into a 
mere forum liKe the United Nations.Pronouncing the role of 
Ii~an as a non-aligned country he said that most of the non-
aligned countries are against the world oppression and Iran 
had served as a model for oppressed nations. He emphasised 
that the non-aligned movement was created in response to the 
expectation of oppressed. But unfortunately it fell short of 
fulfilling its aims. In certain instances the movement had 
adopted Western and Eastern out looks and political views. It 
is therefore a responsibility on Iran to make her presence 
felt within the movement as an example for the oppressed 
nation of the world. In his opinion the non-aligned movement 
had fallen short of standing fiercely against world oppression 
and of cutting off the shackles of dependence. And this was 
7. A.-.y/i.-vv lr,,'erti.it3^.'naJ, March 5, 1983. 
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mainly because of the limited scope of jts sJogan. 
Imam Khomeini in a speech on 14 March 1983 said that 
first and foremost task of the non-aJigned movement should be 
to sweep out those of the members who were reaJly aligned or 
sympathetic with any of the superpowers. He said while the 
founding members of the movements were truly non-aligned and 
committed to the welfare of their own nations but the movement 
has some impurities and it has to cope from it. 
In his speech in the 42nd session of the United Nations 
Genera] Assembly on September 22, ]987. The then President of 
Iran Hojjatolislam Sayyied Ali KhameJnJ said that non-reliance 
on either of the power bloc was 'exceptional characteristic' 
of the Iranian revolution and 'fundamental policy' of the 
revolutionary system'. He said that generally it is believed 
that no political movement can survive in contemporary world 
without reliance on any of the power bloc but Iranian 
revolution had offered a new philosophy and followed it most 
faithfully. Revolution had proved that imperialist power could 
be ignored that their bullying tactics should be resisted and 
their black mailing might not be effective, provided that 
8. hoyhi-n 2nf-ert,^t2^jna(. Tehran, Macb 5, 1983. 
9. K^Yhc^n Intct-nal ion,^>}, Tehran, March 14, 1983 
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there was belief in a power much powerful than all material 
power and that, was belief in God Almighty. 
IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES 
After the over throw of Mussaddiq and restalation of Raza 
Shah Pahelvi in 1953 as the monarch of Iran with American 
help, United States continued to dominate over the decision 
maKing of the government and over the economy and politics of 
Iran till the establishment of the Islamic Republic. 
Following the overthrow of Mussaddiq, the U. S. state 
department seriously considered taking over the management of 
Iranian oil. This move disturbed the Britishers and they 
protested vehemently. Finally the state department, working 
closely with Torkild Reiber, a former oil executive, decided 
not to disturb the oil nationalisation law and the National 
Iranian Oil Company and the rights of the management of 
Iranian oil was given to Consortium of Western oil companies 
for the next forty years. Its shares were divided as the AIOC, 
40 percent; Royal Dutch Shell, 14 per cent; five us oil 
companies (Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Social and Texaco), 8 percent 
each; and Companies Francaise des petroles, 6 percent. The new 
oil agreement between the NIOC and the consortium was signed -
10. President Khameini's Address to the 42nd Session of the 
U.N. General Assembly on September 22, 1987, 
AO 
in Augiist 1954 which was approved by the Iranian parJiament in 
October 1954.-^ "^  
Washington extend generous aid to Iran worth $ 45 million 
in September 1953. Soon after the agreement with the Western 
Oil Consortium, was signed this American aid was enhanced. 
Between September 1953 and December 1956, United State 
provided $280 million economic and $134 million military 
assistance to Iran. By the spring of 1959 America was involved 
in every aspect of Iranian life except religion. The US. 
embassy in Tehran was as important a power centre as the 
Shah's Palace.-^ ^ 
With John Kennedy coming into power jn Janijary .1963 , 
American interference in Iran 's domestic affairs grew. 
Kennedy sent a letter to the Shah advising him to tackJe 
corruption in the royal family and his personal entourage, and 
initiate socio-economic reform. Shah appointed Alj Amini as 
prime minister in 1961 under American pressure while 
persona]ly he did not like Amjnj. Right of franchise to women 
and agrarian reforms were adopted under American pressure. The 
referendum in support of the White Revolution in January 3 963 
pleased the US administration. Kennedy congratulated the Shah 
11. Dilip Hiro, ir^h-i Uncfer AyatnyUBh, Routledge & Kegan Pau3 , 
London, 1987, pp.300-315. 
12 . I bib'. 
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on the result. Iran's reJation with America became a subject 
of public debate in the summer of 1964 when a bill granting 
diplomatic immunity to all US citizens working on military 
projects in Iran was presented in the Majlis. Shah's 
dependence on U. S. and American interference in Iran can be 
Judged by this that the proposed bill was to be passed before 
Washington granted Tehran a $200 million loan to purchase 
American weapons. 
In June 1969 President Richard Nixon enunciated a 
doctrine which clearly favoured the Shah 's arms build-up. 
After the failure of direct U. S. military invo]vement in 
South Vietnam, the Nixon administration decided to increase 
its military and economic aid to its third world allies in 
order to bolster their fighting forces. Under this scheme Iran 
continued to occupy the pre-eminent position in receiving 
American aid. Between 1953 and 1969 it had received as much U. 
S. military assistance in grants as all other countries 
combined. By the end of 1971 Shah was preoccupied with 
military and foreign affairs and wanted to fill the vacuum 
created by the British withdrawal from the Gulf by late 1971. 
In this he had the backing of US. As soon as the British 
announced their intention in January 1968 to leave the Gulf by 
13. Ibio'. 
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December 1971, the Shah renewed the 150-year-old Iranian 
claim of sovereignty over Bahrain. Just before the United Arab 
Emirates was to declared independent in December 1971, the 
Shah claimed the ownership of the Islands at the mouth of the 
Gulf: Abu Musa, Little Tunb and Great Tunb. Abu Musa was 
administered by the principality of Sharjah, and the two 
Tunbs by Ras-al-Khaima. British helped the Shah to take 
possession of Abu Musa and it was decided that Shah wouJd pay 
$1.5 million annually to Sharjah ruler. In November Iranian 
forces occupied the Little Tunb, and captured Big Tunb after 
some fighting. Here also Britain extended its cooperation with 
the 'policeman of the Gulf, openly declaring that he would 
not tolerate any revolution on the Arab side of the Gulf. In 
the words of James Nuyes, US assistant secretary of defence, 
Iran was 'the most determined and best equipped state in the 
Gulf to assert leadership. 
Little wonder that, during his visit to Tehran in May 
1972, Nixon promised the Shah that he could buy any non-
nuclear weapons he wanted. Nixon also assured that the U. S. 
would train Iranians in the use and maintenance of these 
weapons. United States also backed Shah in crushing the 
Kurdish insurgency in Iraq, which had just concluded a 
14. nyid. 
friendship treaty with Moscow. American arms sales to Iran 
increased eightfold in two years : from $519 million in 1972 
to $4,373 million in 1974. 
Personal relations between Muhammed Reza Pahelvj and 
Richard Nixon were excellent. They had been friends since the 
first Eisenhower administration, when Nixon was Vice-President 
and Shah of Iran provoked the CIA to setup two electronic 
surveillance stations in north Iran to eavesdrop on the 
communications traffic of Iran's neighbour - including the 
southern republics of the USSR containing Soviet testing sites 
of missiles and other weapons. In return America permitted 
SAVAK (Iranian Intelligence Agency) to operate in United 
States to monitor the activities of tens of thousands of 
Iranian students and exiles. Direct links between the CIA and 
Savak developed to the point that in 1972 the CIA was annually 
training 400 Savak agents at its headquarters in Lengley, 
Virginia. 
Soon after being re- elected President in November 1972, 
Nixon appointed Richard Helms, a career intelligence officer 
and CIA director, as the ambassador to Tehran. Also the CIA's 
Middle East headquarters was moved from Cyprus to Tehran- With 
15. TbU-A 
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this move intelligence IJnks between Tehran and Washington 
became more closer than before. Iran also established an 
escape route for Soviet defectors wishing to flee to the 
West.^^ 
Among those who had a full understanding of Iran 's value 
to the West was Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser to 
President Nixon from January 1969 to September 3 973, and then 
U.S. secretary of state. Nixon 's resignation in the wake of 
the Watergate scandal made no difference to Us-Tran ties. 
Continuation of Kissinger as Secretary of State under 
President Gerald Ford maintained the Washington - Tehran 
relations on the same manner as before. Intelligence link 
between two were so close that on every Saturday morning the 
Shah had a two - hour meeting with the CIA station chief in 
1 7 Tehran. 
AFTER REVOLUTION 
Ayatollah Khomeini adopted a tough attitude towards 
western bloc and specially with the United States in 
establishing relations with them. In the Later period of 1978 
Imam Khomeini started to outline the future foreign policy 
from France. He issued threats to all the countries who were 
16. Jhi.-i. 
17. Ibid. 
supporting Shah against the movement. From the beginning the 
primary target was the United States and other western 
countries. In mid December 1978 he said to a western 
correspondent that "if any country openly support, the Shah, 
we will not supply them any more oil." In January 1979 when he 
was more assure of his victory he said "if the US government 
stops interfering in our affairs we will act 
accordingly^ . 
In the beginning United States supported shah against the 
revolution but as soon as U.S. was assured of Shah's defeat, 
it liberalized its policy. On vTamiary 17, 1979 President 
Carter clarified his position saying that the U.S. had "no 
intention for ability nor desire" to interfere in the internal 
affairs of Iran and hoped for the maintenance of past friendly 
19 
relation with Iran . By the time such type of appeals had 
lost its impacts. Imam Khomeini blamed U.S. technical and 
military advisors as lackeys of the Shah and threatened to 
America and its allies that he would "cut the hands" of their 
Of) 
influence over Iran oil . 
18. r-HdJIe i£^st Con^ emf'-yrar y Suf vey. 1978-79, <.^/-.rIt. p.534. 
19. H7ndij';i-an TiriK^s. New Delhi, 19 January 1979. 
20. rndiK,n rxpr^.s<^, New Delhi 6 February 1979. 
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On 12 February 3 979, President Carter proclaimed in a 
press conference that Washington wouJd always Jike to work 
21 
closely with the existing government of Iran ' . While United 
states continued to support the Shah appointed prime-minister 
Sbahpour Bakhhiar it also tried to establish closer ties with 
revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini, But Ayatollah 
Khomeini was determined not to have any relation with 
Washington and Mascow and also clarified that he will not 
22 
allow any military installation in Iran by super power 
However the carter's offer of cooperating with the new 
government of Iran was well received by the new Government of 
Mahdi " Bazargan who said in an interview on February 19, 
1979 that Iran hoped to resume producing oil and exporting its 
to all parts of the world including the united states. He 
also expressed the hope to maintain good relations.with united 
states and apologised to the U.S. ambassador William Sullivan 
for the attack on the American Embassy at Tehran by leftist 
gorillas and said that people responsible were not their 
21. Dilip Hiro, 7"/^ "^-/ u,->^^er the Avt ^'J JrJ.'s, nr- clt , p.317. 
22. The Hindi,', Madras 12, February 1979. 
23. Khomeini appointed Mahdi Bazargan as prime-minister on 5 
February, 1979. 
24. HindNstrm Time-i, 15 February 1979. 
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2f> men. 
In ApriJ 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini charged U.S. for 
interfering in the internal matters of Iran. But the U.S. 
State department spokesman rejected this charge saying that 
"we emphatically reject any suggestion that we have anything 
to do with events inside Iran". The state department 
spokesman Hadding Carter further said that we had made jt 
clear from the beginning that 'we did not intend to Involves 
ourselves in those affairs and hoped that other will do the 
same"^ '^ . 
On 17th May 1979 U.S. senate criticised and condemned the 
execution in Iran^ and warned, Iran that the relations 
between two would suffer if Iranian authorities continued to 
o ft 
execute political prisoners . The U.S. senate warning was 
taken very seriously by Iran, Iran urged, Washington to delay 
in sending its new Ambassador to Tehran. Khomeini caJled the 
29 government of United States "a wounded and defeated snake" ". 
For Iranian leader the U.S. threat of breaking relation was 
2 5 . 'itte tiinriK', Madras, 20 February, 1979 . 
2 6 . Ceyh-in l>c^i].- Ntw^, 20 Apr i l 1979 . 
27 . D i l i p Hiro If f=^n undt,- f/*r A, ^toUat,, or- rif, p . 3 1 7 . 
28 . /i/»t >, <_->/" InfJia, New D e l h i 21 May 1929 . 
29 . mt^.rne'norh.l Htral-J Tribu,-,t, 21 May 1979 . 
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not too important as they regarded the relationship between 
two as "one between an oppressor and an oppressed, between a 
plunder and vjctjm of plunder", "we know that the Iranian 
leadership regarded the U.S. reaction as natural because the 
United States was the country which suffered most from the 
TO Iranian revolution. While Khomeini adopted a very hostjJe 
attitude toward United States his Foreign Minister Dr. Ibrahim 
Yazdi adopted a liberal view and urged to limit the 
deteriorating relation between the two countries. He said in a 
press conference, that Iran drew a distinction between "the 
Zionist faction in the U.S. senate and the U.S. government." 
He said that this faction did not represent the people of 
United States.*^  
In the mean time the situation became further worsened 
when Iranian government turned down the appointment of Walter 
Cutler as new U.S. ambassador to Tehran saying that he has a 
"bad record" as envoy to Zaire. Consequently the diplomatic 
representation between the two were lowered to that of r/.-,-o/ 
d\^ff<.-i'rt=-^ as Washington refused to name a new ambassador and 
in ear]y June 1979 Bruce Laingen took the charge of the U.S. 
rhsr%}f rt'rifirArf 'v in Tehran which was accepted by Bazargan 
30. Khomeini's speech cited in the Um( ^^ of Inr^ic-i N. Delhi, ?.l 
May 3 979. 
31. 7im(--^ of India, New Delhi 22 May J 979. 
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government. However in the deterioratjng situation Ibrahim 
Yazdi in Tehran and his son-in-Jaw Rouhani in Washington tried 
to normalise the relation with America and got a little 
success. The staff of the U.S. embassy was raised from record 
low of forty to seventy. The ban of American Embassy Committee 
was lifted in September 1979. But the situation worsened 
dramatically when on 22 October shah was allowed to come to 
America. On 1 november 1979 three Jnillion people marched in 
Iran demanding the extradition of shah from the United 
33 States. 
HOSTAGE CRISIS 
The relations between United States and Iran entered 
into the new peak of bitterness with the seizure of American 
Embassy is Tehran on November 4, 1979. The student who 
captured the American Embassy and made about 60 Americans as 
hostages, demanded the return of the deposed Shah from New 
35 York. On the next day of the seizure of the embassy Iranian 
government abrogated the treaty of 1959 with United States and 
32 . CeyJon r.>/?iJy N'-'-ws, 7 June 1979. 
33 . D i l i p Hiro Im/n under tht- AysdoJ U-^h on.c:it, p . 318 
34 . Ibi\d. 
3 5 . Hinc^ustsn T.i.>r7e3, Ne.is D e l h i , 5 November 1979 . 
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two articles of a treaty wjth Soviet Union that theoretically 
give the Super Powers the right to intervene militarily in 
Iran. However in Washington the officials said, that the 1959 
Treaty of Friendship while significant in a symbolic manner, 
was not regarded as an important pact and would not by itself 
affect the relations between the two countries. The State 
Department refused the demand to return the Shah and expressed 
the hope that the government of Iran would release the 
Americans and return the embassy. 
On 8 November 1979 imam Khomeini justified the seizure 
of the American embassy. In reply to a message from pope he 
said that the 35 million people of this country (Iran) were 
subjected to U.S. imperialism. They were massacred, imprisoned 
and tortured in jails in the most inhumane manner" Thus he 
described the occupation of embassy as a natural repercussions 
of the people and called the American embassy as "den of 
spies" He blamed the embassy for involving in acts of 
espionage against the peoples avc\ countries of the region ~ . 
On 9 Novermber 1979 United States inform the Security 
Council about the occupation of the America Rmbassy in Tehran 
3 6 . Internaf innBl He-naJd Trii-'une-, November 6, 1 9 7 9 . 
37 . Im^-Mn Kh'-'Wd nni .-nd NoV''ti-.h^r 4.tti (A'-'.->n ••''>), Council for t h e 
c e l e b r a t i o n of the fourth Anniversary of t h e V i c t o r y of 
the I s l a m i c R e v o l u t i o n Tehran, (year not m e n t i o n e d ) , p - 7 , 8 , 
and requested the Council to urgently consider the issue to 
secure the reJease of the diplomatic personnel being held and 
to restore the sanctity of diplomatic personnel and 
establishments." 
On 13 November 1979, Dr. Abol Hassen BaniSader sent a 
letter to U.N. Secretory General describing the position of 
Iran he said that the country from the iroup d'est at of 1953 
until the fall of the Shah's regime was directly under the 
domination of the United States, in political, social, and 
39 
economic field^  . He complained to the U.N. thafin the Unated 
States Iranian were being attacked and arrested and most 
probably they might be expelled. The Iranians In US were also 
the targets of aggression. On the other hand United States 
Government, was not taking any step to put an end to such 
actions but was preparing to take military and economic 
measures against Iran. Then he reqiiested the Secretary General 
that in these circumstances it would be his duty to use his 
good offices with the United States authorities to induce them 
38.Letter Dated 9 November 1979 from the Permanent 
Representative of the United States of American to the 
United Nations. Addressed to the President of the security 
council, UNSC Documents S/13635, 9 November 1979. 
39.Letter dated 13 November 1979 from His Excellency Dr. Abol 
Hasan BamiSadr, in change of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General, UNSC, 
Documents, S/1362f>, 13 November 1979. 
to accede to the legitimate request of the peopJe, 
He expressed two desires : -(J) that the united states 
Government should at least recognize an examination of the 
guilt of the former Shah and the consequences it may produce; 
(2) that the property and funds belonging to the Shah and 
members of the former regime which were at that time living in 
40 the United States should be returned to Iran. 
On November 12 President Carter ordered to stop to all 
further U.S. imports of Iranian oil. In response a 
representative of Ayatollah Khomeini said that Iran had 
already decided to ban further exports of oil to the United 
States. •*•* 
On November 14, 15>79 President Carter froze all assets 
of the government of Iran in the United States and under the 
control of United States banks, business and individual out 
side the United States. That action deprived Iran of the use 
of more than $ 12 billion bank deposits, gold and other 
property President Carter also ordered to cut off all 
transaction with Iran, More than that United States asked 
United Nation's Security Council to impose sanction on Iran. 
But the proposed United Nations sanction was vetoed by Soviet 
4 0 . ihld. 
4 1 . Statesman^New Delh i , 14 November 1979. 
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Union in January 1980, 
This was the first economic sanction by U.S. and the 
largest blocking of assets in U.S. history. However while US 
imposed the sanction successfully, it threatened the other 
countries such as Saudi Arabia to invest and deposit money in 
U.S. banks and raised the question of law and policy. The 
unique feature of blocking was that it included more than $5.6 
billion of deposits and securities held at overseas branches 
of U.S. banks. Thus the freezing of Iranian assets raised 
important issues involving the extra-territorial effect of 
U.S. laws and interference with the international banking 
system. 
On 15 Nov. 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini said in a message 
that It was up to the school students, university people and 
the theological students to extend the full force of their 
attack against America and Israel to force America to 
extradite the Shah . 
On 15 Nov. Abol Hassan BaniSadr announced to free all 
the women and black hostages. Ayatollah Khomeini aJso 
directed the students who occupied the Iranian Embassy to hand 
over the women and blacks to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in 
42.Robert Careswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iran 
Experience, For-t-^ign 4f fa.fr.?;^ winter 198]-8;^ , P-247. • '. 
43.Amrit Bazar Patrika,16 November 1979. 
44. SZ-^/.^'.^m^'n. New Delhi, 16 November 1979. 
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order to release them immediately. But he warned the United 
States that, the Iranian nations would not allow the other 
hostages to be release unless the U.S. government meets the 
Iran-ian request. The announcement by the students leaders 
who had been occupied American Embassy that after freeing 
women and black hostages they would put on trial the rest, 
cause concerned at Washington. Meanwhile the Iran's ruling 
Revolutionary Council threatened to break the relations with 
United States if it did not change its "unhealthy and 
unfriendly" attitude toward Iran. 
In Jan. 1980 because of the Afghanistan crisis 
Washington offered future military and economic cooperatjion to 
Iran if the later released the hostages unharmed. However the 
offer was rejected by the Iranian government. In February 
President Carter agreed with the suggestion of the U.N. 
Secretary General to investigate Iranian grievances against 
United States and the deposed Shah by an international 
48 
commaSS3on. . The proposal was also accepted by the Iranian 
president Abol Hassan BaniSadr. However he said that forming 
45. Imam Khomeini and /sfovemli^r dth (April 13) op.cj't, p-17, 
46. Th£- TIme-s of IndiB-, New Delhi, 19 November 1979. 
47. International Norland Tribune-', PA January 1980. 
48. Ceylon Daily Ne-ws. 15 February 1980. 
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of a commission was not sufficient to release the hostages 
The commission was formed which consisted the following 
members Mr. Harry W, Jayawardane (63), a lawyer from Sri Lanka 
and the brother & the then Sri Lankan President Mr. J.R, 
Jayawardane, Mr. Louis Edmond Pettiti (64), a French Judge of 
European Court of Human Rights; Sir Andres AguiJar Mandley(55) 
Venezuela's permanent representative at United Nations and 
former ambassador to United States : Mr. AdJb Daoudy (57) a 
career diplomat from syria and political advisor to president 
Assad and Mr. Mohammad Bedjaoui (51) Algerian's permanent 
representative at the United Nations. Sir Andress Aguilar 
Mandsley and Mr. Bedjaoui were named as co-chairman of the 
commission. The commission reached Iran on 23 February, 1980 
to start investigations. But the commission's work was 
hampered and it cut short its visit on march 11,J980 due to 
the severe differences in the interpretation of the functions 
and work of the commission among Iran, United States and 
United Nations. ^ ^ 
On 7th April President carter announced the breaking of 
diplomatic relations with Iran. He ordered the expulsion of 
all the Iranian diplomats from United States and closed the 
49. Hin-iu<^i:,n Tinir<^. New Delhi, 19 February .1980. 
50. Kcf^i,Ki< Canf '--mpot arv Ar^.hivc'^, October 24, 1980 P-30525. 
diplomatic and consular offices of Iran at vashington. The 
sanction imposed included: (a) the prohibition of all exports 
to Iran except for food and medicine; (b) to prepare a list of 
the assets of the Iranian Government frozen since the November 
1979 so that it can be seized; (c) Carter government a.lso 
declared that alJ the visas issued to the Iranians were 
invalid for their further entry into United States. Washington 
also requested its European allies to take the same action 
against Iran. While some of the U.S. administration officials 
were of the view that the sanction would put a negative effect 
on the situation. They thought that it would undermine the 
position of modej-ate politicians like President BgniSadr, 
retaliate the Iranian to deal with hostages and would 
seriously harm the Iranian economy and might cause 
•SI disintegration of the country . 
The foreign Minister of Iran Mr. Sedeq Qotobzadeh 
flescribed the cutting of diplomatic relations by Washington as 
a sign of nervousness of U.S. administration^ '. 
The revolutionary leader AyatoUah Khomeini 
welcomed the U.S. decision and said that it is in the 
interest of Iranian nation and described it as a 
51. >'/£n.-'>.'<it,.~u-/ 7 >\7ie.-, New Delhi, 10 April 1980. 
52. >\'I^-in-f's r.-.r/^-^/vvo; .,.-/ A-o'.• •-V-A^ , October J980, p-305;^5, 
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53 disappointment of the U.S. Government over Iran. 
When the Carter administration moves to free the 
hostages through diplomatic process was failed it started to 
think about military options. Brezeniski says that previously 
United states planned to attack on oil installations at Kharg 
island, impose a naval blockade and air strike against Iran. 
But with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the plan was 
54 dropped. Later on U.S. Government narrowed its military 
opinion to a resume plan for free the hostages. The United 
States on April 24, Launched an airborne commando operation to 
rescue the 53 Americans held in Tehran. But the operation was 
failed. One of the six helicopters that had landed at Tabas 
air strip broke down and could not be repaired. A helicopter 
collided with a Hercules C-130 transport aircraft and caused 
the death of eight military personnels. Consequently the 
leader of the mission was directly ordered by the President 
55 Carter to abort the mission. On April 25 President Carter 
53. Ayatollah Khomeini's Message of April 9, 1980, imam 
Khomeini stnd Nov&mber 4.th op-.oit , p-26. 
54. Zbigriew Brezinsiki, Fower &nd Principle'. Me^moriBs of the 
N<stionaI Se^cunity Ad\yisor-. 1977-1981, Weiden field 
Nicolson London, 1983, p-488-9. Cited in Dilif? Niro, 
opy.cit , P-318. 
55. Hiro Dilip: Iran under the^ AyataJlsh, op'.cit, p-319. 
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accepted the full responsibility for the operation in a 
televised statement and said that the purpose of the operation 
was to release the hostages, not an act, of aggression against 
Iran. On 25 April permanent representative of the Una ted 
States of America to the United Nations sent the President 
Carter's statement on hostage rescue attempt to the President 
of the Security Council with a covering letter. In which 
President Carter said that the mission was a humanjtatian 
mission not directed against Iran or the people of Iran. Tt 
was not undertaken with any feeling of hostility towards Iran 
57 
and its people and caused no Iranian casualties. 
In Iran the news of the American rescue attempt was 
taken very seriously and angrily. On 25th April Minister of 
Foreign Affaires of Iran Mr. Sadegh Qotobzadeh sent a telegram 
to United Nations Secretary General which was delivered on 
28th April by the permanent representative of Iran at United 
Nations. In his Telegram Qotobzadeh urged the Secretary 
General to investigate and expose the act of "aggression". He 
described it as a shameless act of invasion which was 
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to 
the United Nations Address to the President of the Security 
56. Ibid, 
57. Letter No.S/13908 dated 25th April, 1980 from the 
U.S. Representative to U.N. Addressed to the President^ 
Seucurity Council. 
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Council described by the president of the United States as a 
"humanitatian act". He reiterated the Iran's determination to 
defend the integrity of the territory and the authority of 
58 
revolution. Qotobzadeh described the U.S. move as"an act of 
var". He said that President Carter's actions were due to his 
nervousness and idiocy" and warned the United States for any 
further such type of action. However President BaniSadr 
considered the rescue attempt by United States as a part of a 
larger plot by United States to overthrow the Iranian 
59 Government. The leader of the revolution AyatoJJah Khomeini 
reacted sharply and said that if the group of the American 
military personnel were able to attack on the American Embassy 
at Tehran not one of them nor any of the fifty three hostages 
had received alive, and warned directly to President that by 
undertaking these foolish manoueries he could not prevent the 
Itanian people from the way they had chosen, for their 
independence, freedom and for their beloved Islam. 
58. UN Document No.S/13915 dated 29th April, Telegram dated 
25th April 1980 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Iran to the Secretary General, United Nations. 
59. Ke-esin^'s Contennporsry Arc^hive'S, October 24, J 980, p-
30533. 
60. Ayatollah Khomeini's speech of 27 April, J980, imam 
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In early June 1980, on the initiative of President 
BaniSadr an international conference on U.S. Intervention in 
Iran was held which was attended by a some 300 delegates from 
54 countries including a ten members U.S. delegation led by 
Mr. Ramsey Clark, a former Attorney Genera.1. On the first day 
of the conference delegates were given the documents which as 
described contained the evidences of the Iranian charges 
against United States. The documents disclosed the following 
things: (1) that the United states was plotting a miJitary 
coup in Iran during the last days of shahs regime, (2) 
Brezinski secret memorandum to Vance which recommended 
destabllsation of Khomeini's regime through Iran's neighbours, 
(3) a report sent by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to the State 
Department on 24th Jule 1979 which referred to a person named 
All Eslami who was close to Ayatollah Shariatmadari and 
working against Khomeini. 
On July 24, 1980 Shah of Iran died, soon after the death 
of the Shah 187 members of the U.S. House of Representatives 
urged the Iranian Majlis to consider the hostage issue. A 
month later Iranian Majlis replied and put two conditions: 
that the United States should accept the responsibJljties for 
61. A'ee'sin&s Contemf>or&ry Archives, October 24, 1984, P-305-36, 
62. Hiro D i l i p , Iretn under the- Ay<stollahs, op^.cit, p -320 . 
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Shah's action and should compensate Iran for financial and 
spiritual losses inflicted on the Iranian people. The 
importance of the proposal was that unlike past suggestion 
from Tehran for setting the crisis it came from the Majlis the 
one body empowered to negotiate on the issue. On 11th 
September Ayatollah Khomeini formulated these sentiments into 
specific demands by saying that hostage would be freed if 
United states returned the property of the late shah to Iran, 
cancel U.S. financial claims against Iran, unblocked Iranian 
assets and an American promise of non-intervention in Iranian 
affairs^* 
On 22nd September Iraq launched a full fledged war 
against Iran. President BaniSadr blamed United States for 
encouraging. Iraq to attack with a view to had a solution of 
hostage crisis. However, on October, 2 President Carter 
announced that United States would stay neutral in the war. He 
said that Washington would do nothing to "punish the Tehran 
Government". He added that U.S. wanted Iran to be a secure 
nation and its people should be free to choose their own 
government. He urged that it would be mutuaJly advantageous to 
63. Ibicf. , p-321. 
64. The Timers, London, 13 September 1980, 
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restore normal relationship between two countries. 
On 3rd November students handed over the 52 American 
hostages to the Iranian Government . On the request of the 
Iranian Government acted as mediator in the negotiations and 
on 3rd November Iranian condition for the release of hostages 
were officially delivered to the United states by Mr. Malek, 
Algerian ambassador to Washinton After a series of 
negotiations finally on 19th vTanuary, 1981 an agreement 
comprising the various terms and conditions for the release of 
the hostages was signed by Mr. Christopher in Algiers and 
simultaneously in Tehran by Mr. Behzad Nabavi, Iran's Minister 
of States for Executive Affairs. Under the terms of the 
agreements the U.S. Government undertook (1) not to interfere 
in Iran's internal offer's in any way, (ii) to freeze the 
property and assets of the late Shah and his close relatives; 
(iii) to withdraw all suits against Iran in the United States 
arising from the hostage seizure or the Islamic revolution; 
(iv) to end all trade sanctions against Iran; and (v) to 
restore to the Iranian Government all the assets frozen by 
President Carter on November 14, 1979. On January 1981 the 
65. Stst^^sman: New Delhi, 3 October 1980. 
66. Time^s of India: New Delhi, November 4, 1980. 
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52 hostages were released after 444 days of Captive. On the 
same day the permanent representative of the United States of 
America handed over a message of the President Carter to the 
Secretary General of the United nations din which he informed 
him about the deal. He expressed happiness and satisfaction 
over reaching the agreement to free the 52 Americans heJd as 
hostages in Iran. And requested the Secretary General to 
inform officially the member of the United Nations Security 
Councils, the representatives of the member states of the 
Unites Nations and the President of the International Court of 
Justice about that development . The speaker of the 
Iranian Majlis Hojjatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani told that the 
hostage taking was one of the "greatest measures in history". 
President Rajai expressed that Iran had proved that by 
replying upon its ideology, a revolutionary and committed 
country could stand against the super powers. According to 
him by seizing the hostages Iran achieved." the greatest 
political gain in the social history of the world." Speaker 
Rafsanjani also declared that releasing of the hostages did 
not mean that crisis had ended, and stressed that "American 
68. UN Document No.S/14338,. 20 January 198], Letters dated 
19th January 1981 from the permanent representative of 
the United States of America to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General. 
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continued to remain their enemy and accordingly, they were 
69 American's enemy and that would continue for a long time " 
Now the question is why Iran decjded to accept the 
Algiers Declaration and to free the hostages after 14 months? 
Actually there was tremendous pressure of World public opinion 
on Iran and the issue of hostage was regarded as against the 
International law. Pressure was mounting even from many 
friendly countries to free the hostages. With the beginning of 
Iran-Iran war Iran needed support of many countries jn 
International forums especially in the United Nations. United 
States diplomacy and its direct and indirect attempt also 
paved way for it. Diplomatic means such as severance of 
diplomatic ties with Iran and mobilising the world public 
opinion over the issue, deporting of many Iranians from United 
States also became effective. Iran was facing economic 
problems due to war and decrease of oil export, by releasing 
hostages it got its frozen assets in America. Another cause 
might be the presence of American Carrier task forces in 
Iranian Ocean. Lastly President elect Reonald Reagan had 
already declared that there would be no talk from the day he 
would join office and threatened for military action against 
69. Niddle^ East Cont&/nr>orsry Surve^y, 1980-83, pp-559-60, 
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IranJO 
Newly elected President of United States ReonaJd Reagan 
after assuming power said that United States wouJd not take 
revenge on Iran for taking American diplomats as hostages. He 
also confirmed that he would honour the term agreed by his 
predecessor and lifted economic sanctions against Iran. 
However, in practice American economic sanction had been quite 
ineffective on Iran. With in a week, after the announcement of 
sanctions some 300 Americans and West European Companies 
offered to sell arms and other banned materials to Iran. Iran 
also faced no problem from the sanction imposed by European 
Economic community because Austria, Switzerland and Sweden d.id 
not join the EEC move. The companies of these countries served 
as intermediatries in supplying whatever Iran wanted. 
Therefore during 1980-87, Iran became the second most 
important trading partners of Austria. 
On 29 January, 1981 Mr. Alexander Haig said in hjs first 
press conference that there would be no arms delivery to Iran 
even if Iran would pay a several hundred million dollar to 
United States. The Carter administration gave this impression 
70. Robert Careswell, op.cit, p.247-8. 
71. Hiro Dilip, Iran under the Ayatollahs, op.cit, p.3223, 
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that arms that Iran had already purchased and were still 
undelivered would be considered as Iran's foreign assets. But 
Mr. Haig brush aside on the ground that no where in the four 
accords and nine executive orders signed by Mr. Carter was 
72 there any mention of arms as part of the deal. 
On 9th February 1981 Iranian President Abol Hassan 
BaniSadr, described the long drawn drama of American hostages 
as a mistake for which they would have to pay dearDy". He 
further added that Iranian leaders had persuaded rational and 
reasonable policies Iran would never had become involved in 
73 the war (with Iraq) . This clearly shows that major 
difference of opinion were among the leaders of the country. 
The difference between BaniSadr and other leaders became 
deeper and consequently Khomeini was forced to suspend 
BadiSadr in June 1981 and he was severely charged with anti-
Jiational activities. Anyhow Banisadr managed to escape and 
took exile in France on 28th JuJy, 1981 and the then Prime 
Minister of Iran Rajavi was elected as new President of Iran. 
On 17 August BaniSadr said while he was in France that 
Ayatollah Khomeini confined to him that he had used the U.S. 
hostage crisis to fortify Iran's domestic political situation. 
72. Amrit Bssar Patrikst, Calcutta, 30 January 1981 
73. Hindustan Time's, New Delhi, 11 February ]981. 
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He said, "The Imam clearly explained to him the aim of the 
affair. The American did not want the regime to establish 
itself. Therefore, they should keep the hostages until the 
adoption of the constitution and the Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections in Iran. He further charged that 
objective was not anti-imperialist and anti-America but they 
used the hostages to re-establish despotism or rather the 
74 dictatorship of mullahs". 
On 15 December 1981 AJi Akbar Velayati was appointed as 
Foreign Minister of Iran. After taking the charge of the 
Foreign Ministry speaking on the foreign policy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran he said that Iran wanted to develop friendly 
relations with countries through out the world except with its 
"sworn enemy, the United States" which had "not ceased its 
plotting for a moment." He accused Washington for supporting 
Kurdish rebels as well as Marxist and other leftist opponents 
of the Iranian Government. 
On Jan. 9, 3 982 President Reagan extended the executive 
order of declaring the state of Emergency with Iran. First the 
order was issued by President Carter on J 4th November J 979 
after hostage crisis. He gave the reason that the crisis with 
74. stc:ft^smsn, New Delhi, 17 August 1981. 
75. Si '^Gte&fftetn, New X)e\hy , 14 January J 982, 
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Iran eased but not fully resolved. He added that full 
normalization of commercial and diplomatic relations between 
* • 
7fi the united states and Iran would require more time. 
On 7 March, 1982, New York Times reported that the Untied 
States was secretly aiding Iranian Parliamentary and political 
exile groups in Eastern Turkey and beaming radio propaganda 
into Iran to counter growing Soviet influence in Iran and to 
give the United states a role of its own in the events jf 
Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic regime falters. It also quoted 
that no efforts were being made to overthrow or destablise the 
Khomeini Government. For centuries Iran had been an area of 
tension between Russia and Western countries. The United 
states and Soviet Union continued to recognise the importance 
of Iran in the regime were trying their best to mobilise the 
77 
new regime of Iran m her favour. 
After the end of the hostage crisis the relations between 
Washington and Tehran did not ease. The United states remained 
the "Great Satan" for Iran. The justification for tension with 
Washington during 1981-82 were given as follows: United States 
aid to Iraq; it support for Israel in attacking Lebanon and 
the Palestinians, it's pressure on Arab countries to recognise 
76. Pstriot, New Delhi, 14 January, 1982. 
77. Fstriot, 10 November 1982. 
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78 Israel and its ties with exiled Iranian opposition leaders. 
The Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani said that if all 
the Islamic countries for only one month had severed their 
relations with the U.S. and cut off oil exports as well as 
economic ties with that country, they couJd had prevented the 
79 tragedy that occurred in Lebanon. 
In October 1983 white house warned Iran for any move to 
close the Strait of Hormuz and block the Gulf oil route and 
threatened Iran for military action by United States in case 
80 
of such move . An admiral of the 25 ship task force of United 
States Navy took the position in the Gulf to take naval 
81 
operation in Iran in case Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz. 
On 24 February 1984, Iranian President AJi Khameini warned 
United States against carrying on any "adventurist act" in the 
Gulf in response to President Reagan's statement that the 
United States would not allow the Gulf to be closed. He said 
that British Naval fleets had come to strengthen the American 
fleets in the Persian Gulf. If they decided to intervenes 
78. Mid^ile Fast Coettemryorat-y Survey, 3 981-82, p-562, 
79. Keayhmi InternetianaJ, Tehran, 2 September 1982, 
80. Patriot, 15 October 1983. 
81. rime.<> of India, New Delhi , 24 October 1983. 
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'there fates would be worse than in Lebanon". He further added 
that, as long as there was the possibility for Iranian tankers 
to come and go in the Strait of Hormuz they would do 
nothing. On March 3, 1984, Iran complained to the United 
Nations through a letter from Iranian Foreign Minister Ali 
Akbar Velayati to United Nation's Secretary General, Javier 
Perez de Cueller that Iranian navy and air forces had been 
obstructed by the United States ships inside the Iranian 
territorial waters and that United States Federal Aviation 
Administration had staked an illegal claim of sovereignty over 
the Gulf .^-^  
The another important issue which dominated the Iran 
United states relations during this period was the secret arms 
deal between Iran and United States. A detailed report was 
published in the Times Newspaper on 5 November 1980 that 
America sent a plane loaded of weapons and military spare 
parts to Iran in return for a promise that Iran would 
suspended any involvement in international bombings and 
assassination". An agreement concluded after a secret visit to 
Iran by a United States delegation. The delegation was headed 
82. President Khameini's statement cited in Fatniot 26, 
February 1984. 
83. Tirae^ of India. New Delhi, 4th March, 1983. 
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by Mr. Robert Mc Farlane, President Reagan's former security 
advisor. The speaker of the Iranian majlis Mr. Hojjatoleslam 
Ali Akbar Hashemi confirmed the visit of American delegation 
but clarified that Mr. Mc Farlane came to Iran as an aJrJine 
employee with a false Irish passport carrying with a bible 
signed by President Reagan, a box of cake and pJane loaded 
with American weapons. He said Mr. Mc Farlane and others 
Americans were put in prison for five days and then sent back. 
However Mr.Rafsangani made it clear that Mr. Farlane and 
other's prison was an hotel in which they were confined for 
five days. It was reported that secret negotiations were 
underway between Iran and U.S.A. to release the Amer.ican 
hostages in Lebanon. Mr Rafsanjani put several condition for 
assisting the release of American hostages jn Lebanon as "the 
return of the Iranian assets, the recognition of the denied 
rights of Lebanese Muslim people and the freedom of poJiticaJ 
84 prisoners held in Israel and other parts of the world. 
On 13 November President Reagan appeared on television to 
defend the criticism and justified the secret arms deal with 
Iran saying that there goal was to restore relationship with 
Iran; to bring an honourable end to the (Iran-Iraq) war in the 
Gulf; to bring a halt to state supported terror in the Middle 
84. ThG Times, London, 5 November, 1986. 
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East and finally, to effect the safe return of the hostages 
o c 
from Lebanon. 
The American claim that United States officials had 
diplomatic talks with Iranian officials was denied by the 
Iranian President Mr. Ali Khomeini. He said that only Iranian 
intelligence officers had talked with them to obtain 
information which should not be called diplomatic talks. He 
said Iran was demanding its own weapons purchased before the 
Islamic revolution not a ransom as called by the Americans to 
86 
help in the release of the hostages from Lebanon 
Iranian Prime Minister Mr. Hussain Mussavi denied any 
relation with the United states and said that U.S.A. had 
always adopted a hostile approach against the Islamic 
revolution. They have not stopped even for a movement 
confronting the Islamic revolution. They had not stopped even 
87 for a moment confronting the islamic revolution. On the 
other hand Iranian representative to United Nations Mr. Saeed 
Rajaie Khorasani said that President Reagan had shown a 
drastic change in United States policy towards Iran. He said -
85. President Reagan statement cited in stBt^-sman, 15 
November 1986. 
86. President Khameini's statement cited in the statesman , New 
Delhi, 15 November 1986. 
87. Mr. Husain Mousavi Iranian Prime Minister's statement in a 
Radio Interview cited in Pmtruyt, 18 November 1986. 
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that White House had come to recognise "the strategic power, 
independence and Historical and Cultural identity of the 
Islamic Republic. He urged to consider the move as a positive 
development and described it as a '180 degree change in United 
88 
states foreign policy. 
However, President Reagan tooK the full responsibility of 
the secret arms deal and justified it again saying that "The 
goals were worthy. He did not believe that it was wrong to try 
to establish importance or to try to save Jives. And certainly 
it was not wrong to try to serve freedom for their citizens 
89 held in captivity. " 
In June 1987 Washington warned Iran not to use Chinese 
made Silk Worm Missiles on shipping in the Gulf. Iran reacted 
sharply and the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hussain 
SheiKholeslam said that his country was ready to respond any 
90 United States attack The Iranian Pres3dent All Khameanj 
said that Iran could attack American warships with weapons of 
which Washington was not aware. 
88. Rajaie Khorasani, Iran's Representative to United Nations 
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In August. 1987, Washington blamed that Iran was making 
active preparation for terrorist attacks on United States 
92 Embassies m different parts of the world. 
On 3 July 1988, an American warship attacked an Iranian 
passenger plane in which 290 people were killed. Leader of the 
revolution Ayatollah Khomeini and other leaders .in Iran 
reacted sharply. Ayatollah Montazri advised to declare "total 
war" against the United States. He said that fighting fu.l] 
scale war against America could not be done by slogans and 
propaganda campaign alone but emphasized to draw a plan to 
fight with the main enemy, American on the political, 
economic, cultured and military fronts. AyatoJlah Khomeini 
directed to prepare for a real war and go to the war fronts to 
fight with America and its lackeys."" But Iran's military 
chief and speaker of the Majlis Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani 
said that there would be no violent response against the 
United States action and the place for revenge would be on the 
war front with Iraq. He said, "The United States was trying to 
push Iran into committing a crime as bad as the attack on the 
airbus and urged not to do any thing that could turn the world 
92, Hindustan rim&s, 17 August 1987. 
93 . Ay&toliBh Khomeini's StBt-ements citect in the Hindustan 
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opinion against Iran. 
The Iranian revolution badly damaged the American 
interest in the region. Before the Iranian revolution alJ the 
Arab Gulf States (except Iraq) were in the Western camp. But 
after coming into power the new leadership Jn Iran started a 
campaign to remove all American influence from Iranian society 
and replace it with Islamic self-reliance and self sufficjency 
in the region. Till then Untied state was a dominant power in 
the region. But the Islamic Revolution proved more of a danger 
to the United States than it was visualised. U.S. worried that 
a strategic nation like Iran was pursuing expansion.! st 
policies under the guise of Islam in the region. America had 
been facing a great problem to safeguard its military and 
economic interest in the region in the wake of the Iranian 
revolution. In past the United states had been supporting the 
religion and religious movements as it was powerful tools 
against communists. But the problem was that Iranian movement 
was against the United States and since Iran was openly 
opposing Marxist Soviet Union, the United States neither couJd 
support nor accuse the movement as leftist. Actually a deep 
rooted conflict of interests between Washington and Tehran has 
emerged and one can now gain only at the expense of other. 
94. All Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's speech on Friday Prayer, 
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76 
This conflict between a superpower and a rising regional power 
95 is unlikely to settle m near future . 
The Iranian revolution brought many concern for U.S. The 
most important was that America lost one of its strongest 
allies in the region. The United States threat was that in the 
wake of Iranian revolution, there might had been created a 
second crisis in world oil prices and supply balance, and it 
could exercise a significant effect on the long run policies 
of oil producing countries. From American point of view it 
also threatened the stability of neighbouring nation all 
around the vital area of Persian Gulf. Iran adopted a tough 
attitude against Israel and asked the musJim people and 
government to Unite against Israel, which was also against the 
interest of America in the region. The biggest threat to 
America was that Islamic character of the revolution could 
effect internal political forces in other.Muslim Countries and 
might create a new Islamic bloc of nations. 
RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE 
The Iran - US tensions and Iranian - Soviet tensions 
left Iran to develop its relation with West European 
countries to fulfill it needs. In western Europe Iran mainly 
95. Hiro Di l ip , op.oit, p-330-331. / / -> 
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wanted to develop close ties with France & West Germany. With 
Britain Iran's relation was tense as Britain was considered 
Iran's main enemy after the U.S. because of , its imperialist 
record, its support with United States after the seizure of US 
embassy and its lack of support with Iranian revolution. On 
November 5,1979 Khomeini blamed Britain for giving shelter to 
I 
Bakhtiar and threatened Britain for necessary action while at 
that time Bakhtiar was actually in Paris. Margaret thacher's 
announcement on 17 December that Britain would give full 
support to United States if sanction were imposed further 
intensified anti-British feeling in Tehran. The Iranian 
Central Bank withdrew most of its public funds from British 
banks. The seizure of Iranian embassy at London in May 1980 
caused further deterioration in Iran British relation. The 
situation became more worst in August with the arrest of the 
Iranian students at London demonstrating outside the American 
embassy and action taken in Iran against Anglican ministers 
accused of espionage. Consequently London decided to close its 
embassy in Tehran and called back its four remaining diplomats 
from Iran 
After the release of the American hostages Britain made 
an attempt to normalise the relations with Iran. On 20 January, 
96. Middle East Cant&mponary Sur\'^y, 1979-80, p.479-85. 
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1981 two British diplomats were sent to Tehran to reinforce 
the British interest and the British embassy at Tehran was 
reopened. On the next day Britain lifted trade sanctions 
qn 
against Iran." Mr. Douglas Hurd, British Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs said that "Britain wished to build a good 
relationship with Iran in the future" and the release of the 
98 British detainees m Iran would open the way for this 
President BaniSadr announced in early February 1981 that four 
British nationals detained in Tehran prisons would be freed 
soon. He said authorities responsible for the case had 
informed him about the release because the documents did not 
99 prove that they were spies ' The idea that the four British 
nationals would be released as a part of bargain like American 
hostages was denied by senior Iranian officials. He said that 
the four Britishers were not hostages so there was no 
question of any "price" for their release. The release of 
the British missionaries on 27 February was viewed that Tehran 
wished to improve relations with Britain. But on 25 April 
Majlis speaker Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani toJd the 
9 7 . J^iidcfle Fas t Con I emfH::>rany 5ur ve y, 1980-81 oc'. c 11', 
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British Cha>"-9e d' Afferires that Iran wanted to have friendJy 
relations with all the countries 'which don't pursue colonial 
and dominating end' and the British policy on hostages jssue 
"failed that test*. Three days later Mr. Muhammed Hashemi, 
Prime Minister's political adviser told the British diplomat 
that "our Islamic nation no longer has any confidence in your 
Governroent" due to the position taken by England against. 
Iran" since 1979."'^ -^'^  
In early 1982 relations between Iran and Untied Kingdom 
was slightly improved with the release of British Businessman 
Mr. Andrew Pyke who was detained in Iran since August 1980 in 
connection of alleged financial; irregularities and the 
signing of a contract by British Tablet motor company and Iran 
National manufacturing Agency for purchase of 500,000 Pekyyan 
car kits to assemble in Iran in next five years. However there 
were many issues of contention between the two countries 
including (a) the continued detention of Mr. Frank Skinner and 
the arrest of Mr. John Allen Bowden, another British National, 
on 26 Oct.1982 charged with currency irregularities, (b) 
dispute over the payment of repair work of Iranian embassy at 
London, and (c) the matter of the 20,000 ton vessel, 
101. Middle Fast Cotsl~emi.yaraf-y Survey, 1980-81, op-cit, p-561. 
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In March 1984, Iran accused Britain of helping Iraq in 
war and supplying "genocidal" chemical weapon to Iran. Tehran 
radio said on 3 March that since the Gulf war began Britain 
bad supplied Mirag planes, tanks and weapons worth billions of 
dollars to Iraq. It also accused that British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Carrington helped Iraq in the preparation of a 
plan for extensive aggression against Iran during his vjsjt to 
Baghdad just before the war began. 
On December 8, 1986 the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth office lodged a strong protest with the Iranian 
government on the continued detention of Mr, Roger cooper, a 
businessman and free-lance journalist who was arrested in 
December, 1985. In reaction on, December 10, 1986, Iranian 
Authorities announced that he (Cooper) would face trial on 
103 
spyrng charges. 
The relations between Iran and United Kingdom was 
worsened during 1987 with the arrest of Mr. Ahmad Qaseemi, an 
employee at he Iranian consulate in Manchester, on charges of 
102. A'<?<?si/7g?s Contempoi-->3ry ArchiK^'es, November 12, 1982, P-
3180. The Kharg was launched in February 1977 and had 
been paid for Ijut as it required export license, before 
delivery which was refused by U.K. Government in April 
1980. 
103. f<ee.-?iinp'.s Cantf-mponisry Archives, November 1987, p-35544. 
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shoplifting. In apparent retaliation the revolutionary guards 
abducted Mr. Edward Chaplain, the first secretary of the U.K. 
interest section of the Swedish embassy in Tehran and was 
beaten and it was announced that he would be facing 
unspecified criminal charges. On vTune 4, British authorities 
announced the closure of the Manchester consulate and its five 
staff were expelled. On June 5, three U.K. staff were 
withdrawn from Tehran, and on June 6 Iranian Government 
expelled five United Kingdom's diplomats including Fdward 
Chaplin. On June 10 the U.K. asked Iran to withdraw its two 
staff. Two days later Iranian Government expelled four more 
U.K. diplomats and United Kingdom withdraw its further seven 
diplomats from its visa issuing section. On June .15 & 16 seven 
more U.K. diplomats were withdrawn from Tehran. On June 18 
United Kingdom ordered 15 Iranian diplomats out of remaining 
16 to leave the country by the end of the month and also 
announced the withdrawal of its own head of mission from 
Tehran. Therefore the representation of both the countries was 
confine to single diplomats. Following the attack on a U.K. 
flagged ship in Gulf by Iranian the British Government ordered 
the closure of the Iranian military procurement office in 
London on 23 September 1987.-^°^ 
104. i/!?i:v.l 
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In AprJJ 1988 Britain strongJy protested to Iran over 
the attacK on British owned tanker in the Gulf. ' But the 
situation was changed by June 1988 when Britain and Tran 
agreed to pay compensations for damage to each other's 
embassies Iran's rhar <ye .^'aff,-,irt -^ at London Mr, Mahedi 
Akhounzadeh Basti described it as a "very good meeting' and 
said that some technical issues remain which would be 
dissolved up by the Iranian Embassy in London. A British 
Foreign office spokesman said that "we believe that a 
settlement would be in the interest of both parties." Tt was 
understood that the talks would include the issue of three 
British hostages in l.ebanon. However the Iranian officials had 
denied any link between the resumption of the hostages and 
107 
contacts. On June 19 a four member parliamentary delegation 
from London visited Tran to study the problems related to 
bilateral relations. The four members of parliament visited 
Iran were part of Church of England Mission. On their arrival 
Iran's leading newspaper, Tehran Times, wrote in its editorial 
that as far as bilateral relations are concerned Iran's policy 
105. Ttf- Tames, London, 20 A p r i l , 1988 . 
106. Thf- Time?~, London, 11 June, 1988 . 
107. Tehrr:>n limt-s, Tehran, June 1 3 , 1988, 
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is clear that it wanted to have good relations with all the 
countries of the world except Israel and South Africa. Tt 
writes that "Iran has just one condition that these relation 
should be on equal term with no room of exploitation or 
interference into internal affairs." On Britain under the 
influence of United States took part in anti-Iranian 
activities which caused the worsening of relation. If Britain 
sincerely wanted to normalise diplomatic relations with tehran 
then 'they have to take certain specific steps to prove their 
good intention." 
The meeting of British parliamentary delegation with 
Iranian leaders was successful enough as both expressed their 
intention to resume normal diplomatic relations without 
further delay. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iran Mr. Aliriza 
Moayyeri said that "relations with Britain coujd return to 
their previous level". In London a foreign office spokesman 
said that "the British government is fully prepared to have 
better ties with Tehran but decision is upto the Iranian." 
Moayyeri also promised the delegation to help in locating the 
British hostages help in Beirut at London would also help in 
1OQ the release of the Iranian hostage in Lebanon. 
108. TehrB-n Times, Tehran, June 19, 1988. 
109. Tehran Times: (International weekly) Tehran, 23 June'88 
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The British Minister for Middle East Affairs, Mr. David 
Meller, after meeting the members of the par]jamentary 
delegation visited Iran said that Britain recognised the 
"strategic, political and economic importance of Iran" and 
respects the right of Iranian people to have an Islamic form 
of government. And expressed his willingness to build a more 
constructive and business like relationship with Iran. But 
the statement by British Prime Minister Mrs. Marget Thatcher 
defending the right of U.S warship to down an Iranian airliner 
in the Gulf created new obstacles in the normalisation of 
Anglo-Iranian relations. 
A meeting of foreign secretary of United Kingdom Mr. 
Geofferaz Howe and foreign minister of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar 
Velayati, on 30 September 1988 was held to discuss prospects 
of relations between the two countries and to resume the 
normal diplomatic relations. It was the first high level 
meeting between the two countries since the Islamic 
Revolution. The British foreign Secretary Mr. Geoffery Howe 
describing the importance of the meeting expressed the hope 
that they could find a way for establishing more normal 
relations with the Iranians. It is important that we should if 
110 . Tehr-sn Times, Tehran, July 3 , 1 9 8 8 . 
1 1 1 . Hjn^u<:i}.sn Time.ix, New D e l h i , 6 J u l y , 1988 
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we can because its a large and important country in the 
region. 
After a prolong discussion finally both Britain and Iran 
agreed to resume normal diplomatic relations followed by the 
signature of an agreement in Vienna on 10 November 1988. They 
agreed to "establish full diplomatic relations on the basis of 
mutual respect and equality and non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs". Under the terms Britain was to send 
a Chsr&e d' Affsire^s to Tehran with in a month and Ambassador 
were to be exchanged within six month. 
Iran's relation with France remained relatively good for 
some time after the "Islamic Revolution". The role of France 
during Khomeini's exile in that country was considered to be a 
good factor in Iran-French relations. France offered to supply 
the all immediate need of food to Iran was we]corned by Iranian 
media and people in November 1979. A number of bilateral 
economic agreements were signed in late 1979. But the Iran-
French relations became strained during 1980 mainly due to the 
French support of EEC policies on hostage issue and reported 
111 
activities of counter revolutionary forces in Paris. After 
112. Sir Geoffery Hove speaking on B.B.C. Radio on P.8 
September 1988 cited in Tehran Times; Tehran, 29 
September 1988. 
113. Middle' East Contemporary Survey, 1979-80, p-483. 
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the end of the hostage crisis and the lifting of the economic 
sanctions Jby European Economic Community prospects to improve 
Iran's relations became clear. But it did not help more in 
the normalization of Iran's relation with France due to severe 
differences on some issues such as French arms supply to Iraq 
and asylum granted to Khomeini's opponents incJuding BaniSadr 
114 
and Rajavi. Iran demanded the extradition of BanaSadr and 
Rajavi from France but it was turned down by French government 
on the ground that both were granted political asyJum. Iran's 
plea was that Iran had an agreement with French government for 
the extradition of criminals and accused both BaniSadr and 
Rajavi for killing hundred of innocent people in Iran. The 
difference became as deep as in early August 1981 Iranian 
government asked the French ambassador Mr Guy Gearge to leave 
lis Iran. " After that their diplomatic relations was confined 
only up to the level of Ch^srcrei:f d' affsires. Beside demand of 
extradition and arms supply to Iraq there were other problems 
such as forcible dispersal of Iranian students demonstrations 
in Paris that caused further worsening of relations between 
two. The main objection of Iran against France included the 
delivery of the Mirages to Iraq, Mitterrands visit to Israel, 
1 1 4 . Middle East Contemi>orsny Survey, 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 , p . 4 8 3 , 
115 . K£!iyhan Inlertuiti'ynal , Tehran, August 6, 1981 . 
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his support for the Zionist inventions and for Saddam. 
Rafsanjani on one occasion, threatened that France would be 
"answerable, to Iranian nation in the future which would not 
easily forgive France. He blamed France for a bomb explosion 
in Tehran on 22 february 1982.Again in October 1982 following 
the assassination of Ayatollah Ashrafi, Tehran strongly 
protested to the French, Ch^rcie d'/^^frehires about French action 
against Iranian interest by providing refuge to counter 
revolutionaries. (It was presumed that Rajavi's Mujahedeen-e-
Khalq were involved in the killing). 
In November 1982 Iran offered France to establish full 
fledge diplomatic relations in order to normalise the 
relations But Iran put the condition of either the expulsion 
or extradition of BaniSadr and Rajavi. The condition was 
117 turned down by France In October 1983, All Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, spokesman of the Supreme Defence Council (SDF) of 
Iran declared that the security of the Persian Gulf depends on 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and warned Iraq and western 
countries that if Iran would be deprived of exporting oil 
through this water way no country would be able to use the 
116 . Middle East Contemf.'-orm-y Survey, 1 9 8 1 - 8 2 , p - 5 6 3 , 
117. Indian Express, 25 , November 1982 . 
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route either. He said that Persian Gulf route was secure as 
long as there was no b^hdrance on the export of Iranian oil 
through this way. If any power, Iraq or any super power tried 
to deprive Iran of exporting the oil then the Persian Gu3f 
would be of no importance for Iran. He claimed that Iran had 
the Capability of blocKing the Persian Gulf. He warned that if 
Persian Gulf water way is closed the western powers especially 
France would have to pay high price. Attacking on the 
statement of Franch authority he said that the closure of the 
Strait of Hormuz would not be suicidal for Iran but would be a 
118 
suicide for French Socialist Party. 
On October 23, 1983 over 300 U.S. and French troops 
stationed in Beirut were killed in two simultaneous lorry bomb 
attacks. The responsibility for the attacks was claimed by two 
militants shia Muslims groups : Al Jihad al - Islamla and Free 
Islamic Revolutionary Movement whjch was believed to be 
linked to "Islamic Amal. On October 27 Mussavi denied that 
Islamic Amal had been involved in the attacks, but added that 
he approved the actions and hoped to participate in future 
119 
operations. Iran's relations with France further 
118. Kj^yhcsn int^r-natlon^aJ, Tehran, October 3 2, 1983. 
119. Ke'e:'^.1 na 's Cont*:mporsry Arohives, February 1984, p'32646-
47. 
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deteriorated when an Iranian Air lines Boeing 747 flight from 
Dubai to Tehran was hijacked and forced to land at Paris 
airport on July 6, 1983. The five hijackers claimed to be 
member of Mujahedeen-e-khalq but Massud Rajavi, the leader of 
the Mujahedeen- e-khalq denied that hijackers were members of 
the group and expressed his disapproval of their action. 
However with the mediation and active persuation of Rajavi the 
hijackers released the hostages and surrendered themselves to 
French police. Tn reply of the Iranian demand of the 
extradition of the hijackers, French officials said that while 
they would be prosecuted for air piracy, the hijackers request 
for political asylum would be given sympathetic consideration. 
Hojjatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani denounced the use of 
mediation by Rajavi and accused, France, U.S.A. Iraq, kuwait 
and Saudia Arabia of participating in the planing of hijacking 
and threatened that iran would take revenge. Iranian 
government closed the France•culture Centre in Tehran and the 
Franch Consulates in Tehran and Isfahan. On 27, August five 
gunmen hijacked an Air France jet on flight from Vienna to 
Paris and forced to land at Tehran after making three stops at 
Geneva (Switzerland), Sicily (Italy) and Damascus (Syria). The 
gunmen claimed to be members of "Islamic Liberation Movement's 
were Lebanese with Tunisian passport, demanded the release of 
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all Lebanese prisoners held in France with in 48 hours and 
also the justification by French Government of it's polices 
with regard to Chad, Lebanon and Iraq. After the French 
government refusal to meet their demand the hijackers 
surrendered to the Irajiian authorities on August 31 and were 
given asylum in Iran. On December 24 the French Government 
ordered the closure of the Iranian Islamic Cultural Centre jn 
Paris and expelled three Iranian diplomats. In reaction two 
days letter Iranian Government expelled three French diplomats 
120 including the first secretory of the embassy. 
However during 1985-86 certain attempts were made to 
normalise the relations between France and Iran. In May 1986 
several rounds of talks took place between Iranian and French 
official in Paris during the visit of Iran's deputy Prime 
Minister Ali - Raza Ma'ayeri. He was the highest Iranian 
official to visit Paris since 1979. Iranian press reported 
that the talks were held in a friendly atmosphere. During the 
talks Iran demanded to the French Government to stop 
supporting Iraq and repay Iran's loan. Ma'ayeris reaction to 
the talks was satisfactory and he noticed a change in French 
attitude since the new Cabinet had come to power. He said that 
"we feel that French Prime-Ministers Chirac "has given 
120. ,Kees3:n<,7<^ Conte^mporsry Archives, February 1984, p-32692. 
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particular attention to Iran's strategic position in the 
region". Ma'ayeri asked. France to prove its neutrality in the 
imposed war was and expressed hope that France would restrain 
itself from exporting new weapons to Iraq. France was one of 
the largest supplier of arms to Iraq. On the question of the 
repayment of a $ 1 billion loans to Iran Ma'ayeri demanded the 
repayment with out any condition. Non-payment of Iranian loan 
was also one of the reasons of tension between France and 
Iran. The loan was given to France by the Shah regime for the 
construction work in the French Atomic Industry. On the other 
side President Mitterrand stressed that the existing relations 
between the two countries were not at a satisfactory Jevel, 
adding that relation which were moving towards isolation, 
should be diverted towards solidarity and Unity. Therefore the 
bilateral ties would become deeper and stronger every day. he 
added. -^ "^^  
A confidential Chirac Ma'ayeri Protocol was signed 
during the Ma'ayeri visit. The Ma'ayeri visit and signing of 
protocol took place after the expulsion of Masud Rajavi and 
scores of his supporters from France. For which Iran was 
demanding since the time they were given asylum in France. The 
protocol was a break through in the Irano-French relationship. 
121. Ke>yhsn Internet ions.1, Tehran, May 24, 3 986. 
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There were two important agreement that worried Iranian 
opposition. First France promised not to enter into new 
agreement with Iraq for the supply of advanced war planes and 
Missiles such as Exocets. However the existing agreements were 
to be honoured. Secondly France agreed to give a one bJJlion 
dollars loan to Iran to purchase French arms excluding 
aircraft and missiles but including armoured vehicles and 
radar equipments. This satisfies another Iran's condition for 
better relations. Chirac's change of heart was dictated not by 
French strategic and economic interests in the Middle East but 
by internal political considerations. The case of the french 
hostages held by shia extremists in Lebanon had a great impact 
on French public opinion. Chirac accused hjs socialist 
predecessors for incompetent handling of the case. It was 
presumed that in making concession to Iran he hoped to gadn 
122 Iranian help in release of the eight French men in Lebanon. 
The change in French policy caused great apprehension in 
Baghdad and throughout the Gulf. Iraq sent its foreign 
minister Tariq-Al-Aziz to Paris to probe French intentions. 
The Gulf states, which rely on Iraq's war effort to protect 
their security, were also pressing the Paris government for 
explanation. Iraq's close relations with France were seen by -
122. Times of India-, New Delhi, 23 June, 1986 
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the GiiJf as Vital not onJy for arms supply but also as 
123 
representing a foothold in European djpJomacy. '' 
The two French hostages M. Rochol and N. Manser were 
released in West Beirut on June 20, 1986. After their release 
the Organisation for Revolutionary Justice asked the French 
government to "give final proof of its good will in revising 
its policy and in carrying out its undertakings so that the 
other hostages can be released". Jawed Larijani, the Iranian 
Foreign Minister for International Economic Affairs told the 
press that Iran had played a "vital and constructive role" in 
the release of the French hostages, thanks to "ideological 
Links" with groups in Lebanon. He further added that Iran 
could do the same for British hostages with the conditions 
that if Britain could change its policy toward Islamic 
124 Republic. After a couple of days M-Jean Yves Albirtini, 
station master of Air France in Iran held in prison for the 
last 14 months in Tehran was liberated by Iranian 
authorities. The French Foreign Minister Welcomed this act and 
said that without doubt the release of Mr. Albirtini had 
facilitated the process of normalization of relations between 
France and Iran. ^'^^ 
123. It>jd, 
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In October Devi& Baudouin the spokesman of French 
government said in a statement that France and Iran should 
normaJize their relations. He further said that Iranian were 
not happy with an initial repayments agreement, but it is 
expected that Tehran would take into consideration to restart 
a number of French projects in Iran that were unilaterally 
scrapped after the revolution. He clarified that France had no 
intention to modify its foreign policy but on the other hand 
France believed that normalization of relations with Iran 
"should help smooth things over". 
In November 1986 two French hostages held in Beirut were 
handed over to the French Government at Damascus (syria). This 
was seen by observers as success of the Iranian government in 
conduct of its foreign policy. The release of the hostages was 
taken place due to the active participation and mediation of 
Iranian government. This was to show to the western 
governments if they would adopt a reasonable stand towards 
Islamic Republic, it could do its best. In response the 
Foreign Minister of France, Mr, Jean Bermari Raimond for the 
first time disclosed the amount of a loan repayment agreement 
of $330 million that Paris and Tehran reached as part of the 
solution of a one billion loan repayments problem. There were 
126. Kcirhr^^.-, ]f.'/e>- s->,^t 7..>nsJ, Tehran, October 4, 1986. 
or, 
five more French nationals held in Beirut, whose future and 
127 
repayment of the loan quantum was linked. 
On June 30, 1987 Iranian Embassy at France was 
surrounded by French police who had a warrant to summon Mr. 
Vahid Gordji an interpreter at the embassy, as a witness in 
connection with a series of bombs attacks in paris .in 
September 1986, Gordji took refuge in the embassy. In 
retaliation. Iranian security forces also blocked the French 
embassy in Tehran on June 30. The situation became more 
complicated on July 11 when an Iranian diplomat crossing into 
France from Switzerland alleged that he had been beaten by 
custom officer and some confidential papers which he was 
carrying were also stolen. On July 13 a French Fighter was 
fired on by what were presumed to be Iranian gunboats in the 
Gulf. On July 14 the Tehran public prosecutor issued a 
summon for M. Jean-paul Torri, the French consul in the city, 
to appear on the charges of espionage and smunggling. On July 
15 French government protested to the Iranian government that 
their embassy staff members had been prevented from leaving 
Iran. Consequently on July 17,. The French government 
announced the severance of diplomatic relation with Iran and 
ordered all the Iranian diplomats to confine to th embassy 
127. rh<r- Hindu. Madras 14, November 1986. 
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compound until arrangement. were be made for their 
repatriation. On July 20 French warships in the Gulf were 
placed on alert, and on August, 6, imports of Iranian crude 
oil into France was banned. The pro-Iranian group in Lebanon 
threatened to kill too French hostages M. Merul Carton and M. 
Marod Fontain Kidnaped in 1985-^ ^^  
July 1987 was also not good time for Iran - French 
relations. The already strained relations were further 
deteriorated as the French government sharply protested about 
the blocked of its embassy in Tehran, while continuing to 
insist that the second most senior man at the Iranian embassy 
in Paris Mr. Wahid Gordji be handed over to the French police 
for questioning about suspected terrorist activities. France 
imposed its own 'security cardon'around the Iranian embassy, 
checking every one leaving the building on the hopes of 
1 po 
flushing out Mr. Gordji. France repeatedly asked for the 
surrender of Mr. Wahid Gordji, the second in command of 
Iranian Embassy in paris for police question in connection of 
the terrorist bombing campaign in paris and threatened that if 
he would not be surrendered, France would not hesitate to 
128. A'e/?slnff's Conte-mpot-ary Anchlv^s, Vol.XXXIII, November 
1987 p-35543-44. 
129. The Times, London, July 3, 1987. 
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use all the means necessary' to see that he was brought before 
the magistrate and that could include breaking off diplomatic 
1 30 
relation. The relation tooK new turn in mid July when 
Iranian authorities announced that they were putting the 
Franch consul, Mr. Panel Tern in Tehran on trial. M. Panel 
Tern was accused of espionage, aid to counter revolutionaries 
and participating in a network involved in the trafficking of 
drugs antiquities and money. Ultimately Paris declared the 
1 n breaking of diplomatic, relations with Iran. 
Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hussain Musavi said on vTuly 
19, 1987 that if France had behaved properly the case would 
had been different. He said that it was not uncommon in 
international relations to break diplomatic relations, but 
under such type of situation, diplomats are permitted to leave 
for their own countries. He charged France for not permitting 
the Iranian diplomats to leave country which caused the 
112 
situation to become more complex. 
On French decision of ordering its task force on alert 
in the Persian Gulf, Iranian foreign Minister All Akbar 
Velayati reacted in an interview that this decision was more 
130. 7.hf- Jimeu, London, July 8, 1987. 
131. In.iian Fxn-: e'si-^. New Delhi, July 18, 1987 
132. Teht-Bn Tim^s, 20 July 1987. 
related to French internal politics than the military 
133 
strategy/''^ 
In late 1987 the relationship between France and Iran was 
in its way of improvement when the talks took place between 
the officers of two countries on the mediation of syria, 
Algeria and Pakistan. In early December 1987 a senior Foreign 
Ministry official announced that the so-called "War of 
embassies"between Iran and France ended following "unofficial 
secret and direct" talks between the two sides. Iran's Deputy 
Foreign Minister for political affairs, Husssain Sheikholeslam 
in a television interview predicted the future of Tehran-Paris 
relations as "a very good" saying mutual ties between the two 
countries could improve to the level after the 1979 
revolution. 
The Deputy Foreign Minister said Iran 's negotiations 
with the French government were never interrupted, but talks 
had been assisted through the mediation of Syria, Pakistan and 
Algeria. Each of these countries, were present at certain 
stages of the talks which he regretted did not produce 
favorable results and expressed hope for the positive outcome 
of those talks. ^ '^^ 
1 3 3 . Teh.'-an Timt s. 29 J u l y 1 9 8 7 . 
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In May 1988 France agreed to resume diplomatJc! reJations 
with Iran, settle dispute over Joans, lifted o.il embargo and 
freed two jailed'extermists' to obtain the release of three 
French hostages held in Lebanon. The release of vTournalist 
Jean-Paul Keuffmenn and diplomats Mr. Maseel Carton and Mr. 
Fontaine in Beirut four days before the final round of French 
presidential election-followed protracted negotiations between 
France and Iran. Mr. Chirac publicly thanked Iran for its 
help in securing the release of the hostages, held for more 
than three years by pro-Iranian group in Lebanon. He also 
announced that the release opens the way for a resumption of 
diplomatic ties between Paris and Tehran. 
In July 1988, Iran and France re-establish their 
diplomatic relations. Newly appointed Iranian Ambassador to 
France Ali Ahani was welcomed at the Orley airport by two 
French Foreign Minister officials on July 1, 1988, Jn a brief 
talk with reporters at the airport, Ahani described Tehran-
Paris ties as "historical and friendly, and expressed hope 
that the volume of mutual trade exchanges would increase in a 
near future, Ahani was the first Iranian ambassador to Paris 
135 
since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, 
135. The Hindu, (Madras) 9 May 1988, 
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With West Germany Iran was having strong cominercial 
links than any other West European country during Shah's 
regime. In 1972 when West German Chancellor, Willy -Brandt, 
visited Tehran an economic agreement was signed between two 
countries. The agreement provided for Iranian exports of 031 
and natural gas (through the Soviet pipeline) and west German 
exports and investment' in Iran. In 1975 West Germany became 
the second most important supplier of non-military goods to 
Iran and West German imports was nearly one - fifth of tota] 
Iranian imports. The American economic sanction disturbed West 
Germany, Since 10 percent of the West Germany's oil needs came 
from Iran West Germany was more interested than any other 
European country to see the hostage crisis resolved and was 
much anxious to normalise relations with Iran due to its 
economic interests involve in Iran. Gerhard Ritzel the West 
German Ambassador to Iran played important role in getting the 
two side to come for negotiation. He arranged a secret meeting 
between Warren Christopher, U.S. under - secretary of state, 
and Sadiq Tahatabai, the Iranian government's representative 
in Europe on September 17, 1980 in West Germany. 
However, west Germany joined hand with other European 
countries in imposing sanction against Iran on hostage crisis. 
136. Hiro Dilip, I.^ .,n /jnde> Ay.^Ud }^.ths, op rif, p.310-326 
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This move of Germany cast her badly and it. was a great, set 
back to its economic and commerciaJ interest in Iran. Although 
a number of German and other companies offered to sell arms 
and ammunition and other goods to Iran secretly and they 
succeeded in it. But when it came in to the Knowledge of 
German authorities action were taken against those firms. Iran 
criticised the West Germany's decision to take part in 
economic sanction and accused West Germany's ruling social 
Democratic party for adding and supporting the terrorist 
groups specifically the Munafiqeen (M.K.O.) 
On Apr!J 24, 1982, 86 Iranian students were arrested and 
17 of them were deported after a clash between pro-Khomeini 
and anti-Khomeini faction in Mainz, West Germany. The Iranian 
ambassador at Bonn accused the German police of taking much 
srictz action against the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. In 
protest against the decision to deport the student, Iran 
closed its embassy in West Germany on July 1 although it was 
117 
reopened on July 12. 
A diplomatic controversy aroused on January 8, 1983 when 
an Iranian diplomat and Former Deputy Prime-Minister, Mr. 
Sadeq Tabatabai was arrested at airport on charges of 
attempting to smuggle raw Opium and the court ruled out to --
137. Kr~esir/&'s Contempor-ary Archives, Vol.28, 1982, pp-3.1801 . 
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grant bail and extend diplomatic immunjty to him. After a 
strong representation and reaction of the Iranian government 
he was granted bail on March 9 and returned to Iran on March 
10.^38 
Iran's relations with West Germany was not so good and 
cordial in the few years of the establishment of Islamic 
Republic. But by 1984 relations were developing in the way of 
normalization. The visit of the West German Foreign Minister 
to Tehran on July 20 - 22, 1984 paved way for the 
normalization of relation. Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian Foreign 
Minister, expressed the willingness to develop and maintain 
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closer ties with the European countries. But due to the 
Iran-Iraq war and association of Germany with Western bloc put 
reservation on Iran to develop close ties with Germany. 
However, the relations were both sour and sweet. In February 
1987 a German diplomat was expelled from Iran in protest of a 
television broad-cast on 14 febr\iary, a programme, satirizing 
the Iranian regime. Mr. Hussain Musavi described the broadcast 
as a "hostile action" which reflected the "racist and fascist 
140 polices" of the German Government. 
138. A'e'. ?i,-,5.7'<; Coi-.u'(=-m/r-^-rs-- -y A/-^ hJv s , Vol .XXX, Oct. 1984, 
P-33170. 
139. A^esinp' . , Vol,XXX, August 1984, P-33063. 
140. ,<ef. Kin.,-•^ , Vol.XXXII, November 87, P-35544. 
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By December 1987 the relation between the two started 
growing normal again. In December 1987 a west German economic 
delegation visited Tehran and signed a protocol for the 
expansion of Jran-West Germany economic cooperation. According 
to the protocol they agreed to form a joint economic 
commission and to improved industrial, scientific and trade 
cooperation between the two countries. This development took 
place when west Germany declared that Iraq was the initiator 
"J 41 
of war. The Iranian efforts in releasing a Germany 
businessman who was kidnaped and held in captive in Beirut 
was also a good sign in the direction of normalizing the 
relations. Iranian efforts were appreciated by the West 
Germany's authorities and a special envoy of the West Germany 
came to Iran to extend thanks to Iranian authorities in 
September 1987. 
Iran was the top exporter of hand woven carpets to West 
Germany, which was slowed down by 1979 but during 1985-87 a 
marginal increase was seen in the carpet export (i.e. in 1985, 
329, 100 sq.m, in 1986, 745,000 sq.m. and m 1987 1.03 million 
sq.m. carpets were exported to west Germany.) The main reason 
for that notable increase in carpet export was due to the 
fall in the prices of Iranian carpets and adoption of an 
141. hr=,yi:-n intf-mat ion. t, Tehran, December 12, 1987. 
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appropriate foreign exchange poJiry by Iran. The main rival 
of Iran in the export market of carpets to West Germany have 
been Pakistan and China which exported 512000 sq.m. and 462500 
sq. m of carpets to West Germany respectively in 1987. Again 
by 1<?87 West Germany became the top markets for Iranian 
Carpets. "^ ^^  
In 1988 after the acceptance of cease-fire in Iran-Iraq 
war, good prospects were seen in Irano-German relation. W. 
Germany offered to provide its help in the reconstruction of 
post war Iran. This offer was also extended during the visit 
of West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher in the 
last week of November 1988. Genscher who came to Iran on 
economic mission with a delegation of 30 German businessman 
met with President Khameini Majlis speaker Rafsanjani, Prime 
Minister Mr. Hussain Mussavi and Foreign Minister All Akbar 
Velayati. Velayati said in a meeting with his German 
counterpart that Islamic Republic attaches importance to its 
co-operation with West Germany in the International 
organisation and hope this would expand in the future. ^ 
Iran and Federal Republic of Germany, on 29 November 
1988 signed a letter of understanding involving capital about 
142. Kc^yh,^n Tru' e-'^-n'-'f i^^nsJ, Tehran, November 2, 1988, 
143. K£>yha,i In!*-rn,. I ion.:^}, Tehran, November 29, 1988. 
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three to five billion German marhs ($ J.5 billion to $ 2.5 
billion) . According to the Jetter of understanding the two 
countries agreed to cooperate in building nuclear power plants 
including the completion of Bushehr Atomic Power Plant, 
formation of joint consortium for expansion of economic 
cooperation for which a capital between $ 3.5 to $ 3 billion 
will be provided. The details of the plans were not released. 
The two countries also agreed on the expansion of political 
and economic cooperation. Security Council resolution No. 598 
was also focused on during the talks between the officials of 
the two countries and it was decided that joint efforts would 
be made at international level for the implementation of the 
resolution, expansion of ties with Europe, and stability of 
peace in the Persian Gulf were also discussed. 
The two countries also signed agreements for bilateral 
cooperation in the industrial, cultural and academic fields. 
The two countries also agreed to cooperate in road building 
industry. According to the agreement Iran was to participate 
in the Conference on the Deployment of Chemical Weapons in 
Paris. They decided to take serious steps against Iraq for its 
repeated use of internationally banned chemical weapons 
again*St Iranians and Kurdish population in Iraq. 
144. Tehi-<^n Tfm'-^'., Tehran, November 30, 1988. 
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In March 1989, West Germany decided to field Mr. Dietmar 
Henning second secretary of the Embassy of GDR disclosed at 
the press conference. He suggested that Iran should enter into 
mutual economic cooperation with GDR. West German technologist 
have succeeded in producing one Megabit integrated Circle and 
they were going to make 4 Megabit Integrated Circle in near 
future. Mr. Dietmar Henning called on Iranian officials to 
increase their bilateral trade volume to comparatively higher 
degree than before. The trade exchanges between the two 
countries stood at 110 million. Mr. Mir Alizadeh deputy of 
heavy industries minister went to Berlin to attend the third 
Iran, West Germany joint economical commission meet. Thus 
after many years of mistrust, problems and tension West 
Germany and Iran succeeded in establishing good relations 
based on mutual interest. 
14t5.Ty-hr.csn Times, March 14, 1989, 
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EAST AND THE POLICY OF "NF.TTHKR FAST NOR WEST" 
IRAK AND THE SOVIET UNION 
The antJ-AnerJcan stand taKen by Khomeinj's regjme did 
not produce a pro-Soviet turn, despite the fact that the 
Soviet government adopted an anti-Shah line while Khomeini 
was stiJJ in France. In response to the U.S. support to the 
former Shah against the Islamic Revolution, President 
Brezhnev had warned that "any interference, especially 
military interference, in the affairs of Iran - a state 
which borders directly on the Soviet Union would be 
regarded by the Soviet Union as affecting the interests of 
its security"^. But in the framing of new foreign policy of 
Iran the USSR was almost as objectionable as the U.S. This 
was primarily due to Soviet Union's record of intervention 
in Iran throughout the 19th century as well as during the 
two world wars; the communist ideology and its anti-
religious stands; Soviet ties with Iranian leftist groups 
and Iranian ethnic minorities, and Moscow's good relations 
and economic ties with previous regime. These factors 
compelled Iran to adopt an attitude of maintaining distance 
from Soviet Union under the policy of "Neither East Nor 
West", despite the fact that Soviet Union was a neighbouring 
superpower and Iran shared a long border with Soviet Union, 
1. Pravada, November 19, 1978. 
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as well as reason aJso did not allow to strain relations 
with both the superpowers. However, Khonejni wanted to have 
the whip hand in bilateral relations with Moscow, as with 
the U.S. 
Within a few hours of the estab}ishBient of Bazargan 
government Soviet Union announced its recognition to the new 
regine and expressed its willingness to naintain relations 
"on the basis of equality and good neighbourliness". Sanjabi 
replied that the new regime "genuinely wants friendly 
relations with the USSR" and promised that Iran would no 
longer be Involved in anti-Soviet propaganda. 
Despite this good beginning, difficulties soon arose in 
the wake of unrest among the ethnic minorities of the 
Kurds, the Arabs in Khuzistan, the Baluchis and the 
Turkumans. Iran accused the USSR of giving moral and 
material support to all of them. Criticism of the USSR 
became sharper and was given greater publicity late in 
August 1979 with the simultaneous protests in Tehran and 
Kurdistan. In addition to assisting the minorities, the USSR 
was also blamed for aiding and encouraging the Tudeh and 
other leftists. In a speech broadcasted on 31 August 1979, 
Khomeini openly accused the Soviet Union of aiding his 
opponents. On .1 September 1979, Talegani also accused 
Soviet Union for arousing tension in Iran and particularly 
in Kurdistan. The USSR expressed support of "cultural 
autonomy" for the Kurds "within a united Iran", but denied 
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as "absoJuteJy groundless" any aJJegatJon of materia} 
assistance to the Kurds or any other ethnic minority.^ 
An attack on 7.0 August on the Tudeh headquarters, Jed 
to a crisis in Soviet-Jranjan relations. Khomeini strongly 
criticised Soviet Union. FoJlowing Khoneini's criticism in 
August, a well-known Soviet politicaj commentator caJJed 
Khomeini's rule "a disaster", and added that it had brought 
economic chaos, po3itica3 persecution and the fanatical 
repression of ethnic minorities. Both sides, however, sought 
an opportunity to lessen tensions. On 27 September the 
Iranian and Soviet Foreign Ministers met in New York (where 
both were present at the UN Genera] Assembly) and reviewed 
their countries* mutua3 reJationship. Yazdi later said that 
Andrei Gromyko had apologized for the Soviet media having 
given Iran a negative image. Permission for the Tudeh organ 
to resume publication a short time after this meeting was 
considered a reciprocal gesture of goodwill.^ 
During J979 appeals were made to the USSK "to show 
respect" to Muslims in the Soviet Union and to aJ3ow them 
greater freedom". Ayatollah Montazeri appealed to MusJlm 
communities of Soviet Union to fo3 3ow the pattern set by the 
Iranian revo3ution. Iran criticized Soviet support for 
"anti-Islamic" measures in Afghanistan and protested on the 
oppression of Muslims in Afghanistan. 
2. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1978-79, pp.536-536, 
3. Ibid. 
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The cancel3atJon of the 3 959 treaty with the US vas 
balanced by Iran's announcement that jt was also revoking 
the J92J treaty with the USSR. The latter gave Moscow the 
right "to introduce its troops" into Iran and "to take 
necessary Military measures in the interests of its self-
defence" in the event of Iran being turned into "a base for 
military activity against Russia".^ 
In the field of economic relations, in July 1979, Iran 
decided to discontinue work on the second gas pipeline to 
the USSR which was to enable it to receive greater 
quantities of Iranian gas and to sell its own gas to West 
Germany. France;, Austria and Czechoslovakia. The reasons 
given by Iran for cancelling the project were heavy 
construction costs and its new policy of minimizing gas 
sales. In fact, Iranians viewed this projects as 
"exploitative" because it would enable the USSR to buy gas 
cheaply from Iran and sell its own supplies at the highest 
possible price. As for the first pipeline (in operation 
since the early 1970), Iran agreed to continue to supply the 
volume agreed upon by the old regime, but demanded an 
upwards revision of the price, argbing that the USSR was 
paying only one-third of accepted international prices.^ 
Thus the revolution in Iran was not a honeymoon for the 
Soviet Union, despite strong Soviet support for Iranian 
revolution and a sharp decline in U.S. influence in Iran. 
4 . JbJd. 
5. Tiiid, 
111 
The JsJam.ic regjaes of Ayat.o33ah RuhoJJab Khomeini insJstecl, 
that it wJ13 not 3et Soviet ".iroperjajJsro" replace the former 
American ro.le in the country. Imam Khomeini toJd the Soviet 
Ambassador just two weeks after the revolution that Iran 
wouJd not tolerate interference from any country, 
Soviet Union did not take any step to antagonise the 
newly formed government of Islamic Republic but showed its 
keenness and Willingness to maintain good relations with the 
new regime. Soviet Union also adopted almost silence and 
neutral stand on American hostage issue. In November 1979. 
Mr. Gromyko the Soviet foreign Minister in a two hour talk 
with the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow never once raised the 
question of the hostage inside the United State Embassy in 
Tehran. But he agreed that the issue was an internal affair 
of Iran and he did not wish to interfere in Iranian internal 
affairs.^ 
The main issue which overshadowed bilateral relations 
in 1980 was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Tehran 
basically felt two major dangers by Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan: direct Soviet intervention in Iran, either on 
the Afghan model or by slicing off minority regions. It was 
also viewed as a challenge to Iran's commitment to Pan-
Islamic solidarity. This was taken very seriously by Iranian 
leadership. Qotobp.adeh said on very next day of the invasion 
that "the eyes of the entire world" were turned towards Iran 
6. Inidian Express, New Pelhi, 30 April 1979, 
7, The Times, London, November 7h, 1979. 
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in the expectation that Tehran w.iJJ take the Jead in 
liberating Afghanistan. However, the actuaJ Iranian response 
was a iB.ixture of perplexity, fear, helplessness and a great 
deal of naivety. Imam Khomeini himself did not directly 
refer to the invasion until February 1980. The Revolutionary 
Council discussed the issue on the day after the invasion 
and decided, most uncharacteristically, that the official 
response would be made known by the Foreign Ministry. On 29 
December, Foreign Ministry of Iran Issued a statement 
condemning the Soviet invasion and describing it as "a 
hostile act" against" all the Muslims of the world". The 
statement further said that through its action, the USSR was 
giving "inte^national imperialism an excuse, means and 
licence" to continue attacking oppressed peoples and showed 
surprise that USSR was repeating the same mistake as 
imperialism had made in Vietnam. While 'strongly condemning 
the military intervention* speaking' in the name of all 
Muslims' and all the "oppressed" Iran hoped that the USSR 
would want "to prove its support" for the "anti-imperialist 
movement in Iran" by immediately withdrawing from 
Afghanistan.^ 
Tehran's gravest fear was that the USSR would exploit 
US-Iranian tension to encourage and assist ethnic 
separatists. Iran warned Moscow that they did not want any 
intervention in their internal affairs, even in the event of 
an American military operation against Iran. In November 
8. Middle East Contemporary Survey 1979-80 pp.484-85. 
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1980, when Andrej Gromyko said that. Moscow would "protect" 
Iran against any probable American attacK, Tehran cautioned 
the USSR against confronting the US on Iranian soiJ. 
Anticipating such a deveJopment, Iran moved on 5 November 
(the day after the seizure of the American embassy) to 
abrogate Articles 5 and 6 of the J92J treaty with the USSR. 
On 13 January, a Soviet diplomat in Mexico said that the 
USSR was ready to extend any help to Iran, including 
military aid, if Iran asked for it.^ On January 15, 1980 
Acting on orders of Ayatollah Khomeini the Iranian Prime 
Minister sent a note to the Soviet Embassy complaining about 
the Soviet diplomat's offer to aid Iran militarily against 
the United States and warned Soviet Union to refrain from 
making such statements.-'^ 
Tehran also continued to criticize the USSR for having 
purchased Iranian natural gas at one-third of the 
international prices. In February 1980, the Oil Minister, 
Mo'infar, said that Iran had reduced its gas exports to the 
USSR to c. 15% of the volume contract for under Shah. 
Negotiations on gas exports ended in failure in May and Iran 
threatened to stop gas supplies altogether. However, late in 
April, after the FF,C decided to apply sanctions Tehran 
announced that a new trade accord had been signed with the 
USSR.^ -^  The Irano-Soviet rift became wider by mid 1980 due 
to Afghan crisis, Iran's claim of Soviet support to ethnic 
9. JMd. 
10. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 16, 1980. 
11. Middle East Contemporary Survey. 1979-80, n-193, p-485. 
114 
mjnorJties in Iran and charges of spying over Soviet 
diplomats. Consequently in July .1980 The Soviet Union was 
being asked to reduce the size of its diplomatic 
representation in Iran. By that development, the number of 
Soviet non-diplomatic residents in Jran vas reduced to 
two.^2 
Relations with Moscow deteriorated further as tension 
grew on the Jranian-Jraqi border early in August 1980, Jran 
asked the Soviet Union to stop arms shipments to Iraq 
failing which it might recall its Ambassador from Moscow. 
But the USSR displayed remarkable patience and restraint 
towards Jran. Following the outbreak of war between Jran and 
Jraq, • Moscow made an additional gesture towards Jran: it 
promised not to support Jraq in any way and assured Iran 
that it had no part in Baghdad's decision to go on war. The 
USSR would not supply Iraq with beyond the regular supplies 
under existing agreements. In October 1980 Moscow was 
reported to have offered arms to Jran. The offer was, 
however, rejected.^'' 
On August 13, 1980 the then Iranian Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Sadeq Qutob?:adeh, presented a list of demands aimed at 
improving bilateral relations. These included a Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, an end to Soviet support for 
the Iranian Tudeh (communist) party, the cessation by Soviet 
diplomats in Jran of "abnormal actions" against Iran (which 
12. Tines of IndJa, New Delhi, July 5, 1980. 
13. MiddJe East Contemporary Survey. 1979-80, pp.485, 
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had on June 30 expe31ed a Soviet dip-loraat. for alleged 
spying) , and permission for the opening of an Iranian 
consulate in Soviet TajiKstan (bordering on northern 
Afghanistan) .-'^  
From the beginning of the war the Soviet leaders 
insisted on strict non-interference by outside powers in the 
conflict and repeatedly accused the Western powers, in 
particular the United States, for exploiting the situation 
for their vested interest. Later the Soviet press began to 
accuse the USA of having instigated the war. At the same 
time the Soviet Union did not extend any support to Iraq and 
avoided any expression of hostility against the Iranian 
revolution.^^ 
Mr. Mohammed Mokri, the Iranian ambassador in Moscow 
stated on September 23, 1980 that the Soviet Union had 
adopted a neutral position and had recently somewhat reduced 
its arms supplies to Iraq. The Deputy Prime Minister of 
Iraq, Tariq Aziz, visited Moscow in September 1980 but 
failed in obtaining a continuation of Soviet arms supplies 
to Iraq. Jzvestia (the organ of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR) declared on September 23 that no one had 
the right to interfere in relations between Iran and .Traq.-*^  
President Brezhnev, in a speech on September 30, 1980 
called on Iran and Iraq to negotiate a settlement, saying: 
"We think in general that in this day and age war cannot and 
14. KeesJng's Contemporary Archdves, May 22, 1981, pp.30882 
15. KeesJng's Contemporary Archives. August 1981, pp.31011. 
16. Ibid. 
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uust not be a means of settling djsputee between states". He 
also denounced "those who want to establish their control 
over and Middle Past oJ3, who again dream of turning Iran 
into a military base and gendarme post of imperiaJism", ' 
The US decision to send AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia 
was strongJy denounced by Moscow. Tass (the official news 
agency) stated on October 2J that neither Iran nor Iraq nor 
any other country had threatened Saudi Arabia. Iran also 
condemned and denounced the decision of U.S. government and 
considered that such type of acts wouJd increase arms race 
in the region.^® 
According to some Western sources, the Soviet Union, 
from the first day of the war, had stopped a}l arms supplies 
to Iraq under previous contracts and had ordered cargo ships 
on their way to Iraq to return imroediateJy to their home 
ports, and had also recalled some 800 Soviet military 
advisers from Baghdad.-^ ^ 
On November 3 Pravda described the war as "a 
meaningless dispute". The newspaper accused the West, and in 
particular the United States, of having instigated the 
hostilities and of trying to prolong the conflict with the 
object of weakening Iran and other opponents of the 1979 
Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt Pravda 
also claimed that U.S. was backing Iraq in order to 
17. Jbjd. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
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undermine the Jran.ian revoJutJon and to restore US cJlents 
to power in Iran.^^ 
In December 3 980 Moscow protested about an attack on 
its embassy in Tehran by demonstrators mostJy Afghans-making 
the anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan. They marched 
inside the compound of the embassy and torn down the Soviet 
flag with shouts of "Death to Russia". In an official rep.ly 
to the Soviet protest note., the Iranian Government 
expressed the hope that "the motives which prompt such 
incidents should be eliminated as soon as possible.^^ 
Mr. Rajavi, the Iranian Prime Minister, was reported to 
have to3d the Soviet ambassador in Tehran on February 3 5, 
1983, that the Soviet Union should "officia31y dec3are its 
position vis-vis the two aggressor nations in the region-
Iraq and Israel", adding: "We sha3 3 then be able to say 
which road you have taken, that of the imperia3ists or that 
of the revo3utionaries".2'^ 
However, despite many differences Iran's po3icy towards 
the USSR was genera3 3y more cautions. Caution was probabiy 
dictated by the wish not to antagonize both Super Powers 
simu3taneous3y and certain3y by the fact that Iran had long 
common border with the USSR, whi3e the US was far away. Iran 
also considered the growing economic importance of the USSR 
and its emergence as an important supply route to Iran. 
Thus, although the basic attitude of the new regime towards 
20. Pravada, November 3, 3 980. 
?.l. Middle East Contemporary Survey, 3 980-83, pp.563. 
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Moscow did not change, bJlateraJ relatjons jinproved. The 
Minister of Energy, Hasan Ghafurj-Fard, who vjsjted the USSR 
in February 1982, describe Soviet Union as a "friendJy 
country". 
A different view of Iranian-Soviet relations was 
frequently presented by Western media during 1982. They 
consistently spoke of growing Soviet influence in Tran. They 
claimed that Soviet intelligence officers were being 
employed by Iran (mainly to help in suppressing Mujahideen-
e-Khalq), and that Russian were moving into administration 
and technical posts in power plants, the ports and railways, 
the steel Industry and in oil refineries. They also reported 
significant deliveries of Soviet arms and equipment. But 
Iran totally denied reports of any "tilt to Moscow", Musavi 
explained that although it was "economically advisable" to 
buy arms from the superpowers. But Iran preferred to buy 
arms from the free market in order to avoid "dependence on 
the East or the West".^^ But undoubtedly was an improvement 
in economic relations were noticed during this period. 
During the visit of Ghafuri-Fard to Moscow protocol was 
signed on 15 February 1982 for increasing economic co-
operation between the two countries. Agreements were also 
signed to complete the construction of a hydro-electric dam 
on the Arras river and of two power plants by Soviet Union 
(work on these projects were started during Shah's regime). 
Soviet officials also declared Moscow's readiness to 
23. Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1981-82 pp.f>63. 
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dispatch engineers and experts to Iran and to trajn IranJan 
experts in the USSR. Negotiations took pJace regarding the 
transit of goods for Jran through the USSR, which 
subsequentJy increased sharpjy.^* 
The ambivalence of Irani an-Soviet reJations can be 
judged by what the Soviet Media had said about Jran. Pravda, 
for exampJe, complained that although current economic ties 
were "impressive", the widespread possibilities" of 
expanding reJation were not being reaJi/.ed. The paper listed 
the reduction of the Soviet diplomatic staff in Iran, the 
intensified anti-Soviet propaganda there, and the persistent 
Iranian references to the USSR as a threat equal to that of 
the US. 
In 1983 bilateral relations deteriorated because of 
Moscow's renewal of arms shipments to Iraq, and on the issue 
of the suppression of the Tudeh Party. Nonetheless, formal 
diplomatic relations remained intact with neither side 
willing to push their differences to the point of break. 
Iran condemned the USSR for its military aid to Iraq, 
that caused the prevention of an Iranian victory against 
Iraq. It accused Moscow of having approved the use of 
Soviet-made rockets by Iraq in an attack against Iranian 
civilians and of deliberately prolonging Saddam Hussain's 
political life for the sake of Soviet imperialist aims.'*^ 
24, Kayhan International, Tehran, February 16, 198;?. 
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In mJd-January J 983, Iran's refusaJ to renew the 
permit of the TASS correspondent and the arrest of the Tudeh 
leaders in February 3 983 on charges of spying for the USSR 
heightened the tensions between the two countries. But 
despite the.ir disruptive effect, both sides tried to Jjmif 
the damage. One Iranian spokesman said that the Tudeh 
leaders, incJuding Kiyanuri, were not arrested because of 
their political and party activities but main3y on the 
specific charge of spying. A few weeks after the arrests, 
Iran's Foreign Minister, 'AJi Akbar VeJayati, expressed his 
country's desire for 'good-neighbourJy reJations' with the 
USSR, 'based on mutua} respect for each other's sovereignty 
and on non interference'. But other prominent figures openly 
condemned the Soviets. Meshkini, the Imam Jum'ah of Qom, on 
25 February 1983, condemned the USSR for its part in the 
deaths of Iranians on the Iraqi front. On the same Friday, 
the Imam vTum'ah of Karaj questioned the Soviet Union for its 
protest against the arrest of Tudeh 3eaders.^^ 
Apart from many differences and compJaints against each 
other both sides tried to maintain cordiaJ relations which 
was reflected by the visit of Iranian Foreign Minister, AJi 
Akbar Velayati to Moscow in the first week of April 3 983. 
During his visit Velayati met and talked with President 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Fdward Shevardnadze. 
The bilateral talks focussed on ways of strengthening 
Tehran-Moscow relations, the Iran-Iraq peace talks, the 
26. Kaytian International. Tehran, 26 February 3 983. 
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issue of Afghanistan and the deveJopments in the M.iddJe 
East. The Iranian and Sovjet Foreign Ministers also 
discussed issues related to economic, tecbnica.1 and 
industrial cooperation between their respective countries in 
the meeting. Velayatj described the visit as 'fruitful' 
while the Soviet leaders voiced support for the Islamic 
Revolution and the ideals of the Iranian people and 
described the visit as a sign of promoted ties between the 
two countries.2^ 
On 4 May 1983, Iran declared eighteen Soviet diplomats 
in Tehran Persona-non-grata for having violated the 
principles of noninterference and good neighbourliness by 
maintaining contact with 'mercenary agents'. Pravda reacted 
strongly against what it called an 'anti-Soviet campaign' by 
'hostile circles' and condemned 'fabrications' about Soviet 
involvement in espionage as a 'malicious provocation'. Three 
Iranian diplomats ousted from the USSR on retaliation 
arrived home on i?8 May; they again confirmed that 'the East 
and the West are both our enemies:^^ 
Above the arms supplies to Iraq and Tudeh issue it was 
Afghanistan which remained the focus of bitter and hostile 
anti-Soviet criticism from Tehran. In mid-June 1983, Iran 
officially announced a plan to resolve the Afghanistan 
problem. According to the plan to the Afghan problem was to 
be solved by the true representatives of the Afghan people; 
27. Tehran Times^ Tehran, April 3, 1983. 
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the Sov.iet Union should withdraw its forces and should allow 
all the refugees to return. The Iranian Press also accused 
the USSR of massacring civilians in Afghanistan. Late in 
September 1983, Velayati reaffirmed accusations of 
maltreatment of Afghan citizens by the USSR in his address 
to the UN General Assembly. For him to tell an international 
forum that the USSR was heading in the same direction as the 
US had done in Vietnam was a telling sign of the extent to 
which bilateral relations had deteriorated. He said that 
'Red Satan' had become as threatening as 'Great Satan*.''" 
Relations with the Soviet Union underwent a steady 
improvement during 1986, with a visit in early February by a 
delegation led by the then First Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Goeorgy Kornienko, the highest-ranKing Soviet official 
to visit Iran since the 1979 revolution. They agreed to 
establish a joint commission on economic cooperation.^" 
The joint economic commission played an effective role 
in preparing grounds for cooperation in various fields 
including oil-gas and other field of technology. 
The rich natural resources of the Islamic Republic, its 
strategic location and having common border with the Soviet 
Union attaches a special importance to mutual relations and 
cooperation at an international level. 
An Iranian delegation led by Mr. Agazadeh, the Oil 
Minister, visited Moscow in mid-August 1986 for talks on the 
29 . Ibid. 
30. JCeesi/?g's vol . xxx i i , October 1986, p.34701 
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possibility of resuming Iranian supplies of natural gas to 
the Soviet Union. 
The Iranian foreign minister for economic and 
V 
international affairs*, Moharomecl Javed I.arijani heading a 
delegation, visited Moscow in ear.ly August 3 986. During 
meetings, the two sides discussed issues of mutual 
interests, including bilateral relations and ways to expand 
ties including regional and international affairs.^ -* On 
Iran's gas sales to the Soviet Union, Larijani said that 
teems of experts from the two countries were studying the 
plan. Iran was interested in exporting gas to U.S.S.R. and 
to Europe through Soviet pipelines.-*^ 
In late August, 1986 a Soviet diplomat said that Tehran 
-Moscow relations were "growing fast" and expressed the hope 
for holding a session of the joint Irano-Soviet Committee 
for permanent cooperation in March 1987. 
Soviet Union also participated in the International 
Trade Fair at Tehran Iran and the Soviet Union also agreed 
to cooperate in the field of oil explanation and 
exploration. Officials of both countries bold taIXs on the 
manufacture of oil platforms which was to be set up in the 
Caspion Sea.^^ 
The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petroskey 
leading a delegation arrived Iran in the second week of 
February 1988 on the occasion of the ninth Anniversary of 
31. Kayhan International, Tehran, August 4, 1986. 
32. Kayhan Internationa], Tehran, August M , 1986. 
33. Kayhan Internationa], August 28, 1986. 
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the Iranian Revolution. During his six day visjt he 
discussed many issues such as Jran-Iraq war, Persian GuAf 
crisis. Afghanistan problem as weJ.1 as many international 
issues. On Afghanistan he expressed that crisis should be 
solved in regional perspective rather than in international 
perspective. He assured that Soviet Union would withdraw its 
troops from Afghanistan as soon as a national understanding 
developed among Afghan people. The visit of Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister on the occasion of the anniversary of 
Islamic revolution showed that Soviet union gave much 
importance to Iran.^^ 
After discussions with Iranian officials Soviet Deputy 
Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky expressed his country's 
satisfaction with the 'upward trend of bilateral relations. 
Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi and Petrovsky agreed 
to implement major joint economic projects. Hailing the 
Soviet stance on withdrawal from Afghanistan, Musavi hoped 
that the pullout will be accompanied by the formation of a 
non-aligned government based on the will of the Afghans. On 
Iran-USSR economic cooperation, Musavi noted that decision 
to implement several major projects would be a good step in 
this direction. 
Petrovsky also had a meeting with Foreign Minister All 
Akbar Velayati and voiced his country's concern over 
increased U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region. 
34. Kayhan International, Tehran, February 13, 1988. 
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On Afghanistan jesue, the Soviet off.icJaJ assured 
Velayati of Soviet puJJout from Afghanistan pointing to May 
15 as the set date. He added that his country was ready to 
withdraw a major portion of its forces during the first 
phase.''^  
In June J 988 Iran and the Soviet Union agreed to 
estabJish a joint shipping Jine in the Caspian Sea. The 
agreement was reached in the 17th meeting of the joint Iran-
Soviet commission held at Tehran on June 2-3, 3 988. The two 
sides also agreed on the loading and unloading procedures 
and regulating joint tariffs at their ports. 
Director general of the Ports and Shipping Organization 
of Iran, Muhammad Madad described the Iran-Soviet shipping 
line, to be implemented for the first time, as a major step 
in expanding economic ties in the Caspian Sea area. He noted 
that Anzali and Noshahr ports, both at the Caspian province 
of Gil an, would become strongly active in supplying 
country's needs.^^ 
After the acceptance of U.N. sponsored cease fore in 
Iran-Iraq war, both Iran and Soviet Union tried their best 
to improve relations. In late 3 988 a number of agreements 
and protocol were signed followed by the exchange of visits 
by officials and ministers of both the sides. 
In September 1988 Soviet deputy minister of foreign 
economic relations, Veniamin Koro3ev, visited Tehran and 
35. Tehran Times, Tehran, February 16, 3 988, 
36. Kayhan Internationa], June y^ , 1988. 
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participated jn the ]4th Tehran Internationa] Trade Fair. 
During his visit, KoroJev discussed with Iranian officiaJs 
nutuaJ cooperation in various fieJds including development 
of power stations, extension of the Isfahan steeJ mills and 
construction of dams on border rivers between the two 
countries. Both sides a.lso signed agreements on the 
expansion of bilateral cooperation in the fields of oil and 
gas and on the holding of the 11th session of the Joint 
Economic Cooperation Committee at the ministerial level in 
Moscow in December.^' 
In November 1988, a letter of understanding was inked 
at Tehran during a meeting between the visiting Soviet 
official and Minister of Housing and Urban Development of 
Iran. The two side also discussed expansion of Tehran-Moscow 
cooperation in various construction areas and production of 
construction materials. According to the letter of 
understanding, the two sides agreed on mutual engineering 
consulting services, and establishing of plants for 
producing construction materials. Russians also agreed for 
modernizing of four construction plants in Iran and 
cooperation in establishment of new plants of this kind. The 
letter also provided for Iran's purchase of raw construction 
materials from the Soviet Union in the framework of the 
permanent Economic Cooperation Commissi on.^^ 
37. KayJian Internationa], September 24, 1988 
38. Tehran Times, Tehran, November 19, 1988. 
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Iran agreed to sell natural gas to the Soviet Union in 
November 1988. An agreement was signed by Iran's Foreign 
Ministry Director General for European Affairs, Mabmoud 
Vaezi and Soviet Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign 
Economic Relations, Konstantin Katusheve. The initia] yearly 
sale was 3 billion cubic meters. The agreement was agreed to 
be the revision of previous one between Iran and the USSR 
which was aborted shortly after the victory of the Islamic 
Revolution due to disputes between the Iranians and the 
Soviet over price rates as well as due to some political 
reasons.^^ 
During 1988 the Soviet Union had agreed in principle to 
purchase natural gas from Iran in return for machinery used 
in power plants and steel mill industries and other 
equipment needed for reconstruction projects. The volume of 
mutual trade exchange was reached to $350 million in 1988.^^ 
Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs of Iran, 
Mohammad Javad Travani, heading a high ieveJ delegation, 
visited Moscow in December 1988 to participate in the 1.1th 
Session of the Joint Economic Cooperation Commission. Wider 
cooperation in steel production, power generation, railways, 
utilization of border rivers, construction of dams, and 
resumption of natural gas exports were discussed with the 
officials of Soviet Union. The Iranian delegation included 
high ranking officials from the ministries of foreign 
39. Tehran Times, November 21, 1988. 
40. Tehran Times, Tehran, December 5, 1988, 
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affairs, economics and finance, energy, roads and transport, 
mines and netaJs, construction and the heads of the state 
fisheries and steel company. The top-J eve! ta3ks in Moscow 
was followed by number of meetings between Iranian and 
Soviet experts on ways to increase economic ties and co-
operation. An economic protocoJ was a] so signed at the 
end.*i 
An important achievement of the visit, was an agreement 
to resume Iranian gas exports to the Soviet Union at an 
annual rate of three billion cubic meters. The export had 
been ha]ted since 198J after the two countries faiJed to 
agree on its price. Among other agreements, the signing of a 
note of understanding for joint construction of two dams on 
the Arras border river, raising the production capacity of 
two power stations (Ramin in Ahvaz and Martyr Montazeri an 
Isfahan) by 3 030 megawatts, and a plan to expand Isfahan 
Steel Mill whose annual production within the next six 
months was to raise upto 3.9 mil31on tons were other 
important achievements of the delegation.^^ 
The Iranian Revo3ution was considered to be a boon for 
Moscow and a grave defeat for Washington. The new 
revolutionary government, quickly reversed the po3itlcal and 
strategic orientation of the former regime and started the 
process of 'de-Westernisation*. The mu3tinationa3 
corporations, especia31y the American firms, were banned as 
41, Tehran Times, 5 December 3 988. 
42. Tehran Times, December 9, 3 988 
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It was considered essentjaj to remove the JndustrJaJ.isat.ion 
programme of Shah in order to adopt an IsJamie model of 
economy. However initJalJy it posed some probJem but 3ater 
on things became smooth. The two American eJectronic 
intelligence stations-one adjacent to the Soviet border near 
Bandar Shah on the shores of the Caspian Sea and the other, 
in Kabkam, were closed. That gave a great reJJef to Soviet 
Union as it seized the United States chances to gather data 
on Soviet nuclear and missi.le testing in Soviet Central 
Asia. New government of Iran decided to reduce arms 
purchases and stop to act as policeman of the Persian Gulf. 
Iran opted the policy of nona3ignment and withdrew from 
CENTO. Jt decided to play a roJe in the containment, of 
communism. 
Revolutionary Iran has also not been very friendly, 
close and cooperative with the countries in the region 
having close aliens with U.S. Iran stopped selling oil to 
Israel and severed all connections with it by the end of 
February 1979; broke off diplomatic relations with Egypt on 
April 30, 1979; and recognised the PLO, turning over to it 
the Israeli embassy. On the other hand Iran tried to come 
closer to the Arab states who opposed president Jimmy 
Carter's Camp David programme. Thus in this way Khomeini's 
regime virtually eliminated all the persistent sources of 
tension between Moscow and Tehran.*^ 
43. Rubinstein, Alvin, Z., The Soviet Union and Iran under 
Khomeini, Jnternat.JonaJ Affairs, Autumn 1981, vol.57, 
pp.599-600. 
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IRAN AND EAST EUROPE 
With regard to the Past European countrjes, too, jt was 
in the field of economjc reJatJons that improvements were 
registered by J98i?. As seen from Tehran, these relations 
offered most of the benefits that could be gained from the 
USSR, but without the political onus of reJJance on Moscow. 
In its dealings with them, Iran offered oil Jn exchange for 
technology and foodstuffs. Protocols for economic co-
operatjon were signed with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary and Romania. Consequently, 
there was a sharp increase in the volume of trade. While in 
1977-78, Iran's imports from the Eastern bloc (including the 
USSR) amounted to 5.5% of total imports, in 1980-81 it rose 
to 14.4%. 
With its natural resources including above a.l3, natural 
gas, oil and metals Iran ranks among the ten richest 
countries of the world. Iran offered one of the most 
interesting markets among developing countries for 
Yugoslavia. The Islamic revolution which brought about deep 
social, political and economic changes, created conditions 
for a considerable increase of mutual economic cooperation. 
Yugoslavia did not support the policy of an economic 
blockade of Islamic Republic of Iran. The Yugoslav economy 
put considerable capacities at the disposal of Iranian 
partners in order to help them and satisfy their needs. 
The outbreak of the debt crisis, decline of oil prices 
and economically exhausting war between Iran and Iraq got 
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both Iran and Yugoslavia into a relatively difficuJt 
economic situation. In an effort to overcome objective 
difficulties and increase mutual economic cooperation, while 
at the same time Keeping it at a relatively stable leveJ, 
the two countries concluded the Agreement on Balanced Mutual 
Trade in 1981. This provided a framework for the achievement 
of a high level of mutual trade even in times of economic 
difficulties, and Iran became one of Yugoslavia's major 
trading partners among developing countries. 
The Iran's relations with Yugoslavia after the victory 
of the revolution expanded to such an extent that bilateral 
trade during 1982-83 was 20 times more than the pre-
revolutionary period.^^ 
In December 1981 an Yugoslavian delegation visited Iran 
to study the possibilities of transferring a Tabriz tractor, 
from an assembly factory to a producing and self sufficient 
unit to manufacture agricultural machineries. Fdvard KJiever 
the head of the delegation said that they had come to Iran 
to help Iran to achieve industrial self-sufficiency and they 
had prepared suitable programmes to achieve that goaJ.^^ 
In November 1982 Yugoslavian foreign minister visited 
Iran and met with Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, P.M. 
Musavi, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani, President Khamenei and 
Finance Minister Namazi. President Khamenei during his taJks 
with Yugoslavian Foreign Minister praised the efforts of the 
44. Kayhan International, Tehran, February 28, 1983 
45. Kayhan International, December 14, 1981. 
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founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement and stressed 
the need of further strengthening the movement. He said that 
strength would not come about by adding to the member of the 
Non-Aligned but rather through abiding by the basic 
principles of its founding members,^^ 
The trade between Iran and Yugoslavia continuously 
increased as during 1987-88, Yugoslavia's experts to and 
imports from Iran amounted to about U.S. $260 million. After 
the acceptance of cease-fire in Iran-Iraq war, Yugoslavian 
firms submitted a number of tenders and showed its interest 
to participate in the reconstruction process of Iran. 
Yugoslavia offered a great number of standard technologies, 
as well as original technological and other industrial 
solutions. This was also confirmed by an extremely great 
number of offers and initiatives of Yugoslav organization 
relating to technology and know-how transfer which were 
submitted to Iranian clients in the period after the 
victorious revolution. Considering the needs of the Iranian 
industries, Yugoslavians were mainly interested in to the 
following fields: construction of farms and launching of 
agricultural production: development of high-quality seeds; 
development of beverage, tobacco and foodstuffs industries; 
opening of mines and execution of geological investigations; 
various works in the fields of fisheries, petrochemical 
industry; shipbuilding, conveyance and farming machinery 
industry; ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy; automotive 
46. Kayban International, November 15, 1982. 
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industry; railway equipment; construction machinery; 
transmission electrical power lines; dams barrages; building 
materials industry (cement works, brickyards, etc.); 
construction of cold storage plants, slaughter houses, sJ2os 
packaging assembly lines (especially for foodstuffs 
industry), etc. Equipping of textile industries and 
equipping and management of ports; construction, equipping 
and distribution management of power generation and projects 
also represented a significant part of the export supply of 
the Yugoslav economy. They had also great potentials of 
technology transfer in the fields of pharmaceuticaJ and 
medical equipment industries, rehabilitation centers and 
similar, durable consumer goods industry, including various 
branches of electronic and household appliances and other 
industries. In 1987 several seminars were organized for 
Iranian businessmen so as to acquaint them with the 
potentials of the Yugoslav economy. The organizers were 
renowned Yugoslav exporters of technology, industrial 
equipment and know-how. Yugoslavia also registered its 
presence and potentials in Tehran Trade Fairs every year.^' 
The materialization of the idea about the opening of a 
representative office of the Iranian export center in 
Yugoslavia - which could also serve for the realization of 
Iranian non-oil exports to neighboring countries, especially 
to the countries of Eastern and Central Europe certainly 
47. Tehran Times, November 29, 1988, 
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contributed positive results in the field of purchasing 
Iranian non-oil products. 
Both Iran and Bulgaria tried to expand economic and social 
relations in post revolutionary period. The nations and 
governments of Iran and Bulgaria had identical views on many 
political issues and deep anti-imperialist sentiments. These 
were the views of the minister of Agriculture and Rural 
Development of Iran Mohammad Salamati after his meeting with 
Bulgarian Deputy Premier, Andrei, Lovkanonov who visited 
Tehran in November, 1982. Visiting Bulgarian deputy premier 
expressed that he found a deep anti-imperialist sentiment in 
Iranian revolution and stressed the need of Iran Bulgaria 
co-operation in their campaign against U.S. imperialism. He 
also offered to participate in the reconstruction process of 
the war-stricken region of Iran.*^ 
The bilateral relations between two countries were 
strengthened with the exchange of visit by the ministers and 
top officials of both the countries and signing of number of 
protocols and economic agreements. A delegation from Iran's 
Roads and Transportations Ministry, headed by minister 
Neferd Husseinian visited Bulgaria in June J 983 and 
discussed the various issues of mutual interest with 
Bulgarian officials and Ministers. The purpose of the 
delegation was described by Neferd Husseinian as to 
strengthen the long-established friendship between the two 
countries. The Bulgaria Minister of Transport, Varil Tsanov, 
48. Kayhan International, November 29, 1982. 
135 
expressed Bulgaria's readiness and willingness to expand its 
cooperation with Iranian government in all aspects of 
transportation projects and in other fields.^^ 
Since, Iran was involved in a costly war with Iraq, it 
could not give too much emphasis on trade and business with 
Bulgaria but there political relations were good through out 
that period. That was the reason that a marginal increase 
was seen in trade relation by mid 1988. In May 1988 talk 
were held between Bulgarian and Iranian delegations headed 
respectively by Bulgaria's State Minister Krastitu Stani.lov 
and Iran's Deputy Minister of Heavy Industries Mohsen Safaie 
Farahani. stanilov was also the chairman of Association of 
Machine Building Agriculture and Construction Techniques. 
After the meetings, the two sides signed agreements on 
mutual cooperation concerning heavy and light lift trucks 
production, exchange of buses and trucks production, 
exchange of bus and trucks parts, tractor engine parts, and 
Iran's exports of mini-buses and Nissan pick-ups to 
Bulgaria. At the end of the meeting a protocol on promotion 
of Tehran-Sofia industrial and economic cooperation in the 
field of heavy industries was also signed. The increasing 
economic ties between two can be judged by the fact that the 
volume of industrial-economic exchange between the two 
countries amounted to $40 million in 1988. 
Governor of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Central Bank 
Majid Qasemi heading a delegation visited Sofia in the same 
49. Kayhan International, June 23, 1983. 
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month^^ and signed a protocol of cooperation with Bulgarian 
banking officials. The protocol provided for the expansion 
of relations between the Central Bank of Iran and Bulgaria. 
The protocol was described by Governor as a positive step in 
expansion of bilateral economic relations. He also met with 
Bulgarian Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov and presented a 
message from Prime Minister Hussein Musavi of Iran urging 
for the. Expansion and strengthening of Tehran-Sofia 
relations. It was decided that Bulgarian Prime Minister 
Goergi Atanasov will pay an official visit to Tehran in 
early June 1988. During his talk with Bulgarian Foreign 
Trade Minister and head of the joint Iran-Bulgaria economic 
commission, Hristo Hristov, he discussed promotion of 
bilateral, economic, trade, banking and political reJations. 
The Bulgarian Minister expressed support of his country for 
the 'struggle of the Muslim nation of Iran' and hoped for an 
honorable end to the Iraqi-imposed-war. 
The trade between the two countries gradually improves 
as the volume of trade exchanges between the two countries 
in 1987 was $320 million ^^ while in 1988 it increased to 
$600 million. 
Iran and Bulgaria signed a transportation protocol in 
June 1988. The protocol provided for the expansion of 
Tehran-Sofia air transportation, utilization of two 
Bulgarian ports as well as road transportation via a new 
50. Tehran Times, Tehran, May 26, 1988 
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route for Iran, according to which Iranian goods were to be 
transferred through the BlacK Sea to the Soviet territory 
and then to Iran.^^ The protocol was signed by director 
general of the Ports and Shipping Organization and deputy 
roads and transport minister, Muhammad Madad of Iran and 
deputy transport minister, Emil Zahariev of Bulgaria. 
On the official Invitation of Prime Minister HusseJn 
Musavi, his Bulgarian counterpart Georgl Atanassov vjsited 
the Islamic Republic of Iran from June 7-9, 1988. Heading a 
top-level delegation, premier Atanassov arrived Tehran on 
7th June and was received at the airport by Musavi. 
Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Trade Hristo Hrjstov as weJJ 
as a number of other ranking economic and pojjtica] 
officials accompanied Atanassov. A number of trade 
agreements and protocols were signed during the visit. 
According to one agreement reached between the two sides, 
Iran was to export minibuses, Renault cars, chassis and 
lift-trucks to Bulgaria. The two countries also agreed to 
cooperate in the industrial field. Including manufacture of 
electronic lift-trucks, transfer of technology of C.N.C. 
machines, equipment of cement factories and setting up of 
canned meat and canned fruit plants. They also agreed to 
cooperate in the areas of forestry, production of cheese, 
concentrated grapesand, concentrated apples, air transport, 
shipment of goods to Iran via the Black Sea, and the use of 
52. Kayhan International, Tehran, June 11, 1988 
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SDR system in banking credits.^ -^  Atanassov and Musavj a]so 
signed a 12-year agreement on long-term cooperation between 
the two countries in political, economic and ciilturaJ fjeJds 
until the year 2,000.^^ 
According to another agreement concluded between 
managing director of Iran's civil aviation organization and 
his Bulgarian counterpart, the two countries agreed to 
cooperate in the field of air transportation. 
A joint communique was also issued calling for 
withdrawal of U.S. and NATO military forces from the Persdan 
Gulf and stressed that security of the region must be 
maintained by the Persian Gulf states. A commundque issued 
simultaneously in Tehran and Sofia also condemned the use of 
chemical weapons in the war, supported struggle of the 
Palestinian people and condemned the Zionist aggressjon 
against Arab nations as well as Israeli harassment of the 
occupied territories.^^ 
The other East European countries with whom Iran 
developed relations were East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Romania. In 1989 Trade between Iran and Fast 
Germany was amounted to about 300 million U.S. dollars. 
Trade between the two countries was on barter basis means 
there was a balance between imports and exports. Iran 
exported one million tons of crude oil to East Germany only 
in the year 1989. In return East Germany set up major 
5 3 . Jjbid. 
5 4 . IMd, 
5 5 . Ibid. 
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facility for producing basic materials for the glass and 
paper industries. With Czechoslovakia relations were 
strengthened by the visit of ministers and top officials of 
both the countries to each others countries. During 1987 
Iran's export to Czechoslovakia amounted to U.S. $92 million 
which Included oil, mineral ore, dried fruits, footwear etc. 
While Iranian import from that country amounted to U.S. $62 
million in the same period that mostly included the machine 
tools, textile machinery and spare parts for sugar mills 
constructed by Czechoslovakia in Iran. The bilateral 
relations between two countries was further strengthened 
with the visit of Czechoslovakian Prime Minister, Ladislav 
Adame heading a high power delegation to Tehran in February 
1989.56 
The Islamic Republic of Iran takes a special place in 
the Hungarian People's Republic's approach to developing 
countries. Hungarian foreign policy considered Iran an 
important partner over the long term. Interstate relations 
were always balanced between the two countries. Hungary 
was among the first countries to recognize the new 
provisional revolutionary government in Iran and the Islamic 
Republic declared on April 1, 1979. 
After the victory of Islamic Revolution cooperation 
between the two countries developed in several important 
branches, including industry, agriculture, public health. 
56. Tehran Times, Tehran, February 1, 1989. 
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education and culture. Since 1982 Iran emphasised to further 
develop political relations with Hungary. 
The Irano-Hungary relation was boosted with the visit 
of the Iranian Prime Minister Mr. Hussein Musavi to Hungary 
between October 15 and 17 1986. He was received by General 
Secretary Janos Kador of the Hungarian Socialist Workers 
party. A meeting of the joint Iran-Hungary commission was 
held in June 1988 at the Ministry of Agriculture in Tehran 
which was attended by visiting Hungarian Industries Minister 
Frigyes Berecz and Iran's Minister of Agriculture Abbasali 
Zali. During the talks, the two sides agreed to sign a 
letter of understanding on mutual co-operation in the fields 
of commerce, agriculture and industry. Zali also proposed 
the formation of a joint scientific technical committee to 
boost Tehran-Budapest cooperation which was accepted by the 
Hungarian side. The two sides also agreed to cooperate in 
expanding two 3-5 megawatt power stations in Isfahan, 
dredging some dams, setting up date packing plants and 
producing alloys. Further, Iran agreed to purchase $J5 
million worth of medical instruments from Hungary on barter 
basis. Talks were also held on purchase of agricultural 
equipment and machineries for industries as welJ as 
establishment of small hydro-electric power stations. They 
also studied holding of training courses and agricultural 
cooperation.^^ 
57, Tehran Times, Tehran, June 13, 1988 
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Thus after deciding to maintain distance from both the 
superpowers Iran tried to develop trade and economjc 
relations with the countries of the third world and Fast 
European countries. A remarkable increase can be noticed in 
Iran's trade relation with East European Countries after 
1982 and specially during the period 1987-89. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IRAN: REGIONAL POLICY AND ISLAMIC WORLD 
Iran's policy towards neighbours and Muslim world had 
been guided by different variables. There are a number of 
factors which influenced the policy during the Shah period 
as well as during the regime of Islamic Republic. During the 
Shah Reza Pahelvi era the overt and subversive Arab 
activities in Iran between 1958-67 largely affected Iran's 
foreign policy. During late 1960's and early 1970's Iran 
considerably extended its military presence on its own side 
of the Gulf Coast, to prevent any possible external threat 
to Gulf security. Hence Iran took control of the left bank 
of Shaft al-Arab in April 1969. Tehran gained military 
control over the entrance to the Gulf, occupying three 
strategically important islands near the Strait of Hormu?; in 
November 1971 and intervened militarily in Dhufar (Oman) as 
well as in Pakistani Baluchistan. Iran also tried to 
maintain supremacy over Gulf through diplomatic means and by 
exploiting tensions between the Arab Gulf States. The Iran's 
pro-western policy was also guided by this objective to 
secure and maintain supremacy in the area. Iraq's increasing 
relationship with Moscow in early 1970's was also partially 
responsible for Iran's pro-western policies.•'^  
Iran's dependence on oil revenues made the security of 
the Persian Gulf and oil shipping lanes a primary concern 
of Iran's foreign policy, Iran took keen interest in 
1. Middle East contemporary survey, 1976-77, pp.392. 
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defusing tension in the areas close to Gulf in order to 
secure the stability in the area. Such as Arab-IsraeJ 
conflict, the disputes in the Horn of Afrjca'and development 
in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Indian sub-continent. 
It was also one of the main objectives of Iran's po]3cy to 
reduce Soviet influence in the area.^ 
A conference on Persian Gulf security was held in 
November 1976 at Muscat in Oman. The conference was attended 
by all Foreign Ministers of the Persian GuJf littoral 
states. However, the conference failed to achieve any 
tangible result except to encourage the Arab states to 
increase their opposition to an Iranian initiated colJective 
security system.-' Gulf security remained a major concern for 
Iran throughout 1977-78. A series of events in the region 
like events in the Horn of Africa in 1977, coup in 
Afghanistan in 1978, the changes in YAR and PDRY enhanced 
the need of a collective defence agreement in the Guif. 
However no progress was made. As quoted by Shah in November 
1977 "I do not know what else I can do. I told these peopJe 
(in the other Gulf states) that I could propose to them 
either the closest or the loosest pact they wanted I do 
not want to play the role of big brother J am ready to 
accept absolute equality. But it seems that it cannot get 
the ground". In 1978 Shah said that Iran will no Jonger 
press the idea of Gulf security. When Iran felt that its 
2. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1978-79, pp.492. 
3. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1976-77, pp.392 
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idea of Gulf security is not possible, it started to bolster 
Gulf security through bilateral relations.^ 
The improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations continued 
throughout 1978. The main issue was stabjlity and security 
of the Gulf, preventing Soviet penetration and checking the 
growth of radical movements in Gulf. Oil pricing was not a 
matter of dispute after mid 1977 and other issues of 
disagreement also marginalised. On 11th January 1978, the 
Shah of Iran arrived at Riyadh. The main issue he discussed 
with king Khalid was Sadat's peace moves and developments jn 
Horn of Africa on which the two parties were reported on 
complete agreement. Shah also assured Saudi Arabia not to 
fear about Iran's arms and nuclear reactor purchased from 
U.S. These talks were followed up by an exchange of visits 
and messages. On 15th January, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud 
al-Faisal visited Iran and delivered a message from the king 
that Saudi Arabia would share the responsibility of 
defending Somalia if it became the victims of foreign 
aggression. In November 1977 during the visit of Saudi 
Minster of Interior, Naif Ibn Abd al-Aziz matters of 
internal security were discussed. They also reached to an 
agreement for the exchange of information relating to 
subversive and criminal activities. In the same meeting 
joint measures to combat terrorism were also proposed. On a 
number of occasions Saudi Arabia expressed its concern over 
the internal situation in Iran and publicly declared their 
4. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1977-78, pp.492-93. 
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support for the Shah. In August crown prince Fahd expressed 
confidence in the Shah's ability to restore domestic 
stability. Fahd stated that "The Arab states will have to 
support Iran and the Shah, because the stability of that 
country is important to the region and any radical 
change will upset its security balance".^ Iran's 
Relations with Iraq improved after 1975 Algiers agreements 
despite a number of issues on which there were 
disagreements. In December 1977 Iraqi Vice President Muhyi-
al Din Maruf accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Saud 
Haramadi, visited Tehran. The Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas 
Ali Kalatbani also visited Iraq in February 1978. A number 
of bilateral agreements covering trade and economic links 
and cultural co-operation were signed during this period. On 
oil price policy Iran favoured those who advocated a price 
freeze while Iraq pressed for price increase. Iran also 
continued to be concerned about Iraq's massive purchase of 
arms and development of its nuclear programmes. On Iran's 
internal crisis initially Iraq regarded it as solely a 
domestic matter and expressed confidence in the Shah's 
ability to suppress the opposition. However when the Shah's 
regime and stability of the region seems to be in danger, 
Iraq publicly declared its concern and support to Shah. In 
August 1978 Iraq handed over an Iranian citizen who fled to 
Iraq after admitting involvement in the burning down of a 
cinema in abandon. In September 1978 Iraqi authorities 
6. ibid, 
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restricted Khomeini's freedom of action and in October 3 978 
forced Khomeini to leave Iraq and take shelter in Paris^ 
During the visit of UAE President and Ruler of Abu 
Dhabi, Zayid Ibn Sultan to Tehran in November 1977, GuJf 
security and stability were the issues v?hich were discussed 
during his talks with Shah and other Iranians. A joint 
communique was issued declaring that stability was among the 
main region should be preserved through the co-operation of 
regional countries without any foreign interference. Both 
the sides also signed an agreement for the exchange of 
information regarding subversive groups and activities of 
Left group (communists).^ 
The Shah visited Oman in December 1977. During his 
visit the main issues discussed were the continuation of co-
operation in the protection of Strait of Hormuz and Iranian 
technical and economic aid. The issue of stability and 
security of the Gulf region were also discussed during the 
visit of the Ruler of Bahrain Shaykh Isa Ibn Salman a.l-
Khalifa to Iran in June 1978.^ 
All the littoral states regarded the developments in 
Iran as potential threat to regional stability and danger to 
themselves. Most of the head of the states extended their 
support to Shah.^ 
6. Ibid., p . 4 9 4 . 
7 . Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid., p.495. 
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Iran's policies towards wider regional problems were 
similar to its policies in regard to Gulf. It tried to 
identify the problems which directly or indirectly could 
effect the stability of the Persian Gulf or endanger its oil 
routes and to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the 
area.^^ 
In 1979 after the take over of power by revolutionary 
forces Iran's regional policy was revised sharply. The new 
regime regarded that Shah's aspiration to make Iran a major 
power in the region was due to the desire of United States 
to act Iran as 'policeman' of the region. The aim of the new 
policy was to reduce great power influence in Middle East in 
general and the Gulf area in particular. No state in the 
region should strive for local hegemony. Iran's role should 
be to contribute for the stability in the Gulf region 
through the cooperation of all littoral states. Iran's 
involvement in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean affairs 
was regarded as against the interest of the state and was 
dropped. This in turn brought about a radical change in 
Iran's defence and arms procurement policies and Shah's 
massive acquisition of arms was regarded as an 'American 
plot'. The new regime's view was that Iran should neither 
play the role of 'policeman' in the Gulf nor to serve as an 
American arsenal. 
On the one hand where Iran adopted the policy of non-
interference and not to influence other countries of the 
10. Ibid, 
1.48 
region as well as the world, on the other hand Khomeinj 
wanted to export the revolution to other Muslim countries 
and Muslim societies. He regarded 'Islamic revolution' as an 
instrument for the attainment of Islamic unity and as a 
model for other Muslim societies. He declared, "Our movement 
is for an Islamic goal, not for Iran alone " He said 
that Iran was only the starting point and other Muslim 
countries should also join the revolution even though they 
have different government and have different believes. They 
might be Shia or Sunni but it is not the question. Shariat 
Madani advocated for a confederation of Islamic states whose 
members should enjoy freedom in their domestic affairs but 
should be bound by a common foreign policy. However after 
coming into power Khomeini refrained to call for exporting 
revolution but his other associates did not restrained 
themselves. •^•'^  
During 1979-80 Iran's foreign relation deteriorated to 
almost total isolation. Tension with Iraq led to war which 
dominated Iran's foreign policy and foreign relation till 
1988. Iraq had the support of most of the Gulf States. In 
Middle East only the members of Arab Steadfastness Front-
Syria, Libya, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY) and the FLO- were supporters of Iran. On its 
Eastern borders relation with Pakistan also deteriorated. 
But prevention of Great power interference in the Gulf area 
continued to be a central consideration of Iran's foreign 
11. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1978-79, pp.533-34. 
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policy. In some respect Iran continued the Shah's earlier 
policies and used many old arguments to justify its 
position. Iran repeatedly declared that it would not give up 
the three Islands at the entrance of the strait of Hormuz 
seized by the Shah in 1971 despite the objection of most of 
the Arab states. Like its predecessors, Khomeini's regime 
also objected over the Arab countries on using of the term 
Arabian Gulf instead of Persian Gulf.-^ ^ It was regarded that 
War with Iraq and Iran's position of isolation wou]d compe.l 
Iran to adopt a more accommodating stance to win allies. But 
it had an adverse impact on Iran's attitude and diplomacy. 
It adopted more tough position against Great Powers and 
their allies in the region. In 1981 it presented a new model 
for international relations: isolation- not as a threat but 
a virtue and an advantage.-^ -^  
In its relations with the Arab States, Iran combined 
the pragmatic consideration of national interest inherited 
from the past with ideological principles of the revolution. 
Though national considerations were alien to Khomeini's own 
ideas of foreign relations and of relations with in the 
Muslim world in particular, nevertheless the regime 
continued to act towards the Arab World from a sense of its 
own national interest. Iran's attack on Arab regimes, 
specially on Gulf rulers mainly based on two grounds: that 
they were serving Imperialist interests and secondly there 
12. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1979-80, PP.479-85, 
13. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1980-81, pp.557-8. 
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governments were not according to the Shariah (Islamic 
rules) so they (rulers) were disqualified to rule. In Iran's 
view Arab rulers were acting against the true interest of 
Muslim peoples. Such charges were made against them and the 
people were directed to overthrow the rulers. Tehran 
continued its hostile propaganda against most of the Arab 
countries. It refused to attend the summit of the Islamic 
Conference Organization at Mecca and Taif in January 1981, 
It gave the argument that Iran would not join a conference 
which is 'organised by U.S. Britain and Soviet agents' and 
in which Saddam Hussain was allowed to participate. 
Relations with most of the Arab States was further 
deteriorated during 1981. It was particularly true for 
Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco. Iran's diplomatic relations with 
Egypt and Oman was severed. Most of the Arab States were 
classified as hostile to Iranian revolution so they were 
declared as enemies of Islam. The selection of Baghdad as a 
venue for the conference of Foreign Ministers of Muslim 
countries was treated by Iran as support to Iraq against 
Iran by all the Arab countries who participated in it. 
Kuwait was also denounced for allowing its ports for transit 
( 
facilities to Iraq. 
During 1982 Iran intervened more openly and more 
emphatically in Arab affairs. It condemned the Fahd plan, 
denounced the execution of Anwar al-Sadat's assassins and 
opposed the dispatch of international forces to Lebanon. 
Tehran's rejection of the resolution of the Second Fez 
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summit was accompanied by forceful threats against their 
Arab advocates. ^  
Relations with Saudi Arabia started deteriorating after 
1979 which became worst during Iran-Iraq war as Saudi Arabia 
took the side of Iraq Saudi-Arabia was afraid of further 
Iranian attack on any other Arab country which it regarded a 
direct threat to peace and security of the region. On 
October 5, 1980, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisa.! 
warned Iran that if it would attack on any other Arab 
country Saudi Arabia would help to defend that country.-'^ ^ 
During 1981, Iran's relation with Saudi Arabia was more 
strain as Khomeini and his aides repeatedly criticised the 
Saudi regime and declared monarchy as an unislamic form of 
government. It was mainly due to the Saudi support to Iraq 
and Tehran perceived Saudi support as direct threat to 
itself. Closer Saudi-US relations was also one of the reason 
of Iranian attack and criticism over Saudi regime. Tension 
was further mounted in 1981 when Saudi authorities imposed 
restrictions on Iranian pilgrims to Haj when they tried to 
exploit the religious gatherings to spread anti-Saudi 
propaganda in which several Irani pilgrims were aJso 
arrested. Iran regarded it as an insult to its nation. 
Ayatullah Khomeini argued that by arresting and preventing 
the Iranian pilgrims to serve their principles and views was 
an attempt to separate religion from politics which was un-
14. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1981-82, pp.560-61. 
15. Indian Express,, New Delhi, 7 October 1980. 
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Islamic and doing this Saudi regime was serving the 
imperialist interest.-^^ 
During the meeting of the officials of the Foreign 
Ministry of Iran and UAE in Dubai in November 1981 several 
issues of regional importance such as American supply of 
AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia and Fahd Plan were discussed. 
The Iranian official H. Lavasani condemned the supply of 
AWACS and reacted that it is not a victory for Saudi Arabia 
but it is the part of the American plan to increase its 
presence in the region. On Fahd's eight point programme he 
said that any peace agreement with Zionist regime was 
treason not only to the Islamic Nation but to all the 
oppressed of the world. 
Saudi Arabia gave strong financial backing to Iraq and 
became more close to Iraq due to following developments: (i) 
Clashes between the Saudi forces and Iranian pilgrimage in 
October 1981. (ii) Iran rejected and strongly criticised the 
Crown Prince Fahd's eight point programme for the settlement 
of Arab-Israel conflict, (iii) Saudi Arabia accused Iran for 
backing the coup in Bahrain m December 1981 and trying to 
destabilize the Gulf states. The Saudi Minister of the 
Interior, Prince Nayef ibn Abdul Aziz, after signing a 
security accord with Bahrain in December 1981 , said that 
"the Iranians, who said after their revolution that they did 
not want to be the policemen of the Gulf, have become the 
terrorists of the Gulf", and expressed Saudi willingness to 
16. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1980-81, pp.562-565. 
send military assistance to any of the other GCC members jf 
required, (iv) Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed a frontier 
treaty on December 26, 1981 on their common border. After 
the signing of the treaty Prince Nayef called on other Arab 
countries to abandon their neutrality and to support Iraq in 
its defence of the entire Arab nation. He further said that 
Iraq was at war with Iran "not in defence of its lands and 
sovereignty alone, but also of the whole Arab nation" and 
that "Saudi Arabia stands with Iraq in the same 
position in facing the dangers confronting the Arabs". 
(v) Foreign Ministers of the GCC member-countries met at 
Manama (Bahrain) and announced, on February 7, 198^ that 
they would counter the "Iranian sabotage acts" in order to 
protect the stability of the Gulf region" and urged Iran to 
"respond to international efforts for an equJtabJe 
settlement of the war". 
The Iranian response to this alignment of the Gulf Arab 
states with Iraq was expressed in terms of a threat by the 
Iranian Prime Minister, Mr, Mussavi, on December 21 when he 
said "I warn these countries that their ports and roads are 
under our close observation and that we have knowledge of 
your treasons Neither the USA, Saudi Arabia nor the 
regime of Saddam (Hussein) can protect your independence".-^^ 
Iran's dispute with Saudi Arabia reached to a climax 
during the pilgrimage of 1982. Iran felt the occasion of Haj 
as an opportunity to highlight its viewpoint before the 
17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 4, 3 982, p,31523. 
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Mutlimp all over the world. For this reason Iran's offjrjal 
representative and supervisor of Iran's pilgrims, Hujjat aJ-
Islam Musavi Khoimha stayed back and continued his 
activities after the Haj of 1982. He proceeded to Medina 
from mecca. On 7-8 October 1982 he tried to turn-on a prayer 
meeting of thousands Iranian pilgrims into a poldtjcal 
demonstration. Saudi authorities intervened and arrested 
Khoimha and many other pilgrims, and after the Haj season 
was over they were immediately deported. In retaliation to 
development Iran demanded for a joint administration for 
holy sanctuaries, but could not get enough support for jt.-^ ^ 
Hostilities further worsened in already tense Gu.1f 
region, when on 5th June 1984 Saudi air force jets shot down 
two Iranian F-4 Phantom planes as they approached a sma.ll 
Island. About 80 km. from Gulf's Western Coast.-'^  Iran 
sharply reacted to this, and warned the Saudi's that it 
would "respond severely" in the event of further incidents. 
The Saudi Charge d' affaires was summoned to the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry and was handed over a strong protest 
warning against any further attack.^^ 
On April 26, 1988 Saudi Arabia broke dipJomatic 
relation with Iran and asked all Iranian diplomats to leave 
the kingdom within a week. The reason for this break was 
given in a statement issued by Saudi Government that "Saudi 
Arabia had deceased to cut its ties with the Government of 
18. Middle East contemporary Survey, 1982-83, p.238. 
19. Times of India, New Delhi, 7 vTune, 1984. 
20. Patriot, N. Delhi, 8 June, 1984. 
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the IslamJc Republic of Iran due to Iran's enemy-]dke stands 
towards the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and internationa] harm 
to its basic interest".'^ ^ However in October 3 988, Saudi 
Foreign Minister Prince Saud a.l-Faisa] expressed the 
wilJingness to maintain normaJ relations with Tehran by 
saying that "Saudi Arabia does not seek to entrench enmity 
to Iran but wants to maintain normal ties". He further said 
that the kingdom of Saudi Arabia had a J J "the appreciation 
and love for the brotherJv MusJim Iranian peopJe.'^^ But this 
love did not last 3ong as once again an unwarranted war of 
words surfaced between Iran and Saudi Arabia when the 
Saudi's accused Iran of instigating Saudi Muslims. Saudi 
regime executed four Saudi nationals on charges of 
collaborating with the IsJamic Republic of Iran. However 
Iran's Foreign Ministry immediateJy denied any link with 
them. 
The Saudi attitude of antagonism was surprising 
particularly at the time when atmosphere in the region was 
moving towards peace Saudi Arabia played an eminently good 
role to motivate Iraq to accept the cease-fire after Iran's 
acceptance of Resolution 598. At that time roost political 
analysts were of the view that Irano-Saudi relations would 
improve in view of the end to the Iraq-Iran war. 
During the 8 years of war the relations with Saudi 
Arabia were strained due to the massive material and moral 
21. The Times, London, 27 April 1988. 
22. Tehran Times, Tehran, October 6, 1988 
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support that Saudi qovernment offered to Iraq and the Saudi 
Arabia's coJJaboration with the West in brinqinq about an 
oi] price crash to mount pressure on Iran. The strained 
ties, however, came to a peak when Saudi security men kiJJed 
over 400 Iranian pilgrims and injured another 500 during the 
Haj of 1987.^^ 
The enmity between Saudi-Arabia and Iran was to 
exercise the most powerful member of the G.C.C. and as long 
as their was animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran there 
was no hope for an increase in oil prices, and hence this 
had a direct oil income to aJ.l the states of the reqion. In 
contrast they had enjoyed briqhter years of their economy in 
the 70s and 80s when oi] fetched the best prices as a result 
of their disciplined and collective control over the world 
oil market. Iran had always advocated to return to the 
earlier policies and for an increase in oil prices through a 
joint effort by all the oil states of the region for their 
mutual benefit. But it was possible only when Saudi Arabia 
refrained itself from opposing the increase in oil prices in 
order to damage Iran unless there was a normal and friendly 
relations with Iran. 
In November 1988 some developments took place in Saudi-
Arabian relationship as King Fahd directed the state 
controlled media to halt all anti-Iran campaigns and said 
that "Iran is a Muslim state, a neighbor, and we are living 
in the same region, and there is nothing which is separating 
23. Tehran Times, Tehran, October 6, 1988. 
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us but the (Persian) Gulf". In response Tehran also halteG 
propaganda against Saudi Arabia and the first Deputy Foreign 
Minister of Iran Ali Mohaounad Besharati described it as a 
positive step in normalising and improving bilateral 
relations and decided to reciprocate the Riyadh move. He 
also admitted that Iran and Saudi Arabia was both 
strategically important in the region and had a common 
interest in various field and if the Saudi regime would take 
further positive steps, Iran might enter into direct 
negotiations with Saudi Arabia. He further added that as 
Saudi Arabia was the initiator in breaking diplomatic ties 
therefore Saudi Arabia should take the first step in the way 
of a smooth flow of reciprocal relations. 
In late 1988 there were sincere efforts to normalise 
relations between Saudi-Arabia and Iran, Pakistan and some 
Gulf countries offered for mediation and Saudi Arabia also 
showed its keenness to normalise the relation which posed a 
question for Iran whether or not to accept the offer. The 
Saudis were making "good will" gestures at a time when the 
brutal massacre of defenseless pilgrims in Mecca was sti]] 
fresh in the minds of all Iranians; when Fgypt was 
preoccupied with domestic and foreign issues, and the Syrian 
leadership was engulfed in the growing complexities in 
neighboring Lebanon. Saudi Arabia wanted to consolidate its 
hold and influence over regional politics. In that context 
Al-Saud family was making efforts to play a more influentiaJ 
role related to Iran and Iraq. Despite the end of its 
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difficult war with Iraq and unusual circumstances prevailing 
in the country, the Islamic Republic was still considered a 
significant power with a special strategic position in the 
region. Thus the restoration of Tehran-Riyadh political tjes 
was considered as a logical response from Hijaz with the 
idea of benefitting from the position of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
Saudi Arabia might also act as a communication channel 
between Washington and Tehran. Thus the normal relation 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia was needed in order to serve 
the American interest. It must not be forgotten that the 
Saudi Kingdom is America's most important ally in the region 
of immense geo-politic importance and is mainly responsible 
for ardently implementing Washington's dictates in the 
Persian Gulf. It is but natural that in today's world the 
expansion and development of relations is a must for 
international existence. But for Iran maintaining the 
principles of the Islamic Revolution have been the 
determining factor in maintaining foreign relation. Thus 
initially Iranian leadership was reluctant to accept the 
Saudi offer despite the mediation of Pakistan and other 
friendly countries. But ultimately in March 1989 Iran and 
Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic ties. 
Kuwait was the another state to feel the winds of the 
Iranian revolution. Thirty percent of its population 
consists of Shias. Most of them are poor Urban dwellers, 
nomadic tribes and small merchants. Kuwaiti Shias were 
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receptive to Khomeini's attacK on Gulf rulers whom they 
often described as 'ministers'. In July 1979 a dejegatjon of 
local Shia notables visited Tehran to congratulate Khomeini. 
Later thirty out of the fifty former parliamentary deputies 
demanded to the ruler to revive the national assembly which 
was dissolved in 1976. In 'response, the ruler increased 
restriction on press freedom and banned discussions on 
public affairs even in private gatherings.^^ 
The number of GCC which came nearest to being directly 
involved in the fighting between Iran and Iraq was Kuwait. 
Like other member-countries of G.C.C. Kuvait also feared 
Iranian ambitions in the Gulf. Kuwait had a strategic 
importance for Iraq as after the closing of Basra port 
Iraq's dependence on Kuwait for its transit facilities was 
increased. Two incidents in particular exacerbated Iranian-
Kuwaiti antagonism in 1981. (i) On June 13, 1983 Kuwaiti 
authorities protested that Iranian aircraft had violated its 
northern airspace and opened fire over a border post. 
However Iran denied that charge and blamed Iraq for the 
destruction. Iran had also denied the Kuwaiti claim that 
Iranian aircraft had conducted attacks on Kuwait twice in 
December 1980. (ii) An oil gathering station in northern 
Kuwait was bombed on October 1, 1981; according to Kuwait 
the attack was carried out by three Iranian Phantom jets 
(which had possibly missed Iraqi targets), but Iran denied 
the allegation and again accused Iraq of responsibility. The 
24. Hiro Dilip, Iran under the Ayatollahs, op. cit p.343 
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Iranian Foreign Ministry added that the attack was part of 
an anti-Iranian plot by the USA and Israel , executed with 
the co-operatjon of the UK and France. 
In May 1983 Foreign Minister and senior officials from 
Kuwait and UAE visited Tehran and met President Khameini. 
Referring to the issue of oil slick president Khameini said 
that it was disadvantageous to all the Persian Gulf States 
excluding Iraq and emphasised for a serious joint, effort on 
the issue. They also met Majlis speaker, Hashemi Rafsanjani 
and discussed the issue relating to oil slick from the 
Iranian oil well into the Persian Gulf waters caused by the 
Iraq's attack. Rafsanjani said that Iran desired to harness 
the oil spill as quickly as possible so that the people of 
the region may remain safe. He further said, the regional 
governments should compel the Iraqi government to cease its 
'adventurist acts: He said that Iran is directing all its 
resources toward solving this problem in the interest of the 
people of the region.'*"^  A few days later President Khameini 
expressed satisfaction over the talks held during the visit 
of two foreign ministers stating that most of the talks were 
focussed on good neighbourly relations. From the time of the 
victory of the Islamic Revolution the Islamic Republic 
announced that it did not wanted to play the role of the 
"police of the region" and would not allow anyone else to do 
so. This was an assurance to the Persian Gulf states that 
the Islamic Republic, the most powerful country in the 
25. Kayhan InternatJonaJ, Tehran, May 18, 1983. 
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region would never take an aggressive roJe. President. 
Khomeini charged the big powers special.ly United States for 
preventing the unity of Islamic countries especially the 
states in the sensitive region of Gulf, otherwise, there was 
no reason for the Stiffening of ties between the regional 
states.26 
A Kuwaiti Airways Airbus with 150 Passengers and crew 
on a flight on December 4, 1984, from Kuwait to Karachi was 
hijacked and the Pilot was forced to fly to Tehran. Shortly 
after landing, an American official of the US government's 
Agency for International Development (AID) was shot dead by 
the hijackers. A second AID official was killed on December 
6. The hijackers demanded for the release of Shia Muslims of 
Kuwait who were imprisoned in connection of bomb attacks in 
Kuwait City in December 1983 and warned that they would blow 
up the aircraft unless these demands were met. The majority 
of the hostages were released during the period December 4-
8, while negotiations between the hijackers and Iranian and 
Kuwaiti officials continued. Many of those released reported 
that they had suffered ill-treatment at the hands of the 
hijackers, and that US and Kuwaiti nationals had been 
singled out for beatings and abuse. The hijnck ended on the 
morning of December 9, when Iranian security men overpowered 
the hijackers and freed the remaining nine hostages, 
including two Kuwaitis whom the hijackers had earlier 
claimed to have killed. 
26. Kayhan International, Tehran, May 23, 1983, 
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Controversy as to whether the Iranian authorities had 
co-operated with the hijackers continued during and after 
the incident. A US State Department spokesman. On December 
6, charged Iran for collaborating with hijackers giving the 
Identification of hijackers as members of Hezbollah. The 
allegation was denied by Iranian government. The following 
day. President Reagan said that Iran was not being as 
"helpful as it could be or should be", but added that there 
was "no evidence of actual collaboration" with the 
hijackers. Kuwaiti officials accused Iranian that they had 
unnecessarily delayed the storming of the aircraft. This 
charge was also denied that its security forces had 
refrained from such action at the explicit request of the 
Kuwait authorities. In turn, the Iranians accused the 
Kuwaitis of having "walked out" of the airport negotiations. 
Hostages interviewed afterwards denied that they had 
seen any evidence of collaboration, and several praised the 
Iranian security forces for their efficiency in overpowering 
the hijackers. A US government spokesman on December 11 
accused Iran of encouraging "extreme behaviour" by the 
hijackers, and demanded that the latter should be extradited 
to Kuwait. The accusations were denied by AyatoJlah 
Khomeini, while Mr. Mussavi stated on December 12 that no 
extradition would take place, and in turn challenged the US 
government to hand over to the Iranian authorities 
dissidents who he claimed had "martyred thousands of peop3e 
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inside Iran". The Iranian 'public prosecutor announced on 
December 18 that the hijackers would be put on tria.l.^' 
Through out the Iran Iraq war the Iran-Kuwait relations 
was tense and antagonistic due to Kuwaiti support to Iraq. 
But Iran-Kuwait relationships after Iran's acceptance of 
U.N. Resolution 598 took turn for the better. This despite 
the fact that Kuwait had been one of the principal 
supporters of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. Kuwait 
continued to help in several ways; it went so far as to 
extend financial aid to that country, helped Iraqi oil ships 
and was mainly instrumental in inviting the American Navy in 
to the region. Iran, however, restricted its animosity to 
these moves only through warnings and did not wish to 
perpetrate direct confrontation. These were going to 
reflect the future relations between the two countries. 
Ever since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has been unab3e 
to resoive its continuous border dispute with Iraq and Iraq 
has still not completely accepted Kuwait's sovereignty. The 
Iraqi rulers have always looked forward to opportune moments 
to establish their hegemony over Kuwait. Then it was 
judicious for Kuwait to take a good second look to it's 
behaviour and relationship in the region.^° 
Ultimately in September 1988 Kuwait and Iran re-
established their diplomatic relations which were broken in 
1987 and Kuwait sent two diplomats to reopen its embassy in 
27. Kessing's Contemporary Archives Volume XXXI, October 
1985, pp.33951. 
28. Tehran Times, Tehran September 29, 1988. 
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Tehran in a move toward norma.!JzJng re.1at.Jons after the 
Iran-Iraq war. In the beginning a Charge d' affaires and 
counseJJor was sent to Tehran to oversee refurbishroent of 
the embassy and to resume normal embassy work. Kuwaiti 
Foreign minister said that they wanted to forget the past 
and found no reason to keep the tension going on.^^ 
UAF was alone among GuJf States which was ma.'intaining 
correct re.lations with Js3aroic Republic since the revo.lution 
despite its financial aid to Iraq and being a member of GuJf 
Cooperation Council. In J983 UAE's financial aid to Iraq was 
running at the annual rate of $1500 million, but UAE also 
maintained its trade relation's with Iran, Dubai where 
yiO,000 Iranian merchants lived did thriving business with 
Iran. In April 1983 Iran Airlines started its flight from 
Bandar Abbas to Dubai and Sharjah. U.A.E. was also one of 
the two Gulf states which was having diplomatic relations at 
ambassadorial level with Iran, (other states was Kuwait).^ ®^ 
However Iran's relation's with all the six members of 
Gulf Cooperation Council was tense throughout Iran-Iraq war 
but Iran adopted a softer policy towards Oman due to its 
reasonable attitude towards Islamic Republic, After the 
cease-fire Oman acted as mediator to normalize the 
relation's between Islamic Republic and members states of 
Gulf Cooperation Council. Consequently upto the end of 1988 
Iran was having diplomatic relations with all the G.C.C. 
29. Tehran Times, Tehran, September 31, 1988. 
30. Hiro Dilip, Iran under the Ayatollabs, op.cit., pp.339 
-40. 
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states except Saud.i Arab.ia and efforts were continued to 
further strengthen the ties. Jn 3988 Iran appointed Mi . 
Mohammad Arab as its ambassador to Oman. This appointment 
was given importance among dipJomatic circle as Mr. Arab was 
earlier holding an important position in the Foreign 
Ministry of Iran. And this reflected the sincerity of Iran 
about its wil3 to improve relations with the countries of 
the region. 
After Kuwait, Bahrain was the another country which 
experienced the winds of the Islamic Revolution mainly due 
to its sizable Shi a population. Bahrain tiroe-to-time charged 
Iran for interfering in its internal affairs, for provoking 
the people to overthrow the regime and blamed Iran for 
backing the sabotage activities in Bahrain. In December 1981 
Bahraini security forces foiled an attempted coup with the 
arrest of a group of terrorists and captured arms and radio 
equipments. The arrested persons were said to be members of 
the Tehran based Islamic Forum for the Liberation of 
Bahrain.^^ 
After interrogation of the 60 detainees (45 Bahrainis, 
13 Saudi Arabian, one Kuwaiti and one Omani) the Bahraini 
authorities disclosed that the group had intended to launch 
attacks on government establishments and to take over radio 
and television networks on December 16, Bahrain's national 
day. Iranian state radio simultaneously broadcasted the news 
31. KeesiJig's Contemporary Archives, February 9S, 1982, 
pp.31353. 
166 
of the "revolution" in Bahrain. The group was reported to 
ht.ve confessed to having been trained in Iran. Arrested 
persons were charged under Section .122 of the Bahrain penal 
code for collaboration with a foreign power in activities 
hostile to the state (the prescribed penalty for this 
offence being death) . Later on some more i)erBon6 were 
arrested and more arms were restored in a search on 
operation by Bahraini police. On January 4, 1982, the 
Government of Bahrain directed the 12 Bahrainis living in 
Iran to come bacK within three months unless their 
citizenship would be cancelled and they would be tried in 
absentia. On January 8 authorities were given power to 
declare martial law in case of any internal or external 
threat to the country or to its leaders. On December 13 1981 
The Foreign Ministry of Bahrain made an official protest to 
the Iranian Charge d' affaires, Mr. Hassan Shushtari-Zadeh, 
and demanded an official clarification from the Iranian 
Government of its stance over the plot. In response the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry denied any involvement in the coup. 
But on December 30, the Bahrain newspaper Akhbar al-Khalij 
named Hojatoleslam Hadi al-Mudarasi, director of the "Gulf 
affairs section" in Iran, as the chief organiser of the 
coup. Hojatoleslam Mudarasi had fled to Bahrain from Iran 
during the Shah's regime and returned to Tehran after the 
Iranian revolution of February 1979. The situation became 
worst; The Iranian ambassador to Bahrain Shushtari-Zadeh was 
declared persona-non-grata and both Iran and Bahrain called 
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back their ambassadors. Other countries in the GuJf also 
attributed the plot to Iran, and the Gulf Co-operation 
Council issued a statement on December 14 condemning the 
"sabotage attempt". On December 20, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
concluded a security agreement, and the Bahrain Minister of 
the Interior, Sheikh Muhammad bin Khalifa al-Khalifa, spoke 
of the need for a "rapid deployment force in the Gulf that 
would be capable of quickly providing assistance when 
needed".^2 
RKIATJONS WITH STKADFASTNF.SS FRONT 
Where as on the one hand Iran's relations with its 
neighbours was tense and antagonistic, on the other hand its 
relations with the countries of Stead-fastness Group (i.e. 
Syria, Libya, PI.0 and Algeria) was good and friendly. They 
were some how inclined towards to Iran in the war and also 
extended some aid to Iran. In return Iran supported their 
anti-American stand. 
There was an exchange of visits at below the bead of 
states Jeve.} in 1980-81 i.e. Rafsanjani visited Syria, Libya 
and Algeria and also met Yaser Arafat in Beirut in November 
1980. The Iranian Minister of Transportation visited the 
same countries in January J981 and signed an agreement for 
an air link between Tehran, Damascus, Tripoli and Algiers. 
Syria remained one of the Arab country closest to Iran. Iran 
32. Keesings Contemporary Archives, February 26, 1982, 
pp.31353. 
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praised Syria's struggJe ayajnst Zionism, its efforts for 
the Palestinians and its Ant.i-.Tragi stand. But relation with 
Libya was not so clear and somehow problematic. Qaddafi's 
regime, his personal image and his action programme as an 
Islamic revolution were disturbing Iran. In mid 3 98.1 
coolness among the relationship was noticed which was mainly 
based on ideological differences.-^ -^  
Iran's relation with Syria and Libya further 
strengthened in the winter of 1982-83, particularly through 
a tripartite conference in Damascus on 20-22 January 1983. 
Iran also wanted to become a member of the Front. At one 
occasion Velayati said that Syria and Libya had welcomed 
Iran as member of the Front and the matter was to be 
discussed with Algeria, PDRY and FLO. However later on it 
was clarified that they aM wanted a good relationship with 
Iran but were not ready to accept Iran as a member of the 
Front,. 3^* 
In December 1983, Foreign Ministry of Iran, Ali Akbar 
Velayati told in a press conference that under all 
conditions it is the objective of Iran's policy to support 
the people of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon in their struggle 
against Zionism and Imperialism. Iranian support was not 
verbal but practiced as an Iranian force made of Volunteers 
was sent to Lebanon in 1982 after Israeli invasion and were 
33. Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1980-81, p.558. 
34. Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1982-83, pp.546 
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stationed at an area under the influence of the Syrian 
forces. ^  
Iran's relations with Syria was good through out the 
Gulf war due to their respective national interest. Syria 
was one of the two Arab countries to support Iran in the war 
the other heing Libya. This alliance resulted aainly due to 
the antagonism between the Government of Iraq and Syria. 
Efforts were made for the merger of the two countries in 
1978 and 1979 but relations deteriorated subsequently and 
widened further with the outbreak of the Jran-Iraq war. 
After the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran a 
number of visits were paid by the officers, ministers and 
bead of the Governments of both the countries to each other 
states. In the last week of December 1981, Hafez Al-Asad, 
President of Syria, was warmly welcomed in Tehran.^^ In 
return Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited 
Syria in the next week. Before departure he expressed the 
views that "Syria is the only country which has firmly stood 
against Israel and has a firm stance like that of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran". He said that the purpose of his 
visit was to extend support to Syria in the formal 
annexation of the Syrian Golen Height and their struggle 
against the aggression of Zionist regime,^^ 
Syria's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Abdollahalion Khaddan visited Tehran in March 198/! 
35. Kayhan International, Tehran, November 7.2, 1983. 
36. Kayhan International, Tehran, December 30, 1981. 
37. Kayhan International, Tehran, December 31, 1981. 
170 
and in his meeting with President Khameini anti-imperjaliem 
and anti-Zionism stances of the two countries beside other 
common issues were discussed. On the same day Mr. SaJJm 
Yassin, the Syria's Economic and commerce minister, met wjth 
Iranian commerce Minister Asgar Owdadi. The Ministers 
expressed their wishes to expand the biJateral, commercial 
and trade reJations in the Jight of their simi Jar stances 
vis-a-vis Zionism and iroperiaJism. The Syrian commerce 
minister also announced his country's readiness t.o export 
agricultura.1 products such as barley, peas, lentils and 
phosphate.^^ 
With Syria the reJations were improving during J982-83. 
In January and August 1983, Jranian Foreign Minister AJi 
AKbar Velayati visited Damascus. Other important Iranian 
leaders also paid visits to Syria in J983. In return Syrian 
Minister of information visited Tehran in February 3983. 
Syrian Minister of Commerce and Minister of oiJ also paid 
visits to Tehran in July and March J983 respectiveJy. Iran 
made it cJear that it wiJJ extend every possible aid to 
Syria. The ties between the two was more cJose in late 1983 
when both of them criticized superpowers and speciaJJy 
United States for its roJe in Lebanon. 
In August 3 983, banking agreement was signed between 
the centraJ banks of Iran and Syria foJJowing the visit of 
the governor of the centraJ bank of Iran, Mohsen Noorbaksh, 
to Damascus. The agreement concJuded between the two parties 
38. Kayhan Tnternational, Tehran, March J5, J982. 
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was to faciJ.itate credit accommodatjon between the two 
countries. In addition, the agreement was to enable both 
countries to adjust the voJume of their export and import 
through the speciaJ account opened by the two countries, two 
years ago.^^ 
Syria's relations with Iran deteriorated during early 
J985 as a result of Syrian activity in Lebanon in particular 
because of Syria's support for Amal and its stance against 
Muslim fundamentalist groups. In early August .1985 Iran 
agreed to supply five mi J J ion tones of oil at a 
concessionary rate of $J?.50 per barrel, with an additional 
one mi J lion tones free of charge, in implementation of an 
agreement first concluded in J982. However, deliveries were 
suspended, reportedJy because of payment arrears and of 
difficulties in the Iranian oil industry after Iraqi air 
attacks. The deliveries resumed after talks in Tehran on 
December 1-3 between Iranian leaders and a Syrian delegation 
Jed by Dr. Abdul Raouf aJ-Kasm, the Prime-Minister of Syria. 
Further interruption in Iranian oil deliveries to Syria 
were reported in mid-May 3986 by the Middle East. Economic 
Survey which said that these were due to disputes over 
payment. However supplies were resumed again in Mid-June, 
1986.40 
The rift between Iran and Syria became widened in 1986 
and a total break off between the two could dramatically 
39. Kayhan International, Tehran, August 4, 3 983. 
40. Keesings Contemporary Activities, August 1986, 
Vol.XXXIT, p.34583. 
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alter the political scene in the region. There were several 
indications during 1985-86 that Jran was applying pressure 
on Syria to abandon its reconciliation with Jordan. The 
first sign of rift came when Syrian efforts to free French 
hostages held in Lebanon by por-Iranian groups ran into a 
deadlock. This was followed by a report that Iran had 
suspended oil supplies to Syria due to pending payments. 
There was absence of Iranian war communiques in the state-
run Syrian media. Syrian government also imposed strict 
measures to control the movement of Iranian visitors to 
ancient religious sites in Syria.^ -* 
In August 1987, Iran received a warning from Syria that 
Damascus would not be a silent spectator if Iran attacked 
another Arab country, such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. This 
warning came from Mr. Ororan Adhan, a rich Syrian businessmen 
and personal friend of President Assad, who claimed that he 
was talking in official capacity.^^ 
Iran criticised the killing of the 23 members of Shi a 
Muslim Hezbollah by Syrian troops on 9.4 February 1987. The 
Iranian Minister of Interior, Hojatolislam Ali Akbar 
Mohtashemi reached Damuscus on March 6, 1987 to discuss 
Syrian moves in Lebanon. However, Hafiz al-Asad, the Syrian 
President considered it as Iranian interference in Lebanon 
and regarded the issue to resolved with in the Syria's 
sphere of influence. 
41. Tines of India, New Delhi, February 5, 1986. 
42. The Times, London, August 7, 1987. 
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Jn AprJJ .1987 the tension was somehow eased when 
Syria's OiJ and Mineral Resources Minister, Mr. GhazJ aJ-
Durubi visited Iran. On Apri3 30, 3 987 Jran announced to 
supply oil to Syria for the next .12 months against cash 
payment. Jran was to suppjy one mi .11 ion tones of crude oi ] 
free of cost, p.lus a further two million tones at official 
OPEC prices, under the agreement. The agreement came within 
the framework of a 3 0-year protocol signed in April 1982 and 
renewed annually, but disrupted in 3 986 by a dispute about 
prices and payments arrears. The 3ess favourable price terms 
of the new agreement ref3ected problems over Syria' debt to 
Iran. 
The Syrian Foreign Minister, Mr. Farooq ash-Sharaa, 
visited Tehran on May 32, 3 987, and conveyed a message to 
Iranian President Khomeini from President Assad pledging 
continued Syrian support for Jran. The visit took p3ace 
sbort3y after the reported meeting between president Assad 
and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and it was intended to 
allay Iranian concern over a possible Syrian reconciliation 
with Iraq. Jt was a3so reported that the two countries were 
believed to have settled their differences over the role of 
the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. Mr. a3-Sharaa went to 
Tehran again on July 3 2, 3 987, when, according to the Beirut 
newspaper Al-Safir, he asked Iran for help in releasing all 
foreigners held as hostages in Lebanon.^^ 
43. Keesing's Contemporary Archives Volume XXXITJ, September 
1987, pp.35416. 
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In December J988 Syrian Forejgn Minister Mr. Farouq A.l 
Sharaa again visited Tehran. Referring to the desire of the 
Persian Gulf littoral states to expand ties with Iran, Sarah 
reiterated Syria's role in bringing the stands of the 
Persian Gulf Arab states closer to those of the Islamic 
Republic. Syria was in favour of the expansion of relations 
between the Islamic republic of Iran and Persian Gulf 
littoral states as the best way to strengthen regional 
security and stability. Syrian Foreign Minister argued that 
support for Palestinian uprising in the occupied lands was 
the basis of unity among Muslims and Arab and Islamic 
countries in the region.^^* 
Syria was making attempts to mobilise both Tehran and 
Riyadh to normalise their relations and encourage other Arab 
states to join its drive, Persian Gulf political observers 
argued that Farooq al-Shara's visit to Tehran was for the 
same purpose. 
Observers believed that Syria's national security 
consideration dictates better relations between Tehran and 
Saudi-Arabia-cum-Kuwait, since the latter two states were 
the major financial backers of Syria. Improved relations 
between Iran and Saudi-cum-Kuwait could further defuse 
traditional animousity between Syria and Baghdad, since it 
would lead to better relations between the two states, 
preventing a further rift in the Arab world. 
44. Tehran Times, Tehran, December 28, 1988 
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If realized, the poJJtJcaJ s.it.uat.-ion in the Persian 
Gulf Would resemble the 1980's political scenario which 
spelled stability. Tt is only then Tran-Jraq war would be 
characterized as a purely local conflict and not soinething 
as big as an Iran-Arab confrontation. 
Iran offered two conditions for the normalization of 
relation with Persian Gulf States, (i) In the Iran-Iraq 
conflict neutrality of Arab countries and (ii) naming Iraq 
as aggressor. Iran had taken steps to show its good will to 
its Persian Gulf neighbours that was substantiated by the 
close economic cooperation of some Arab littoral states of 
the Persian Gulf. Iran's preparedness for the maintenance of 
safe shipping in the vital and international water way of 
the Persian Gulf was also undermined by the other Gulf 
States. 
Among the members of the Stead Fastness Front Libya was 
another states with whom Iran was having good relations 
despite some ideological differences. Both Iran and Libya 
have been opposing the domination and interference of out 
side powers specially America in the regional affairs. Both 
regarded Zionism as enemy and supported the Liberation 
movement of Palestine. Both advocated for the international 
and external sovereignty for all the states of the region. 
Both wanted a collective, coordinated, organised struggle 
against Zionism and Israel. However their approach were 
somehow different. Both the countries were led by their 
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leaders (i.e. Khomejnj & Qaddaf j) , who were bav.ing massive 
popular support behind them. The Jran-Jraq war which 
stressed Iran from Arab Gu3f States forced it to came closer 
to the steadfastness Front. Since the beginning of the war, 
Iran developed cultural, economic and trade relations with 
Libya, A number of agreements and accords were signed. The 
relation were strengthened by the visit of ministers and 
officials of both the countries to each others states. In 
February 1981 Iranian Foreign Minister visited Tripoli and 
signed a cultural agreement and the letters of understanding 
in the economic and trade fields. The cultural agreement 
included the expansion of cultural, training, scientific and 
sports.^^ 
Apart from some problem during 198;?-83 Iran's relations 
with Libya improved. During winter of 1982-83 they were 
having a very good relation. On 7, December 1982 Libya's 
Foreign Minister Adb-al-A3i al-Ubaydi and Minister of 
Information Abd aJ-Rahman Shalqam arrived at Tehran. They 
discussed the bilateral relations, wars in Gulf and Lebanon, 
American Imperialism, 'reactionary Arab states' and the 
forthcoming conference of Non-aJigned Movement at Delhi. 
Velayati described the visit as 'important and fruitful". 
President Khameini extended official invitation to Qaddafi 
to visit Iran. 
45. Kayhan International, February 21, 1981 
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other top level contracts were made during the visit 
of, Iran's Navy Commander to Tr.ipoJj in February .1983, 
Deputy Foreign Minister in May and October J983. Iranian 
Foreign Minister, All-Akbar VeJayati also visited TripoJi in 
August J983. In return Libyan Minister of oiJ and Libyan 
Navy Commander paid visit to Iran in January and October 
respectively. Iran supported Libya's anti-Imperialist 
approach and its position vis-a-vis France in Chad. Libya 
repeatedly expressed support to Iran on aJmost all issues. 
Some difference of opinion were also noticed on both side 
i.e. Qadafi expressed his resentment of Iranian criticism 
against Saudi Arabia over Haj.^^ 
In December 1982, Iran's Foreign Minister, A.li Akbar 
Velayati said that Iran shared Libya's position on U.S. 
imperialism and that Iran beJieves that the onJy way of 
dealing with the Zionist regime is by through force and both 
the countries opposed any compromise with the Zionist 
regime. He further said that Iran and Libya share common 
views on Non-a3igned Movement and reiterated Iran's support 
for the Libyan position towards the organization of African 
Unity (O.A.U.). In return Libya backed Iran's stand in the 
Non-aJigned Summit of New Delhi and welcomed President 
Khameini's suggestion on the formation of a joint fund in 
the Non-aligned Movement to the help third world 
countries.^^ 
46. Kayhan Jnternational, December 32, 1982. 
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In February 1983 Iran's representatives at United 
Nations Rajaei Khorrasani condemned U.S. iniJ.itary presence 
in the Middle East and Jts threats against Libya, he a]so 
denounced measures by the United States in Various parts of 
the worJd under the pretext of supporting its interests. 
Speaking at a special security council held on Libya's 
request to discuss U.S. violation in its air and sea 
territories borders, Rajaei Khorassani stressed that the 
Islamic Republic of Iran supported all the oppressed and 
their struggles to become free from the yoke of super powers 
and imperialists. He praised the firm stance of the Libyan 
peoples in defending his country, and hoped that Libya would 
become an example for other countries in that region where 
U.S. Military and political bases had been established.*^ 
A Military co-operation agreement between Iran and 
Libya was concluded at the end of a visit to Tripoli by 
Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Iranian 
Majlis from June ?.0 to 23, 1985. The agreement provided for 
the establishment of a joint political and military 
committee, "Islamic Revolutionary League" and an "Army of 
Jerusalem to liberate Palestine". 
In response to the agreement and the reports that Libya 
had expressed support for Iran in the war with Iraq, the 
Iraqi government announced on June 26 that it had "withdraw 
its recognition of Libya as an Arab regime", and had severed 
48. Kayhan International, February 27, 1983. 
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diploinatjc relations. Jn ret.a.TJat.Jon I.jbya called for the 
expulsion of Iraq from the Arab League. But on June ?.9 I.jbya 
authorities clarified that the agreement with Iran did Bot 
have the status of a treaty. And added that the Libyan side 
and made certain proposals for the ending of the for the 
ending of the Iran-Iraq war which were rejected by Iran.*^ 
In the formation of new foreign policy Iran adopted a 
tough attitude towards Israel. Unlike other Arab countries 
PLO described the new foreign policy of Iran as anti-
American, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. PLO opposed 
Shah and supported the Iranian revolution to some extent. 
PLO became the natural allay of Iran as someone in Iran 
regarded PLO as; a possible channel of communication with 
the U.S.S.R. a possible measure to influence the Arab 
countries where Palestinians were residing, and a suitable 
vehicle to spread the Iranian revolution to Arab World. Even 
before Khomeini came to power several Iranian leaders such 
as Montazeri, Mustafa Ali Chamran and Sadeq Qotob7.adeh net 
PLO leaders. Immediately after the emergence of new regime 
PLO chief Yaser Arafat on 17th February visited Iran with a 
31 member delegation. However Iranian authorities declared 
that they had come without any invitation but he was 
received like a head of the state and was given a warm 
welcome. He met with figures of the regime. He visited 
Meshhed and Ahwaz, the capital of Khuzistan, where he opened 
49. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.XXXII, February 
1986, pp.34201. 
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a P.L.O. Informatjon office for Arab speaking populatJon. In 
a highly emotional ceremony the buiJdJng formerly belonging 
to the lBrae.li diplomatic delegation in Tehran was handed 
over to the P.L.O. an the name of the street at which the 
building was situated was changed from Kakh (Palace Street) 
to Palestinian street. But during 1979 Iranian support to 
the P.L.O. was only verbal. Officials of Islamic Republic 
repeatedly declared that Iran was not giving very material 
support to the P.L.O. The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister on 
12 April, 1979 said that Iran would not supply Palestinians 
with arms nor it would make use of Palestinian experts in 
its army. But Iran would extend all its support and 
assistance to Palestinian in international forums and 
organi zation.^^ 
On 7 August Khomeini called on Muslims everywhere to 
celebrate the last Friday of the month of Ram7.an as 
"vTerusalem Day" or 'Dusds Day' in order to demonstrate 
solidarity with the "rights of the Muslim people of 
Palestine. On 16 August he called for a campaign to liberate 
Jerusalem, saying: "If every Muslim was to four a single 
bucketful of water on Israel, it would be drowned by an 
uncontrollable flood". 
However, P.L.O. to do one of Iran's objective to 
effectively mediate between Iran and Arab countries such as 
Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain. There was also some disputes among 
50. Middle Fast Contemporary Survey, 1978-79, p.541. 
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the policy makers in Iran rejatjon to P.I..O. as some one in 
Iran accused P.L.O. particularly the PFI.P, for inciting and 
aiding the Arab minority in Khuzistan for supporting leftist 
groups in the country, and laking side with Baghdad in Iran-
Iraq disputes. An unidentified Iranian official blamed the 
Palestinians for fighting out their ideological difference 
in Iran. He explained: "Al-Fath has chosen Khomeini; the 
PFLP seems to have chosen the non-reJigious.... the 
liberals, the leftists and the pro-Moscow people". General 
Nadani, the Governor General of Khuzistan, accused the PFLP 
and George Madani Habsh for increasing tension in Iran. 
Shariat Madani questioned the wisdom of allowing the P.L.O. 
to open an office in Khuzistan.^ -* 
RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 
After the culmination of the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran, relations between Turkey and Iran took a new turn for 
the better. Officials of both countries used every 
opportunity to call for closer and more comprehensive ties 
in the political, economic commercial and other spheres. 
On April ?.?., 1981, Iran and Turkey signed a joint 
protocol. According to the protocol four committees were to 
be established in the fields of agriculture, energy, 
transportation and industries. Means and ways for increasing 
51. Ibid. 
1B2 
the import, of food stuff from Turkey were a.lso discussed. It 
was also decided that Turkish Government wouJd grant 
permission for the transport of one miJlJon tones of 
merchandise to Iran annually. The signatories of the pact 
were Turkish minister of Commerce, Karna.1 Canturk and Iran's 
minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Hussain Kazempour, who 
expressed the hope that the signing of such a protocol wouJd 
pave way for unlimited cooperation and excellent relation 
between the two Muslim neighbouring countries.^'' Same year 
in the first week of the month of May Turkey and Iran signed 
another protocol for increasing of freight traffic from 
Turkey to Iran. The protocol was divided into three parts: 
railway transportation, overland transportation and 
communication. Under the agreement 1.5 million tones of 
goods purchased by Iranian State and private concerns was to 
be carried by Turkish Trucks.^-^ In 1982 Turkish Deputy Prime 
Minister, Turkut 0?al, visited Tehran in the first week of 
March. Before his departure to Iran he said that Turkey 
would like to have a strong independent Iran as Prime 
Minister, Turkut 07.al, visited Tehran in the first week of 
March. Before his departure to Iran he said that Turkey 
would like to have a strong and independent Iran as its 
neighbour since it would be in the interest of both 
countries. He further added that cooperation between two 
countries bad increased after the period of Shah.^^ During 
52. Kayhan International, Tehran, April 23, 1981. 
53. Ibid., May 7, 1981. 
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the stay at Tehran he held talks w.ith Jranian Offjcja.ls for 
further expansion of economjc relations between Iran ar)c\ 
Turkey. Issues related to industrial cooperation, exchange 
of export and establishment of joint technical companies in 
the field of oil and natural gas were also discussed. ^  
Despite the closer trading links established between 
Iran and Turkey in March 198;^  tension persisted between the 
two countries over repeated Iranian allegation that 
dissidents were operating from bases inside Turkey. This 
accusation was denied in vlanuary 1981 by the Turkish Prime 
Minister, Adml. Bulent Ulusu, and again on March 8 by 
Professor Ilhan 07tra7., a Deputy Prime Minister and then the 
acting Foreign Minister. They classified that they would 
never tolerate any conspiracy against brotherly neighbour 
Iran in Turkey. According to a report published in The 
International Herald Tribune (April 6), Iranian were 
entering into Turkey daily, but the activity of many of 
those was believed to be illicit trade rather than of a 
paramilitary nature. This trade was though to involve 
smuggling of commodities such as sheep, floor and salt into 
Iran, and watches, electronic goods etc. into Turkey.^" 
Trade exchanges which amounted to only a few million 
dollars during the Shah regime reached upto 5.3 billion in 
1985. Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Musavi and his Turkish 
5 5 . Ibid., March 8, J 9 8 2 . 
5 6 . KeesJngs Contemporary Arch J ves, November 22, 198;?, 
p . 3 1 8 0 1 . 
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counterpart Turgiat Ozal sjgned a mii.lt j-b.i 1.1 ion doJ.lar trade 
pact when Musavi paid a vjs.it to Ankara jn January J985. In 
fact the premiership of Oxa.l gave a nev impetus to the 
flourishing relations with Tehran. Before Musavi and other 
dignitaries of Iran visited Turkey in 1985, Oza.l paid visit 
to Iran and met Iranian leaders in May .1983 and Apr.il 1984. 
If Tehran-Ankara relations are studied in political 
perspective it is found that Turkish leaders had cleverly 
tried to maintain a sort of balance in their relations with 
Iran and Iraq over since the out break of war and declared 
itself neutral in the war. Moreover Turkey had always tried 
to be closed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This 
move brought a big question marks about Ankara's Iranian 
relations due to the simple reason that NATO adopted a 
hostile attitude towards the Islamic Republic. But despite 
all these difference both Turkey and Iran maintained good 
relations with each other.'*' 
-vln May 1987, the fifth Irano-Turkish trade and economic 
protocol was signed between Iranian Heavy Industrial 
minister Behzad Nabvi and Turkish minister of state for 
executive affairs Tinaz Fitiz at the end of eleven days of 
talks held between the Iranian and Turkish delegation at 
Ankara.^^ 
57, Kayhan International, Tehran, February 27, 1988 
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The Turkish Foreign Minister Mesual Vilmas visited 
Iran in February 1988 and expressed the views that mutual 
respect for national values and international affairs 
between Turkey and Iran have served as a cornerstone, for 
the promotion of relations between the two countries. He 
further said that enhancing of political-economic ties 
between Tehran and Ankara would also be in the Interest of 
other regional states. He emphasised that joint historica.l 
affinity and geographical proximity was other major factors 
for strengthening mutual ties. Since 1984 many efforts had 
been made to strengthen trilateral economic cooperation 
between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. In February 1988 Turkey 
condemned the arms embargo against Iran as well as the 
presence of foreign forces in the Persian Gulf describing it 
as threat to the regional peace.^^ In the same month Iranian 
Foreign Minister All Akbar Velayati visited Turkey with a 
delegation. Just before his departure he stated that Iran -
Turkey relations had steadily broadened since the coming of 
the Islamic regime in Iran. They discussed many issues such 
as further strengthening of Iran Turkey relations, regional 
developments and other international issues especially the 
project concerning the oil Truck line linking Iran and 
Turkey.^^ 
In the same month Iran's Deputy Interior Minister 
Seyeed Mohammad Sadr visited Istanbul to discuss security 
59. Kayhan International, Tehran, 15, February, 1988. 
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along the 320 Km. Iran Turkey border.^ -'^  New dimensions in 
relations between Iran and Turkey begin to emerge jn 
February, 1988 with the visit of Turkish Prime Minister 
Turgut Ozal on February 28, 1988. That months was 
particularly rich in contacts between Iran and Turkey. Two 
important visits took place in that month from Iran to 
Turkey such as the visit by Iranian Foreign Minister All 
Akbar Velayati followed by the Deputy Interior Minister 
Seyed Mohammad Sadr. Turkish undersecretary to the Treasury 
and Foreign Trade Ministry Yavuzz Canevi also visited Iran 
with a delegation to discuss the joint economic commission 
between the two countries.^^ 
RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN 
Like Turkey, Pakistan was once a member of the Baghdad 
Pact to which Iran belonged. In 1964, three countries formed 
an organization called the Regional Cooperation for 
Development. During the Indo-Pak war of 1965, some military 
aid was extended to Pakistan by Shah. However in 1971 war 
Shah was unable to provide help to the military reg.ime of 
Pakistan. But the Shah established good relations wjth 
Zulfiqar All Bhutto when he become the head of the state. 
61. Kayhan International, Tehran, 23, February, 1988 
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Shah considered the Baluchistan province of Pakistan as part 
of Iran's security perimeter. He opposed the demand of 
popularly elected provincial government of Pakistani 
Baluchistan as he thought that it would give Irani Baluchis 
a 'dangerous idea'. In February 1973. Bhutto dismissed the 
Baluchistan government, under the pressure of Shah and gave 
reason that Baluchis were plotting disturbances in Pakistan 
and Iran the help of Iraq and Soviet Union. Bhutto was 
offered an emergency financial and military aid from Shah 
stating that 'we strongly reaffirm that we will not close 
our eyes to any secessionist movement in Pakistan and urged 
Pakistan to use army as well as air force to crush the 
Baluchi insurgency and lent Pakistan scores of Iranian 
helicopter gunships. The insurgency continued for three year 
and during this period Shah gave substantial financial and 
military aid to Pakistan^ -^  
Pakistan recognised the Bazargan Government the day it 
was formed. There was a pragmatic reason behind this as 
Pakistan was indebted to Iran of several hundred million 
dollars. In 1979 Pakistan's foreign minister Agha Sbahi 
visited Iran and met Khomeini. In the political atmosphere 
which emerged hostage crisis, radical elements in Iran 
placed Ziaul Haque in the same category as President Sadat 
of Egypt. Addressing a group of Pakistani naval officers in 
November, Khomeini called on them to initiate Iranian type 
63. Hiro Dilip, Iran Under Ayatollah, op. cit., pp.351-52 
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fi-lamij revolution in Pakistan. But the Soviet military 
^itervention in Afghanistan brought Iran and Pakistan closer 
to adopt a common approach for the soviet withdrawal from 
^Afghanistan and the relations between two became cordial 
despite the fact that Pakistan was closer to United State 
and Saudi Arabia and was getting military and financial aid 
trom them.^^ 
In 1988 after the acceptance of cease-fire Pakistan 
played an important role in mediation in the normalization 
of relation between Iran and Saudi-Arabia Pakistan always 
i,ried to maintain cordial relations with Iran as it wanted 
to use Iran against India. Specially on Kashmir issue 
akistan's aim has been to mobilise Iran in order to pose 
the issue as of international importance concerning the 
fuslimr. throughout the world. However, on Kashmir, initially 
iran msde some mistakes by issuing irrelevant statements but 
ater on it realised and advised to solve the problem 
arough bilateral negotiations. This was a big blow to 
akisten policy towards Kashmir. 
vJiLATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
Ir April 1978, Noor Mohammad Taraki took over Mohammad 
i«aud tlirough a military coup in Afghanistan. The coup in 
..fghan.istan presented a two fold danger for Shah in Iran 
'4. Ibjd. 
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which he always wanted to avoid: (i) Since the new regime in 
Afghanistan had an intimate relations with Soviet Union 
which paved the way for an intensification of Soviet 
influence, (ii) it created a focus of tension and 
instability in Iran's immediate geographical proximity. 
Tehran also feared the possible impact of the coup in 
Pakistan with whom it wanted to improve relations. Another 
concern of Iran was tribal affinity among the Baluchis who 
were concentration on the frontiers of Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan might cause unrest. However, the new regime of 
Afghanistan expressed it will to continue friendly relations 
with Iran. Ultimately on 6 May 1978 Iran recognised the new 
regime. It was agreed that both the governments would regard 
the agreement signed with former regime as automaticaJly 
valid. The new ambassador of Afghanistan to Iran promised to 
strive harder to promote good relations with Iran.^^ 
But in 1979 the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
disturbed the new regime of Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran 
strongly criticised and condemned the Soviet intervention 
and its relations with Afghanistan became worst. The 
allegations and counter allegations by Iran and Moscow 
dominated Taraki regime indicated significant rift between 
traditional allies. While the Kabul regime accused Iran for 
sending soldiers across the border and inciting a rebellion 
in Afghanistan. Tehran radio reported major c3ashed in Herat 
65. Middle East Contemporary Survey. 1977-78, op.cit. 
p.497. 
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and the Western gate way of Afghanistan near the Iranian 
frontiers. Iranian authorities were also accused for trying 
to incite and instigate Shia Muslims against the people's 
revolutionary regime.^^ 
In December 1979 Ayatollah Montazeri strongly condemned 
the Soviet intervention and demanded for the immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. He urged the 
people of Afghanistan to 'Unite and align themselves as soon 
as possible with in the framework of pure Islamic ideology* 
and continue the war of liberation until final victory was 
achieved. He also urged the governments of Muslim countries 
and Muslim peoples all over the world to extend all type of 
help and assistance to the struggling people of 
Afghanistan.^^ 
In April 1980 Kabul regime again charged Iran for 
abetting rebel activities in Afghanistan, Kabul radio 
announced that a member of the Iran based rebel group, Barat 
Ali, had confessed for taking part in rebel activities.^" 
In February 1981, Iran refused to participate jn the 
proposed tripartite meeting on Afghanistan in the presence 
of a U.N. representative saying that Iran would never 
discussed the fate of the Afghan people with Soviet 
66. TJie Tribune, Chandigarh, 21, March 1979. 
67. Ayatollah Montazeri's Message on the occasion of coup in 
Afghanistan dated December 31, 1979, published in the 
Dawn of the Islamic Revolution, Ministry of Islamic 
Guidance, Tehran, pp.408. 
68. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 28 April 1980. 
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representatives in KabuJ and demandeci the expu.lsjon of the 
•puppet regime' of Afghanistan from the Non-aligned 
Movement.^^ 
Iran was too much concerned with the situation of 
Afghanistan. On 3 0th November 3 983 Iranian Government 
published a detail plan for the resolution of Afghan crisis, 
which was presented to Andrei Gromyko, the then Foreign 
Minister of Soviet Union. The plan provided for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the 
replacement of a joint peace - keeping force comprising 
Iranian and Pakistani troops as well as troops of some third 
world countries. Meanwhile the Afghan government was to be 
replaced by a council of 30 clergymen of the Muslim Wor3d. 
Though Pakistani response to the proposa3 was favourable but 
it was rejected by the three of the 'Mujahideen' groups as 
well as the Afghan government itself. The proposal was also 
condemned by the Soviet News Media, On November 15 Kabul 
radio reported that the plan fai3ed to grasp the origin and 
nature of the Afghan prob3em and it was a vain attempt by 
those "fundamentalist, fanatlca3 and reactionary forces in 
Iran" who had completely lost touch with the realities of 
Afghan society",^^ 
On 23, November 1981, Prime Minister Musavi commenting 
on the plan concerning the Afghanistan said that the 
69. TJie Times of IndJa, New Delhi, 6 February 1981. 
70. Keesings Contemporary Archives, June 18, 3 982, pp.33 545, 
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government, of Iran knew that the plan would be rejected by 
the BarbaK Karmal government as thJs pJan was not for h.is 
regime but thjs plan was prepared for the Jong term goal of 
reaching independence in Afghanistan and jt was natural that 
the Kabul government and the eastern and western superpowers 
would not be pleased with the Iranian proposal. He claimed 
that the plan was appreciated by the people of Afghanistan 
and added that the Muslims of the world would not tolerate 
too long the presence of Red Army in Afghanistan. 
In February 1986 the Russian backed Afghan government 
lodged a protest in the U.N. Security Council against the 
Government of Iran for interfering in its internal affairs 
and violating the International law quoting a report of IRNA 
that a delegation under the supervision of Hojjatolislam 
Jawaheri, composed of Iranian clergymen, Afghans residing in 
Iran and counter revolutionary bands of the so called 
Pasdaran-e-Islami, Nasr, Na7;hat-e-Islami Harakat-e-Tslami, 
Jabhah-e-Motlahed-e-Fngelab-e-Tslami and Niro-e-Tslami-
Fngebab-e-Afghanistan had been constituted on the 
instruction of Ayatollah Montazeri to carry out a mission in 
Afghanistan. The purpose of the mission was to eliminate the 
differences and conflicts among the afore-mentioned groups 
and creation of a so called United Islamic Front in 
Afghanistan to establish contacts with the residents of 
their localities in order to inform them about the views and 
concern of Ayatollah Montazari about the oppressed people of 
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Afghanistan. In a 3etter to the Secretary General of U.N. 
the permanent representative of Afghanistan to United 
Nations, Mr. M. Farid Zarif, on ]3 February 1986 demanded 
that the leaders of TsJamir RepubJic of Iran should stop ail 
types of "aggression, interference and provocation against 
the Democratic RepubJic of Afghanistan" and "to refrain from 
committing such hostiJe actions".^ -' 
In September 1986 Tmam Khomeini criticised the Non-
aligned Movement for its role in connection of Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and demanded that the struggle 
for liberation in Afghanistan should be equally represented 
at NAM conferences. He emphasized that the NAM could not 
discriminate between the struggle of the Muslim people of 
Lebanon, Afghanistan and Palestine or Namibia for the 
departure of occupying foreign forces and demanded the 
representation of independent and liberation movement of 
Afghanistan in Non-aligned meets like other liberation 
movements.^^ 
In a major departure from its earlier policy, Iran 
proposed a conference on the question of Afghanistan quite 
independent of the Geneva process, in February 1987. 
Velayati outlined the proposal to Soviet President Gromyko 
and Foreign Minister Edward Shevaradnadze during his visit 
71. Letter dated 13 February 1986 from the permanent 
representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Document 
N0.A41/162, S/17825 dated 13 February 1986. 
72. Kayhan International, Tehran, September 6, 1986. 
to Moscow in February 1987 and also discussed the concept 
with Indian leaders during his visit to India in February 
1987. The proposal suggested that the conference shouJd be 
attended by Iran, Pakistan the Soviet Union and the Afghan 
Mujahideen or freedom fighter, Uptill then Iranian had 
sought an unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops as a 
pre-condition for any discussion on the Afghan question. A 
conference which includes the Soviet Union was therefore a 
radical departure from Iran's earlier stand. Velayati said, 
"We do not want a Vietnamization of Afghanistan". In other 
words if the "occupiers" stay in Afghanistan, then they will 
have to leave just as the American had to leave Vietnam. He 
emphasized that "Neither we nor the Russians wants this to 
happen". He stressed that it should be guaranteed that 
neither Ameircan nor American surrogates would substitute 
the Russians. He demanded that the problem of Afghanistan 
should not be solved in the East-West context but in a 
regional context.^^ 
73. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 21 February 1987, 
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C H A P T E R - V 
I R A N AND A R A B - I S R A E L C O N F L I C T 
Chapter - V 
IRAN AND ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT 
Arab-Israel conflict has been an important source of 
tension for Iran. Since the 1967 war Iran adopted a 
consistent position. It called for IsraeJi wdthdrawaJ from 
all the occupied territories and for safeguarding the 
sovereignty and integrity of all independent nations in the 
region including Israel. Iran maintained good reJations with 
both the sides and tried to encourage negotiations to soJve 
the problem but refrained from taking any initiative of its 
own. The Shah considered that the settlement of the conflict 
was possible only through American mediation. When Sadat 
launched his initiative, he got encouragement from the Shah. 
In November 1977 Shah praised Sadat for his effort to 
resolve the crisis. But the growing unrest in Iran reduced 
the involvement of Shah in Arab-IsraeJ conflict, however. 
Shah welcomed the Camp David agreement. 
The policy of Iran towards Israel took a severe change 
soon after the proclamation of Ts.lamic Republic of Iran. 
Iran declared to close its embassy in IsraeJ as we.1.1 as 
ordered to close the Israeli embassy in Tehran. It 
established full fledge diplomatic reJations with 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Imam Khomeini asked for 
a full scale uncompromising war and an 'honest IsJamic 
Challenge* against Israel in order to liberate Palestine. In 
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order to prepare the ground for the liberation of Quds 
(Jerusalem), he suggested that the last Friday of the month 
of Ramazan be designated as the Day of Quds. Imam Khemeini 
selected the day of the Quds from among the most auspicious 
days of the year. Friday is the day of the Muslim's Jargest 
weekly gathering. Further the month of Ramazan is an 
inspiration of victory for Muslims since it reminds them of 
the Battle of Badr, the prophet's (PURH) first war against 
the unbelievers which resulted in the victory of the 
Muslims. 
Imam Khomeini adopted a tough attitude towards JsraeJ 
even before the proclamation of Islamic Republic. If we go 
through different messages and speeches of Tmam Khomeini 
beginning from 1962 we will find that Imam Khomeini always 
considered Israel as an enemy of the Muslim countries and 
Muslims. He was totally against establishing and maintaining 
good relations with Israel. He considered Israel as an agent 
of super powers in the region to create problem for the 
Muslim countries and to play the role of policeman of the 
region. 
In 1962 criticising the Shah's policy he said that many 
sensitive positions were in the hands of Israeli agents 
which were a danger to Islam and warned the then government 
of Iran to sign any pact with Israel as it would be an 
opposition to Islam. He also requested the religious 
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scholars to aware the people about the danger in order to 
prevent the government to take any such type of step. 
Again in 1963 Imam Khomeini charged the government by 
saying that This "tyrannical regime" (Shah's regjme) co-
operating fully with Israel and its agents. They had 
influence in the court and had been given sensitive position 
in the army, in the Ministry of Education and in other 
ministries, he urged the people to be aware about the danger 
of Israel and its agents and be fearful about the 
consequences. He used the threat of Israel as a propaganda 
measure against Shah and his regime and provoked the people 
not to be silent at that time as silence was equivalent to 
the approval of that regime and aiding the enemies of Tslam. 
One of the major charges of Imam Khomeini against 
Israel was that he felt that Israe] wanted to take 
possession of the economy of Iran and to destroy the 
commerce and industry of Iran.^ 
In 1964 Imam Khomeini criticised the Shah regime for 
behaving in a friendly manner with Israel and having trade 
relations with Israel. He said that Iranian people were 
innocent and they were not the supporter to government's 
decision in regard to Israel.-^ In the same year of 1964 Imam 
Khomeini in a message of the 20th of Jumada al-Akhirah, 
disclosed that it was America which protected Israel and its 
1. Tlie Imam Versus Zionism, Ministry of IsJamic Guidance, 
Tehran, 1984, p.11. 
2. Ibid, 
3. Imam's Message on the Occasion of the Anniversary of the 
15th Khordad on June 5, 1964. 
19S 
sympathizers in the region and which empowered TsraeJ to 
make Muslim Arabs homeless.'* He urged the Islamic countries 
not to cooperate or help in any way with Israel as it was 
engaged in armed aggression against the Islamic countries. 
He declared that helping Israel, whether through the sale of 
arms and explosive or through the sale of oil, was forbidden 
and in opposition to Islam. He forbid any type of commercia.1 
or political relation with Israel describing it as 
opposition to Islam and urged the Muslim to refrain from 
using Israeli goods.^ He was totally against the access of 
Israel into the markets of Iran. He expressed these 
sentiments in 1963 in a message by saying that "Do not 
continue to allow Israel and its treacherous agents free 
access to Muslim markets; do not endanger the country's 
economy for the sake of Israel and its agents.^ In 1970 Jmam 
Khomeini said in a lecture "Devise a solution for freeing 
the Palestine from the grasp of Zionism", which he described 
as "the stubborn enemy of Islam and of humanity". He urged 
to help and co-operate with the people who were fighting for 
the freedom of Palestine He criticised the heads of 
Islamic countries whose conflicts with each other created 
problems and which did not allow it to be solved. He said 
4. Imam Khomeini's message of the 20th of Jumada ul-Akhirah 
(1964) published in Imam Versus Zionism, op cit, 
pp.20-21. 
5. Excerpts from the Iranian's Declaration in opposition to 
the Law of Capitulation. 
6. The Iranian's Message of the 29th of Safar, 1383 
concerning Israel Aggression (1963) published in Imam 
Versus Zionism, op cit, p.22. 
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that If seven hundred million Muslims with their large and 
widespread countries were politically developed and wouJd 
join together to form a united front, it would not be 
possible for the colonialist governments and Zionists to 
penetrate their countries".^ 
In a message to the pilgrims of Mecca in 197J Imam 
Khoneini called for jihad against Israel as only way to save 
the Palestinians and to save Iran from the domination and 
exploitation of Israel. He said that it was the duty of all 
Muslims to aid the holy Jihad both financial 3Y and 
spiritually. He urged the Iranian people to severe a.13 
financial transactions with Zionists in Iran, both 
international Zionists and others, and to 'render them 
financially and psychologically impotent'. He argued that by 
severing all type of financial relations with Israel agents, 
they would be forced to cut off their relations with Iran 
and with the Muslim people and as a result of which the 
Iranian nation would be able to avail freedom from their 
domination. He declared that it is the duty of Muslims 
living in every part of the Islamic world to use all of 
their power for the liberation of the occupied land and to 
take vengeance on the occupiers. Imam Khomeini was of the 
view that the goal of the great powers in creating Israel 
did not end with the occupation of Palestine, but their aim 
7. The Imam's Lecture Concerning the Imperial Regime, 28th 
of Rabi-ul-Akhir, 1309 (1970) published in Imam versus 
Zionism, op cit, p. 21. 
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was to take control of whole Arab countries.^ So that in 
order to safeguard their own independence, it is incumbent 
upon Muslims in general and Arab regimes and government in 
particular to devotedly aid and support the group of freedom 
fighters, and not to spare any effort in supplying them with 
arms, food and other suppJies. He was of the view that 
Israel was born through the collusion of the colonial 
government of East and West for the purpose of exploiting 
and crushing the Islamic nation and it is being supported by 
ail colonialists. He criticised England and America for 
strengthening Israel militarily and poJiticaJly by supp3ying 
it with lethal weapons, and condemned the Soviet Union for 
guaranteeing the continued existence of Israel and its 
deceit, treachery and compromising politics,^ 
In October 1973, Egypt launched a surprised attack on 
Israel and penetrated a number of miles in Sinai desert. 
Simultaneously, the Syrian launched an offensive in the 
Golan Heights and overran the IsraeJi outpost. Though the 
war started on these two fronts, the other Arab countries: 
the Morocco, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Iraq etc. aJso 
deployed their troops. But Israel taking advantage of one of 
the weak points of the Egyptian troops pushed her tank force 
to the other side of the Army's communication line with its 
base and threatened to move towards Cairo. On the Syrian 
8. Imam's Message to the Pilgrims to Mecca, J4th of Bahrain, 
1349 (February 8, 1971). 
9. Imam's Message to Religious scholars. Orators and the 
nation of Iran, 8th of Safar, 1392 (1972) published in 
Imam Versus Zionism, op cit. 
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front, also the Israeli forces managed to occupy the 
strateg.icalJy important Golan Heights. At that time Imam 
Khomeini extended hjs support to Arabs and urged all the 
governments of Islamic countries and specialJy the Arab 
government to mobilize al.1 their forces and come to the aid 
of the devoted men who were fighting on War-front and 
looking for heJp to the Islamic countries. He urged the oil 
producing Muslim countries to vse oi} as weapon against 
Israel and countries supporting Israel and did not supply 
them any more oil. He also advised the government of Iran 
not to be indifferent towards savage aggressions of 
Israel.^^ 
In 1973 Imam Khomeini criticised the Shah for sending 
Iranian Officers to Israel for training, for selling oil to 
Israel and his opposition to use oil as weapon against 
Israel and America,-'-' 
He criticised the Camp David Agreement describing it as 
a plot to legitimize Israel's aggressions, and as 
disadvantage to Arabs and Palestinians. He said such 
agreements would never be acceptable to the people of the 
reg.i on. -"^  
In 1978 Imam Khomeini declared that neither the Muslim 
nation of Iran nor any Muslim would recognize Israel, and as 
10. Fxcerpts from the Reply of the Imam to Muslim students 
Residing in Furope, America and Canada, 9th of Safar, 
1393 (1973), Imam versus Zionism, op cit. 
11. The Imam's Message to Islamic Governments and Nations, 
Ramadam 1393 (1973), Imam versus Zionism., op cit. 
12. Jmam versus Zionism, op cit, p. 33. 
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for as Iranian people are concerned they wou.ld always defend 
their Pa.1est.inian and Arab brothers-'^ He further said in an 
interview with a magazine that they (Iranian people) were 
with the oppressed people of the world and Palestinians are 
oppressed, if Israel was oppressed they might have on their 
side. He rejected Israel describing it as enemy of Iran and 
Muslims and declared that when he would come to power he 
will severe all relations with Israel and stop oil to 
Israel .-'^  
In 1979, after the victory of Islamic Revolution in his 
first meeting with Yaser Arafat Imam Khomeini said that if 
the Arab government with their vast populations and groups 
were united, these disasters would not have occurred for 
Palestine and Quds. He expressed grief that however, the 
Arab governments did not accept his advice and did not try 
to overcome the differences created amongst them by the 
foreigners. He also described the Camp David Agreement as a 
plot to create difference among Arab nations.'^ 
As Imam Khomeini declared that last Friday of Ramazan 
to be designed as Day of the Quds (Jerusalem). Describing 
the importance of the Day he said that The Day of Quds will 
be an international day devoted to Quds alone and will be 
the day of the uprising of the oppressed over the 
13. Imam's Interview with Associated Press, 16th of Aban, 
1357 (November 7, 1978). Imam versus Zionism, op cit. 
p. 33. 
14. Imam's interview with Middle East Magazine, 1978, Imam 
versus Zionism, op cit. p. 33. 
15. Imam's Meeting with Yaser Arafat, February 19, 1979, 
Imam versus Zionism, op cit, 
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oppressors. It will be the day of the uprising of the 
nations under oppression by America and others. He 
emphatically said that, "The Day of Quds is a day when the 
oppressed nations should assert their existence and rise up 
and defeat the oppressors as Iran did, and will continue to 
do. They (the oppressed nations) must rise up and dispose of 
this 'source of corruption* (Israel). Israel, this enemy of 
mankind and humanity, which is creating disturbances every 
day and setting our brothers on fire in southern Lebanon, 
must know that its masters are no longer accepted in the 
world and therefore must leave the scene". His attack was 
not only against Israel but also against super powers 
particularly America which was repeatedly called by him as 
source of all oppression.-^^ 
After the victory of Islamic revolution in 1979 Iran 
adopted a straight forward policy about Arab-Israel conf3ict 
at international forums specially in United Nations. On ]2 
March 1979 Iranian representative to United Nations, Mr. 
Sherairani condemned the Zionist aggression against Arab and 
Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and other Arab and 
Palestinians territories. He also condemned the Israeli 
settlement around Jerusalem and other parts of occupied 
territories describing it as systematic process of 
desecration, emasculation and exploitation of the shrines, 
legacies and peoples of these lands. He also charged IsraeJ 
16. Imam's Message to the Shias of Lebanon, June 9, 1979 
Imam versus Zionism, op cit. 
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for defacing and denolishlng Islamic sites and shrines and 
described the Israeli occupation of Arab and Palestinian 
lands as denographic, economic and psychological 
strangulation of the region. In his speech he draw the 
attention of the council towards the Israeli colonization of 
occupied territories as the violation of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention, principles of International law and relevant 
United Nations resolutions and demanded to the Council to 
take steps to restore the Islamic and Arab status of 
Jerusalem and to undo the despoliation which the Israeli 
occupation has carried out in the Holy city. According to 
him the government of Iran felt that Palestinian question 
was a fundamentally political issue and central to the 
entire Middle East problem. Full respect for, and 
realization of, the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people to self-determination, including the right to 
national independence and national sovereignty, were 
indispensable elements in the establishment of just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East and it is commonly accepted 
that failure to do it would brought about a situation which 
constitute a great threat to international peace and 
security. He called upon the Security Council to take prompt 
and effective action in this regard. including the 
application of Chapter Vli of the Charter, to ensure 
compliance with its own Charter and resolutions on this most 
grave and crucial issue.-^ ^ 
17. Speech of the Iranian representative to United Nations 
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At last he said that the urgency and centra 11 ty that 
the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian 
people holds for any Meaningful, just and lasting solution 
to the Middle East question was one of the naln pillar of 
Iran's foreign policy considerations. This policy was not 
only predicted on the religious and cultural affinity 
Iranians always had for their Palestinian brothers, but was 
also a natural product of the successful Iranian revoJutlon, 
whose nain objectives were the ellnination of oppression, 
colonization and ijnperialisBi.^ ® 
In July 1981, an Argentine Cargo aircraft crashed near 
Ervan in the Soviet Union. There was news that aircraft was 
carrying weapons fron Israel to Iran. This news was 
described as runour by Behzad Nabvi, State Minister and 
Iranian Government spokesman saying that Iran strongly 
condemned any arms purchase from the regime occupying 
Quds.-^ ^ On July 28, 1981 in the open session of the Islamic 
consultative Assembly (Majlis) Hojotoleslam. Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, the then Majlis speaker described the propaganda 
of buying arms from Israel as baseless and an imperialist 
and Zionist plot. He also recalled that after IsJamie 
Revolution Iran closed the embassy of Israel in Tehran and 
the same place was allotted to the embassy of Palestine. He 
further added that during the war they cried the slogan for 
in 2124th Meeting of Security Council held on 12 March 
1979. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Kayhan International, Tehran, July 28, 1981. 
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the destruction of Israel and they would repeat it without 
any pause.^^ Inaa Kboneini also clarified Iran's position on 
this issue while addressing the participants of Qnds 
conference on August 9, 1981 that they had always opposed 
Israel even before the Islamic Revolution and Iran did not 
consider Israel of any Importance. ^-^  
In August 1981 The foreign Minister of the IsJasic 
Republic of Iran, Mir Hussein Musavi, outlined the futare 
progrannes of his Ministry for a practical struggle against 
inperlallsB and Zionisn. He said that the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry Intended to forn a world-wide Islamic front to 
fight against Zionisn and that all the genuine states and 
liberation novenents of Islamic countries who were really 
fighting against inperialism and Zionism could take part in 
this front. When asked to elaborate, Musavi said that Iran 
was of the opinion that the formation of such a front could, 
to a great extent help to speed up and strengthen the 
struggles of Muslim nations against Imperialism and Zionism. 
Speaking to Pars on the occasion of the Quds day 
celebration, Musavi said that liberation of Quds would not 
just be the return of a piece of land, it also meant freeing 
nations from the Yoke of Imperialism with out such freedom 
liberation of Quds was impossible. He added that the Foreign 
Ministry of Iran was drawing up a foreign policy which 
presupposes that the liberation of Quds would be possible 
20. KayJian International, Tehran, July 29, 1981. 
21. Imam's Meeting with participants of the Quds Conference, 
August 9, 1981, Imam versus Zionism, op clt. 
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only when the Muslin countries were liberated. When asXed 
what message he had for the oppressed and those seeking the 
liberation of Quds, Musavi said that those who were aspired 
for the liberation of Quds should first seek the freedom 
befitting their human dignity and liberate thenselves and 
their nations since every step towards the freedom of 
nations would be a step towards Liberating Quds.^^ 
In 1982 Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd gave an eight 
point plan to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict. That pJan 
was opposed by Iran. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran issued a statement condemning the 
Fahd Plan saying that the Government of Iran felt that 'a 
peaceful coexistence with Zionism in reality means a 
peaceful coexistence between a wolf and a sheep*. The 
statement added that, "the issue of Jersusalam and Palestine 
is an Islamic one and not one based on race, or Arab 
nationalism'.^^ 
In 1981, Israel annexed Golan Heights. Iran strongJy 
condemned this act and the Foreign Affairs Ministry of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran issued a statement on December 16. 
1981 announcing total support to Syria and once again calJed 
on all Muslim nations of the world to form a United Islamic, 
anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist front for the liberation 
of Jerusalem.^* When the proposed United Nations Resolution 
against Israel condemning the annexation of Golan Height was 
22. Kayhan International, Tehran, August 3, 1981. 
23. Kayhan International, Tehran, August 3 5, 1981. 
24. Kayhan International, Tehran, December 16, 1981. 
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Vetoed by United States, Iran reacted sharply. The then 
Friday Prayers leader of Tehran Hoj jatolislain Hashni 
Rafsanjani, Condemned the U,S. action and criticised the 
right of Veto as one of the nost 'meaningless and oppressive 
institutions in the interest of a handful of arrogant 
countries in the United Nation.^^ 
On 15 April 1982, Iran's permanent representative to 
United Nations, Mr. Rajaie-Khorrasani said in bis speech in 
the Security Council that, Palestinians should definitely 
sort out their problems with reference to Divine law, that: 
If, "anyone attacks you, attack him In like manner as he 
attacked you; fear Allah, and know that Allah is with those 
who restrain themselves". In this way he called the 
Palestinians to fight with Israel in the same manner as they 
were fighting with them. He emphasised that the solution to 
the problem was no longer to produce mild resolutions, but 
the world community especially all those countries which 
wanted to maintain good relations with the Muslim world and 
those which claimed to care for international peace and 
security must face the truth that Palestine belongs to the 
Palestinians. The sooner the Palestinians go back to their 
homeland the less tension and the more international peace 
and security would be in the area. He demanded for the 
payment of Compensation for the losses and damages done upon 
the Palestinians inside and outside the occupied lands, as 
well as for the losses inflicted upon the Lebanese and other 
25. Kafban International, Tehran, January 23, 1982. 
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peoples. He also demanded for the return of people to their 
countries of origin who were living in Palestine and killing 
the innocent local people. 
He classified that be did not want any discrinination 
or injustice for the native Jews of Palestine. Those Jews, 
like the Christians and Muslims, must be given full freedom 
to administer their sanctuaries, to preach and practice 
their faith fully and comprehensively, as well as they 
should also get chance to participate in the administration 
of the country without any discrimination. 
Rajaei - Khorrasani also criticised the imposition of 
'illegitimate* regime of Israel upon the people of Palestine 
as the greatest mistake of United Nations. He said that this 
regime had no legitimacy and was nothing but usurpation and 
trespassing, whether it be the destruction of religious 
centres, the murder of worshippers, or the builders of 
schools or churches. From the legal point of view, 
construction and destruction by the usurping body were 
equally contrary to principle.^^ In September 1982, 69th 
Inter-Parliamentary Conference was held at Rome in which 
Iran called for the dismissal of Israel from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union as well as from all international 
organizations such as the United Nations.^^ 
In June 1982 Israeli troops with the help of American 
supplied weapons made a rubble of West Beirut and brought 
26. United Nations Documents, S/PV.2354, dated 15 AprlJ 
1982. 
27. Kayhan International, Tehran, September 18, 1982. 
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about a compJete defeat of P.J>.0. but the Arab states 
refused to offer any help to P.L.O., they onJy agreed to 
offer hospltaJJty to the humbJed P.L.O. men evacuated fron 
Lebanon. At that time Iran strongly denounced Zionist 
aggression against Lebanon and the occupation of Western 
Beirut leading to the massacre of innocent Palestinian and 
Lebanese people.^^ 
On J3t.h February J983, Rajaei Khorrasani , the permanent 
representative of Iran to United Nations said in the 
Security Council that the occupation of Palestine by 
'Zionist aggressors' and the formal recognition of that 
occupation by the United Nations was an imperialist 
conspiracy against the Muslims of the Middle East in general 
and against the Palestinians in particular, and, as such, 
constitute a blatant act of violation of international peace 
and security. He expressed the views that, however, the 
intention of the United Nations, and the Security Council 
was good but Iran was not too optimistic to believe that 
this body would achieve any tangible solution to the problem 
simply because those Powers which had been backing the 
Zionist aggressors in the area were still supporting them in 
the United Nations. Moreover, the philosophy behind the 
creation of the United Nations was not the defence of the 
oppressed or the prevention of aggression or the eradication 
of imperialism; but the preservation of peace and security 
as defined by the founders of this international body. The 
28. Tbid.. September 20, 1982. 
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ruJing powers and superpowers are using the United Nations 
to fulfil their interests. That is why there was not one 
single instance of any internationaJ crisis or probJe» which 
had been resolved against the interests of Western or 
Eastern superpowers. The United Nations could not end the 
Vietnam War; the United Nations could not prevent the United 
States for supporting the inhuman South African regime; the 
United Nations was not able to force the Russian amy to 
withdraw from Afghanistan. Similarly, the United Nations was 
not capable of restoring the rights of the PaJestinian 
people. He expressed that his delegation wouJd only hope 
that his participation would shed more light on the issue in 
order to affect the Internationa] consciousness that many 
more of the oppressed might stand against global arrogance. 
Jn Security Council Iran once again condemned the annexation 
of Golan Height and Gaza strip and its continued occupation 
by Israel. He said that Palestine is an Islamic 3and and its 
occupation worried all Muslims of the world. The Muslims of 
the Middle East, would continue their struggle against the 
Zionist base. He further added that the Government and 
people of the Islamic Republic of Iran were fully determined 
to stand beside their Palestinian brothers and sisters 
regardless of the cost. They strongly condemned the Zionist 
atrocities in occupied Palestine. They also denounced the 
national and international conspiracies against Palestinians 
that was contrary to all principles of justice, morality and 
internationaJ law. Iran strongly opposed any compromise with 
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or conceBSion to the Zionist usurpers, whether it cones from 
the Jnperialist Powers or from their agents in the ruling 
bodies of the area as weJJ as any resolution under the 
guise of peacefuJ coexistence, for the preservation of the 
'usurping Zionist regiae'.'^ ^ 
On August 1, 1983, Rajae-Khorrasani Iran's pernanent 
representative to United Nations caJled for the ful] 
mobilization of all the sources of the Mus5i»s to face the 
challenge posed by the Zionist aggression. He explained that 
fu]l nobilization neans all the assets deposited in foreign 
banks, the entire market of the Muslin wor3d, the entire 
econony of the Muslin world, all the raw materials, all the 
oil and its power, and above all the endless miseries of 
Muslin population, plus the oppressed people all over the 
world particularly In Africa and Latin Anerica. 
He charged the rulers of Muslin countries that instead 
of preparing the Muslins actually to nove to Palestine, they 
used to come to the Security Council for the solution of the 
problem which was like giving forged birth certificate to 
Israel 30 
In 1986 Iran was again charged for purchasing arms from 
Israel. This charge was strongly denied by the Iranian 
leaders. In November 1986, Friday prayer leader, Rafsanjanl 
categorically denied that Iran had purchased arms from 
29. United Nations Documents, S/PV. 2413 dated 13 Februair. 
1983. 
30. United Nations Documents S/PV 2459, dated August 1, 
1983. 
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JsraeJ. Rafsanjani sai6 Iran wlJJ buy U.S. manufactured 
ujljtary hardware on the jnternational market and from any 
country except Israel.^^ 
In 1988 the Quds Day was celebrated in many parts of 
the world on the initiative of Iran. The celebrations which 
took place in Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab 
Emirates, India, Pakistan, Italy, Spain, Hamburg, London etc 
reflected that Iran was for some extend successful in 
mobilising the people over the issue of Palestine and it got 
support to the Ideology of Islamic Republic about the issue. 
In Lebanon the Quds day was celebrated in different parts of 
the country and was addressed by prominent leaders and 
clergymen. In a statement issued by the Supreme Shi a 
Assembly of Lebanon, call was given to Lebanese Muslims to 
prepare themselves for an all-out confrontation with the 
regime occupying Quds. In the same manner the celebration 
were made in other parts of the world by condemning the 
Zionism and United States and praising Imam Khomeini and 
Islamic Republic. But in all gathering main attack was over 
United States not over Israel.-*^ 
On December 11, 1988 Iran strongly condemned the 
aggression of Zionist ^^ forces on the South of Beirut and 
called for the boycott of Palestinian leaders who had 
recognised the Zionist entity. Foreign Minister of the 
31. Kayhan Jnternational, Tehran, November 28, 1986. 
32. Tehran Times, Tehran, May J6, 1988. 
33. In December 1988 Israeli forces assaulted Palestinian 
gueri11 ion base in south of Beirut from Land Sea and 
air. 
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Jslanic RepubJic aJso caJJed on a3J PaJestJn.ian and 
Lebanese MusJJns to "nobJJise aJ3 tbejr forces and to set 
aside alJ thejr differences Jn order to defeat the Zionist 
enemy with their heroic resistance". The statement a3so 
cJ aimed that "The Quds occupying regime very soon understood 
that Lebanese and PaJestinians Mus3ims wlJJ no more toJerate 
any further aggression by the this usurping regime.'^ * Next 
day MajJis speaker HojjatolesJam Hashmi Rafsanjani urged the 
United Nations to defend the rights of the oppressed people 
of Itebanon. He also criticised the United States 
administration for lifting the ban on export of cluster 
bombs to Israel describing it as giving green light to 
Zionist regime to continue its crimes.^^ 
Since 1979 Iran's policy towards Israel have been 
motivated by following considerations: (i) Iran opposes 
Israel due to its close links with America, (ii) Inam 
Khomeini and bis aides consider Israel as enemy of Muslim 
and Iran, (ill) Shah recognised Israel and maintained 
political and diplomatic relations with it while all roost 
all the Muslim countries derecognised Israel, Thus during 
the revolution Imam Khomeini also played Israeli card 
against Shah by criticising him for maintaining relations 
with Israel, (iv) One of the main principle of new foreign 
policy was to support all the liberation movement and 
oppressed people of the world, under this principle Iran 
34. Tehran Times, Tehran, December 11, 1988. 
35. Tehran Times, Tehran, December 12, 1988. 
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supported the Pa3eEt.inJan people, (v) Iranian Jeadersliip 
visuaJIJsed that they wJJJ get the support of the MusJims 
through out the worJd by supporting Palestinians and 
opposing Zjonism and Israel. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
IRAN, INDIA AND OTHER THIRD WORLD 
COUNTRIES 
CHAPTER VI 
IRAN, INDIA AND OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
There had been good and mutually beneficial 
relationship between India and Iran fron centuries except on 
sone occasions. There is no nation with which Iran has so 
vitally connected as with India. Since pre-hlstoric tines 
there had been racial, religious, political and cultural 
affinities between the two. Even before the dawn of recorded 
history intimate connection between Iranian and the 
ancestors of the present day Hindus can be traced. Both of 
them lived together as an Important branch of Aryan family 
and enjoyed a basic identity of race, religion, language, 
customs and culture In general.* The historical connections 
between Iran and India can be traced with the conquest of 
the Punjab and Sindh by Darius Hystaspes in 512 B.C. Since 
then there is a long and uninterrupted association between 
Iran and India in various sphere of life.-'^  
A country which is half of the size of India having ast 
petroleum reserves with G.N.P. four times greater than 
India is an important country and a neighbour with whom 
India share a long history. Astride the Persian Gulf and 
*This point has also been emphatically discussed in 
Girilal Jain, The Hindu Phenomenon, UBS Publications, 
New Delhi, 1994. 
1. Oavar, Flroze C , Iran an India through the ages, , Asia 
Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, pp.VII-VIII. 
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stretching fron Turkey to Pakistan, Iran can both be a 
narket as well as a gateway into markets of central Asia and 
the Caucasus. The Islaaic revolution which shook Iran was 
not considered any threat for India as by Western countries 
and their allies in the region. Since the advent of IsJamJc 
regime India's relation with Iran has been relatively 
comfortable. India adopted a policy of neutrality in the 
Iran-Iraq War. The relations between Iran and India have by 
and large except on few occasions been good such as Iran's 
material support to Pakistan during its war with India and 
its continued interference in Kashmir probJem. 
However, India and Iran by virtue of their geographical 
proximity, common culture and shared heritage have had trade 
and commercial ties since, time immemorial. The ground for 
their modern relations was provided only after India's 
independence when the first treaty of commerce and 
navigation signed between the two countries in 1954. The 
agreement comprised of 16 articles which included permission 
for the citizen of two countries to visit each other's 
countries and could engage in trade and commerce activities. 
The 1954 agreement provided a base for other agreements 
which were signed in 1961, 1963, 1968 and 1974. The 
agreement of 1974 provided for the exploration of all 
possibilities and promotion of trade between the two 
countries. In 1975 an agreement was signed between India and 
Iran through which Iran provided $630 million to India for 
the construction of Kudermukh Iron ore complex in India. 
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Iran also agreed to buy 150 nlllion tons of Iron pellets 
from KuderBukh.^ 
When the Islanic Republic of Iran cane into emergence, 
at that time in India there was the government of Janata 
Party headed by Morarji Oesai as Prime Minister. The 
government of Morarji Oesai immediately extended its 
recognition to the Islamic Republic of Iran.^ India's Prime 
Minister sent a congratulating message to Ayatollah Khomeini 
on the successful culmination of Islamic Revolution. He 
further added in his message that "a prosperous and Is Jamie 
Iran" was a guarantee for the peace and stability in the 
region. In another message sent to the Prime Minister of 
Iran by the Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai expressed 
its keenness to maintain good friendly relations between the 
peoples and governments of two nations. He also admired the 
Iran's decision to join the Non-aligned Movement and 
considered it as a strong foundation for a mutual 
relationship between India and Iran.^ 
On March 14 1979 an Indian good will mission headed by 
a senior Janta Party leader, Ashok Mehta, vjsited Iran. They 
met the leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini in Qum 
and conveyed the best wishes of the people and government of 
India. In reply Ayatollah Khomeini urged the countries of 
2. Islanic Republic of Iran, a dawn breaks, Vol.1, No.l. 11 
February 1989, Press Department, Embassy of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, New Delhi. 
3- Data India (New Delhi) 12-18 February 1979. 
4. Indian and Foreign Review (New Delhi), Vol.16, No. 10, 
March 1, 1979. 
219 
the region to come closer and work for the betterment and 
development of the region.^ 
In December 1979 Mr. Abol Fazael Mojtahedl was 
appointed as new ambassador of Iran to India. Immediately 
after presenting his credentials to President N. Sanjiva 
Reddy he declared that the Islamic Republic of Iran was 
firmly resolved to continue the expansion of its political» 
economical and cultural relations with India and would 
respect the treaties and agreements signed by two 
governments.^ 
Since domestic development which took place in both the 
countries during 1979 gave lesser opportunity to renew the 
mutual relations. Due to the fall of Janta Party government 
and political instability In Iran, the Indian embassy in 
Tehran was without an ambassador throughout 1979. However 
when Mrs. Indira Gandhi again came into power in 1980, she 
Immediately appointed Mr. Akbar Khaleeli as India's 
ambassador to Iran in February 1980. Akbar Khaleeli in an 
interview on 24 February 1980 said that India's ties with 
Iran had been "as good as ever" and would not be Influenced 
by the revolution in Iran and change of government in 
India.^ 
During the last week of February 1980, Romesh Rhandari, 
Secretary in the Ministry of Externa] Affairs went to Tehran 
5. Government of Islamic Republic of Iran, News and Views, 
Vol.1, No.125, Tehran, March 16, 1979, p.25. 
6. Time of India, New Delhi, December ?.0, 3 979. 
7. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 24, 1980. 
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as special envoy of Prlne-Minister Indira Gandhi. During his 
visit he met with aany leaders of the Islamic Republic 
including the then President of Iran BaniSadr with whom he 
discussed the issues of mutual interest. There was a good 
impact of Bhandari's visit which was reflected in an 
interview of Bani Sadr with Press Trust of India when he 
praised India's efforts to remain independent from the 
domination of superpowers.® The visit of then India's 
Finance Minister, R. Venkat Raman in September 1980 was 
viewed as a good will gesture in Iran. However during these 
visits no concrete agreements were signed between two but 
both sides showed their eagerness to maintain good ties.^ 
In March 1981, Dr Kamal Kharrazi, the Managing Director 
of Pars News Agency and head of the supreme Defence Council 
of Iran visited India. The main objective of his visit was 
to mobilise the Indian government and leaders in favour of 
Iran in the wake of Iran-Iraq-War. His visit took place just 
before the Indian Foreign Minister's visit to Iran on the 
peace finding mission assigned by the Non-aligned 
Conference. Dr Kharrazi urged that being a member of the 
Non-aligned Movement India should not be indifferent towards 
the aggressor. He argued that those countries who are 
friends of Islamic Republic and those who wanted to maintain 
good relation with Iran should explicitly announce their 
stance towards the aggressors. In reply the Indian Foreign 
8. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, February 1980. 
9. Times of India, New Delhi, September 10, J980, 
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Minister confirned that India as a ueniber of the Non-aligned 
Movenent should not have an indifferent stands towards any 
localised aggressor and expressed the hope that in the 
course of his forthcoming visit to Iran and specially the 
area under invasion, he would be able to get first hand 
knowledge of facts to help him in carrying out his 
responsibility. 
Dr. Kharrazi also held meetings with the offJcJaJs of 
the Ministry of Information and discussed the prospects of 
the expansion of news exchange between the two countries and 
mutual cooperation to strengthen the Asian News Network in 
such a way as to counter the domination of 'Imperialist news 
network' A^ 
A five nan Iranian delegation headed by Mr. Mohammad 
Attarchi, under-secretary in the Ministry of Energy visited 
India in April 1981. During his meeting with Attarchi, the 
Indian Minister of Irrigation offered to cooperate with Iran 
in the expansion programs in the fields of technology and 
water resources. The other issues discussed during his taJks 
with Indian officers were the provision of advisory services 
to Iran, training of Iranian engineers in the fieJds of 
hydraulic system and exchange of information and irrigation 
method etc. At the end of the tour Attarchi described it 
very successful. 
In March 1982, Indian Ambassador in Tehran, Akbar 
Khaleeli said in an interview that India and Iran had come 
10. Kayhan International, Tehran, March 28, 1981. 
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•ucb closer after the Revolution specially with the joining 
of Non-aligned Movement by Iran. He also recalled the Jong 
history of nutual cooperation and understanding between the 
two countries. He compared the Iranian Revolution with 
Indian freedom struggle saying that both were expression of 
the aspiration of the mass of people in each of these 
countries. On the bilateral cooperation between Iran and 
India Khaleeli said that there was "no limit to the scope of 
cooperation" between the two countries. He said that IndJa 
was with Iran during its good and bad days and recalled that 
"when other imposed an embargo on trade wjth Iran, India 
opened its doors ever wider to Iran and opted for 
cooperation with the country in every conceivable manner". 
Giving figures he said that India's imports from Iran 
amounted to $1 billion while export to Iran stood at $3 50 
billion during fiscal year of 1981.-^ ^ 
Cooperation between Iran and India in the steel, lead. 
Zinc and Copper industries as well as training of experts 
were discussed during the visit of Roroesh Bhandarj in March 
1982. Iranian officials expressed its willingness to export 
Lead and Zinc to India while Indian envoy showed the 
readiness to train Iranians in the field of steeJ 
Industry.-^ ^ 
The five days official visit from 28 April to 2 May 
1982 by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar VeJayati to India 
11. Tehran Times, Tehran, March 2, 1982. 
12. Kayhan International, Tehran March 15, 1982. 
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was considered to be very inportant as it was the first 
visit by the Foreign Minister of Iran since the emergence of 
the Islamic Republic. After reaching New Delhi Velayati 
praised the long and deep relations with India in various 
fields. He further said that both the countries had common 
aspiration and shared the will to remain independent from 
the influence of imperialism. He was given a warm welcome in 
India.^^ A banquet was organised on 29 April in honour of 
Iranian Foreign Minister. The then India's Foreign Minister, 
P.V. Narslmha Rao, in his speech expressed the hope for 
further Improvement in Indo-Iran relations. Dr Velayati 
emphasised the need for a closer Indo-Iranjan cooperation at 
a tine when Iran was facing many problems.-'^ During his 
visit he met many Indian leaders including the then Prjme-
Minlster Shrlnatl Indira Gandhi. In an Interview he said 
that his visit to India had proved instrumental in paving 
way for greater cooperation In economic and other fields. At 
last a joint press statement was issued simultaneously in 
New Delhi and Tehran on 2 May 1982 in which satisfaction and 
similarity in their views in many spheres were declared.^^ 
Both sides also expressed their keenness and determination 
to further expand their cooperation in the fields of trade 
and industry, petroleum, mines, agriculture, science and 
technology. 
13. Statesman, New Delhi, April 29, 3 982. 
14. the Hindu, Madras, April 30, 1982 
15. Times of India, New Delhi, 3, 1982. 
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During the second week of August 1982, an IranJan 
delegation headed by All Akbar Hashini Rafsanjanj, the then 
speaker of Iranian Majlis, visited India. During their stay 
the member of the delegation met with many Indian ministers 
and senior officials, and discussed the issues of mutual 
Interest. Rafsanjanl said that Iran had no problem Jn its 
relations with India.-^ ^ The visit of Rafsanjanl which was 
schedule to commence on 8, August was postponed which opened 
the door for many speculation. The political observers in 
India speculated mainly three reasons for the postponement 
of the visit: 1. Iranian parliamentary delegation visit 
coincided with the visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister; 2. 
Internal developments in Iran. 3. The Presence of Cuban 
Vice-Mlnister, Peregrlve Torras in New Delhi, Rafsanjanl 
might have not like to discuss the NAM summit with Cuban 
leader at that juncture. 
The foundation for a better mutua] cooperation which 
was laid down by the visit of Iranian Foreign Minister in 
May 1982 was acquired further Impetus with the visit of then 
India's Foreign Minister, Shrl P.V. Narsimha Rao, in July 
1983, heading a high ranking political and economic 
delegation. The Foreign Minister held meetings with the 
President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Islamic 
Republic. During his meeting with President of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, All Khamelnl, he extended warm greetings 
and discussed the prospects of the formation of the joint 
16. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 15, 1982. 
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Iran-India Econonic Committee with a view to further expand 
the economic relation. The response of the Iranian President 
was very positive and he expressed hope that the committee 
could further strengthen the ties between the two countries 
taking inspiration from the historic and sociaJ relations 
between India and Iran. He added that soon after the 
culmination of Islamic Republic, leadership in Iran decided 
that Iran should develop sincere relations with India which 
was looking to turn into practice. He also speak about the 
Non-aligned Movement and expressed the views that Movement 
was subjected to various political pressure but despite all 
that the independence of the hope which this movement had 
inspired in the hearts of the people should not be 
undermined. He further added that the independence of the 
movement should not be attained by futiJe political 
activities but through a firm commitment to the ideaJs of 
the founders of this movement.-^^ 
During his meeting with Indian Foreign Minister, the 
Prime Minister of Islamic Republic, Mir Hasan Musavi 
expressed his concern over the presence of big powers in the 
region. In response the Indian Prime-Minister stressed the 
need for cooperation and coordination of the regional 
countries in order to eliminate the presence of the big 
powers from the region as well as from the Indian Ocean. 
During the second round of talks on 2;i July 1983, 
between the foreign minister of the two countries, mutual 
17. Kayhan International, Tehran, July 23, 1983. 
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relations, international issues and political events were 
discussed in detail. On the same day talks were heJd for the 
expansion of cooperation in the field of water, electricity, 
and energy as well as sharing the expertise and technicaJ 
progress.-^" 
At the end of the visit a Joint Iran-India CommunJaue 
was released in which both sides expressed satisfaction over 
the talks held between the officials and minister of the two 
countries. They recalled the deep historical and cuJturaJ 
relations between the people of Iran and India and 
emphasized that these relations were due to their antl-
imperialist and anti-colonial freedom struggle. The two 
ministers were reported to be agreed that similarities in 
political views and approaches provided a firm basis for 
establishing an institutional frame work for intensifying 
economic, trade, scientific, technical and cultural 
cooperation between the two countries. 
In respect of cooperation in trade both the sides 
agreed to study ways and means of bridging the trade gap 
through the continued implementation of the August 3982 
Memorandum of Understanding and through further discussions 
during the forth coming visit of the Iranian Commerce 
Minister to India in September 1983. A detailed time 
schedule for the implementation of the cultural exchange 
programme for the year 1983-84 was also chalked out. The 
detail programmes for cooperation in the field of education, 
18. Kayhan International, Tehran, July 23, 1983. 
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exchange of films and radio programmes and cooperation 
between the national informations media of the two countries 
were also discussed. They also agreed to ease the process 
of issuing visa and accreditation facilities for media 
representatives on reciprocal basis.•'^ ^ 
The Foreign Minister of the Islamic RepubJic of Iran, 
Ali Akbar Velayati again paid a visit to New Delhi in the 
third week of August 1986. That showed that Iran gave too 
much importance to India and its sincerely to improve 
relations with India. The Iranian Foreign Minister during 
his stay in India met with the then Indian Prime Minister 
Shri Rajiv Gandhi the then Indian Vice-president Shri 
Ramaswamy Venkat Raman and the then Foreign Minister of 
India Shri P. Shiv Shankar along with other dignitaries. 
During his meeting with Rajiv Gandhi he briefed him about 
his talks with Indian officials and stressed the need for 
Irano-Indian cooperation on various internationaJ issues 
particularly on Apartheid. He also briefed him about his 
just concluded visit to Africa and some Non-aligned 
countries. He also emphasized that Harare Summit of the Non-
aligned Movement should be utilized to advance the anti-
racist struggle.20 
A letter of understanding was signed between Foreign 
Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati and his Indian 
counterpart P. Shiv Shankar at the end of Velayati's visit. 
19. Kayhan International, Tehran, July 24, 1983, 
20. Time of India, New Delhi, August 23, 1986. 
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According to the document In order to boost Iranian oil 
exports to India and Iranian delegation was to visit India 
to finalise the agreement in this regard. The delegation was 
also to prepare a list of items to be purchased from India. 
It was also decided that an Indian delegation headed by 
deputy Minister of Steel and Mines would go to Iran to 
explore ways of expanding industrial and technical 
cooperation specially in the fields of transportation, 
communication and steel mill industry.^^ 
In September 1986 the then Iranian President Ali 
Khameini met with Indian Prime-Minister Rajiv Gandhi at 
Harare during the Eight summit of the Non-aligned Movement. 
Beside other international issues they discussed the problem 
of apartheid in South Africa. It was noted that both the 
leaders had many common views and approach in regard to the 
Apartheid. President Khameini highly appreciated and backed 
the Rajiv Gandhi's proposal for establishing a fund to help 
the oppressed people of South Africa. In November 3986 
Indian Prime-Minister Rajiv Gandhi sent a letter to 
President Khameini which was delivered to him by Indian 
ambassador at Tehran Mr, A.B. Gokhale on J3th November 3 986. 
In his message Rajiv Gandhi described the discussions with 
President Khameini at Harare as very effective for 
strengthening the unity of the Non-aligned Movement and 
stressed for the further expansion of bilateral relations 
between India and Iran. He also renewed his earlier 
21. Tehran Times, Tehran, August 23, 1986. 
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Invitation to President Khaneini to vjsit India whjch was 
accepted by him.^^ 
In December 1987, Iran's Minister of Heavy Industries 
Behzad Nabavi with a delegation visited India. During h.is 
visit he net Minister of Finance, PetroJeum and NaturaJ Gas 
as well as other high ranking Indian officials. Iranian and 
Indian delegation discussed various issues concerning the 
signing of new agreements in industrial and research 
cooperations.2^ A letter of understanding was signed between 
the officials of the two countries. The Iranian delegation 
also visited about 15 factories and industria3 complexes in 
different Indian cities. It was also agreed that 18 Indian 
and 30 Iranian companies will cooperate on industrial 
projects and 23 companies from India and 33 from Iran wiJJ 
exchange their industrial products. Iran was to purchase 
tea, meat and wheat from India in return for oil. Iran also 
decided to import industrial machines from India. On his 
return to home Nabavi expressed satisfaction on his visit 
describing it a very productive one. He said that the two 
countries share identical approach to self-sufficiency and 
severing ties of dependence on foreign powers.'^* In August 
1988 Secretary of Indian Ministry of Steel and Mines, Mr. 
R.P. Khosla, visited Iran with a delegation where he met Mr. 
Mohammad Javed Iravani, the Minister of Economic and 
Financial Affairs. He praised the Iranian decision to accept 
22. Kayhan International, Tehran, November 15, 1986. 
23. Kayhan, December 26, 1987. 
24. Tehran Times, December 27, 1987. 
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U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 on Iran-Iraq war. 
Beside several issues the joint Iran-India Kudremukh 
Concentrated Iran Project was also discussed.^^ 
India was the first country to which Iran sent an 
special envoy following the decision by Iran and Iraq to 
accept a U.N. sponsored cease-fire w.e.f. 20 August 1988. 
Mohammed Husain Lavasani reached Delhi in the second week of 
August 1988 with a message from Iranian Prime Minister 
Musavi to his Indian counterpart. Musavi's letter explained 
the reason for Iran's decision to accept the cease-fire to 
bring to an end the bloody war. During hjs 30 minute talk 
with Indian prime-minister the task of rehabiliation and 
reconstruction in Iran was discussed in detail. Indian 
leader expressed its readiness to extend all possible help. 
The visit of Iranian special envoy to India was given great 
importance in diplomatic circle as it showed that Iran 
considered it necessary to keep a friendly nation like India 
to inform about the latest situation in the country. 
Considering that India has the necessary technical skills, 
expertise and a reservoir of vast manpower at its disposal'. 
It was considered that both Iran and Iraq wiJl invite India 
to play a significant role in the rehabiliation and 
reconstruction work.^^ 
India as a leading third world and industrialised 
country has immense opportunities of trade and commerce with 
25. Tehran Times, August 13, 1988. 
26. Tehran Tines, August, 14, 1988 
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Iran. It's experience in the fields of power generation, 
railways telecommunications, textiles and other small scaJe 
industries can be of great use for Iran. There are a number 
of common factors which can contribute for further 
strengthening of the relations between the two countries 
such as: 
1. Both are the developing third world countries and members 
of the Non-aligned Movement. 
2. Both are facing many identical problem. 
3. Both the countries have many common interest in the 
Persian Gulf region. 
4. The common culture and languages of the people in India 
and Iran especially the vast and profound act of the Persian 
language and culture and the Iranian religious and cultural 
traditions which are observed in the Indjan social lives. 
5. India needs to meet its oil requirements with out foreign 
pressure. Iran has oil resources to meet India's need. Iran 
can also invest in a number of sectors of Indian economy. 
Iran is in need of technology and industries which can be 
provided by India. India can provide technical experts, 
doctors, nurses and other specialist to Iran. 
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IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 
The new regime of Islamic Republic of Iran changed its 
foreign policy in a deep transformation for establishing and 
expanding its ties with African and Muslim countries as well 
as the other countries of the third world. In July 1983 
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said that the 
policy of Iran was based on having ties with MusJim 
Countries and then with the third World Countries and the 
countries of African continent.^^ 
In March 1981, Iranian Minister of Industries and 
Mines, Mr. E, Neroat Zadeh said that in regards to the 
foreign investment in Iran most of the contacts concJuded 
with the west and the United States in the past had been 
studied and reviewed. In regard to new contracts Iran's 
preference would be the friendly and non-aligned countries 
of the third world.28 
The Deputy for International and Economic Affairs of 
the Foreign Ministry, Hussain Kazem said on one occasion 
that the objective behind the foreign economic poJicy of the 
country was to transfer the centre of foreign trade from 
Europe and United States to Asia and Africa. He said that 
Iran had decreased the amount of economic cooperation with 
western countries and had shifted to other countries. He 
said that for this purpose economic missions would be 
dispatched to Sweden, Finland, Austria, Brazil, Argentina, 
27. Kayhan, July 27, 1983. 
28. Kayhan, March 11, 1981, 
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Cuba, Greece and progressive Arab countries such as Libya. 
Syria and Algeria. He further disclosed that delegation form 
India, Pakistan, Turkey, German Democratic Republic, 
Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, and Albania for talks 
on the expansion of economic relations were expected.^^ 
Encouraged by the new approach of the Iran's foreign 
policy of improving relations with the countries of the 
third world, a number of African, Asian and Latin American 
countries showed its keenness to develop relation's with 
Iran. Officials, ministers and heads of the states and 
government of many third world countries paid visit to Iran. 
A number of agreements and protocol were signed between Iran 
and these countries. 
In April 1982 an Iranian commerce delegation visited 
Latin American countries. In September 1982 a Brazilian 
commercial delegation was received at Tehran and a contract 
worth over 130 million U.S. dollars was signed between the 
two countries. A big oil contract for the supply of Iranian 
oil to Brazil was also signed between Brazilian oil 
officials and Iranian Oil Ministry authorities. On that 
movement President Khameini said that these trips were aimed 
at further cutting dependence on imperialist countries and 
replacing them with third world countries.^^ 
In 1983 under its polij&y of improving relations with 
third world countries Iran upgraded its representative in 
29. Kayhan, January 28, 1982. 
30. Kayhan, September 19, 1982 
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nany countries of the third world from charge 6' affaires to 
anbassador and also established embassies in some African 
countries for the first time.''-^  Iran established diplomatic 
relations with Nicaragua and an Iranian embassy was opened 
at Managua. Iran extended its full support to the newly born 
revolutionary government of Nicaragua. President Khamelni 
also proposed for establishing a common fund to help the 
third world countries like Nicaragua. He proposed that 
eleven OPEC countries who are also member of Non-aligned 
movement should allocate a part of thejr revenue for this 
fund which could be used by the third world countries.^'' In 
May 1983 Nicaraguan ministers of Education and Foreign Trade 
visited Iran and expressed the interest of its government 
for further expansion of relations between Iran and 
Nicaragua. *^^ 
In July 1983, the Niger Foreign Minister, Daouda 
Diallo, visited Iran accompanying a delegation. During his 
meeting with President khamelni the Niger Foreign Minister 
expressed the desire of his country to expand ties and 
cooperation between the two Muslim countries. President 
Khamelni pointing to the need for further expansion of ties 
with third world countries welcomed the endeavours of he 
foreign minister of Niger for the expansion of relations 
with the Islamic Republic. He said that the Issues 
pertaining to African countries were of vital Importance to 
31. Kayhan, January 27, 1983. 
32. Kayhan, Jan 15, 1983. 
33. Kayhan. May 10, 1983. 
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Iran. He expressed his concern over the domination of 
Apartheid South African regime and described It as 
•unfortunate*. The Chad problem was also discussed on which 
president Khameini expressed his view that Chad should be 
free from Super powers rivalry.^^ 
The Middle East and Africa were the two strategic axes 
in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To 
this end the Iranian officials have always exercised 
particular emphasis on further acquaintance with the nations 
of these regions. For this purpose Husain Sheikho.leslam, the 
political under Secretary of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, 
conducted a month long tour of a number of Middle Eastern 
and African countries with a delegation. In Africa, Gabon 
and Nigeraia-both members of OPEC - was the first 
destination of Sheikholeslam. In the meeting of 
SheiKholeslam with Gabon President, Omar Bango, the latter 
voiced support to Iran's policy against the superpowers. He 
praised the Iran's stand against South Africa and 
cancellation of oil export to that country. The 
strengthening of mutual relations and promotion of bilateral 
cooperation in international arena as well as in OPF.C were 
also discussed. The other countries to which SheikholesJam 
visited was Madagascar and Mauritius. In Madagascar the main 
emphasis of discussion was the facilities Iran couJd provide 
to them in relation to oil exports. Certain concession were 
promised in the light of the government's decision to 
34. KayJian InternationaJ., Tehran, JuJy 25, 1983. 
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allocate revenue from 10 percent of .its tota] oJ3 sale to 
the third world and part.icuJar.1y African countries. 
Expansion of poJlticaJ reJations between the Is]amic 
Repub3ic of Iran and Mauritius, opening of embassies in two 
countries were the issues discussed with the officials of 
the Mauritius.^^ 
Generally the policy of Is]amic Republic of Iran aims 
at to improve relations with these countries. Sheikho3es3am 
described his visit as successful and fruitfuJ. He said that 
the exchange of views with the leaders of these countries 
had helped in the increase of relation with these countries. 
He expressed that in Africa he had the opportunity to 
closely witness the miseries in some of these African 
countries which were under French domination. He added that 
these infringements have wide political, economic and even 
military repercussion.^^ 
35. KayJian International., Tehran, December 5, 1983. 
36. Ibid. 
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SUPPORTING LIBERATION MOVEMFNTS AND OPPOSITION TO AI,L TYPES 
OF OPPRESSION 
Supporting the people who are JnvoJved in the 
liberation movement and BtruggJing against any Kind of 
oppression has been one of the main objectives of Iran's 
foreign policy. Under this objective Iran extended the 
support to PaJestinians, Afghanis and Lebanese in the 
region. It also supported or at least showed its sympathy 
with other liberation movements in different parts of the 
World. 
On February Jl, 1979 Imam Khomeini expressed his wi.lJ 
to fuJly support ali the liberation movements through out 
the World. He also expressed hope that all the Islamic 
governments would support them at appropriate time.-^ ^ On 
April 11, 1979. Imam Khomeini said, "the Iranian Movement 
has not been limited to Iran alone but rather it is a 
revolution of the deprived against the oppressors and it is 
the supporter of all those who respect humanity and human 
rights".-^^ On many other occasions Imam Khomeini spoke about 
the support of the liberation movement and condemned the 
oppression in different parts of the World. 
In case of Lebanon, Iran reacted sharply and extended 
Its whole hearted support to the people of Lebanon. On June 
14, 1979 speaking about the situation in Lebanon, the 
37. Iran Khomeini's speech of February 11, 1979, Iran 
Khomeini supports the Deprived and Liberation Movements 
throughout the World, Jmam Khomeini 's views on 
superpowers, op cit., p. 26. 
38. Iran Khomeini's message of April 11, 1979, Ibid. p.-25. 
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Iranian representative at United Nations strongJy condemned 
the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in his speech in 
Security Council. He described the situation in Lebanon as 
'explosive' and 'dangerous* and a threat to the peace of the 
region. He strongly said in his speech that the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanese territory and the subsequent loss of 
innocent civilians life and destruction of property caused 
by those vicious attacks, have once again proved the 
Israel's expansionist, belligerent and seJf-serving motives. 
The 'bankruptcy' of Israeli attempts of infringement on 
territorial sovereignty, unity and political independence of 
a member State had been amply reported by the Iranian 
representative in the U.N. which reflected Iran's concern 
about Lebanon. He said: The issue at state here is a rather 
basic and fundamental one: whether we, the community of 
nations, are going to allow the flagrant and continual 
violation of the national and territoria] sovereignty of a 
fellow member State. No fabricated or imaginary excuse, 
pretext or smoke-screen, whether in the form of "punishment 
raids" or "peace accords", should distract our attention 
from the very basic fact. Our failure to deal with this 
issue resolutely, firmly and in unison will set a dangerous 
precedence for the conduct of international relations. The 
risks of such failure are particularly high in a region 
where conflict, injustice and aggression have for too long 
been a part of the political landscape". 
239 
"The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has on 
several occasions and in various forums addressed itself to 
this point, having strongly condemned Israeli violence and 
aggression against defenceless and innocent civilians in 
Southern Lebanon. That being the case, we believe that the 
Council must by its decisions make it clear that acts of 
violence and destruction cannot be tolerated in the region, 
and that such Inhumane actions emanating from Zionist 
expansionism and deliberate Israeli provocations aimed at 
the destruction of any chance of a just peace or of 
guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian People, on which 
the just resolution of the Middle East conflict ultimately 
depends, remain intolerable". 
"My delegation wishes to restore its view that any 
peace not guaranteeing the rights of he Palestinian people, 
including the right of return, the right to self-
determination and the establishment of an independent state 
in its homeland, is at best tenuous and at worst contains 
the makings of a broader international conflict. Therefore 
we believe that any decision regarding issues related to the 
Middle East question as a whole, such as the one we are 
discussing here today, must keep constant congnizance of 
this fact".39 
In May 1981, in strongly worded statement Iranian 
Foreign Minister condemned the situation in Lebanon 
39. United Nations Documents, 2148th Meeting of the Security 
Council held on 14 June 1979. 
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describing it an Israeli and Imperialist, conspiracy to 
disintegrate Lebanon. The foreign Minister condemned the 
massacre of the defenseless Muslims inhabitants of the 
country and extended its support to the people of Lebanon. 
The statement further said that it lauds the efforts of the 
oppressed masses of Lebanon to protect their independence 
and freedom from superpowers and the domestic reactionary 
and subversive forces. The statement extended support to the 
Arab peace keeping Forces stationed in Lebanon and the 
countries which had stood up on the side of the tyrannized 
people of Lebanon.^^ 
On December 6, 1983 Majlis speaker Hashmi Rafsanjani 
said that U.S air attacks an Lebanon's central mountains 
against the Syrian Forces should be considered as a very 
important event at the international level. Speaking at a 
open Majlis session Rafsanjani noted that this incident was 
a clear threat against the future of Islamic world, 
especially the Arab World. The Islamic Republic of Iran 
considered this danger seriously and therefore could not 
remain indifferent towards this important action committed 
by the U.S. and its allies. The joint U.S., French and 
Zionist attack against Lebanon's central mountains was a 
non-declared alliance of enemies of Islam in an Islamic 
land, the Majlis speaker remarked.^^ 
40. Kayhaur May, 9, 1981. 
41. Kayhan, December 7, 1983. 
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On many other occasions Iran come out openJy to support 
the people of Lebanon and condemned the Israeli occupation 
of Lebanon, its atrocities and oppression against the peopJe 
of Lebanon. On 31, August 1984, Mr. Kamali, the 
representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to United 
Nations In his speech in Security Council reiterated Iran's 
support to Lebanon. Referring to the statement of the 
representative of Lebanon he said: 
"The details of the behaviour of Israeli forces of 
occupation in Southern Lebanon, presented to this Council by 
the Ambassador of Lebanon, clearly demonstrated United 
States-Israeli objectives in the Middle East; no amount of 
misinformation by the American media can distort the truth". 
He questioned the council for not taking in appropriate step 
in this regard due to the veto power of United States vho 
was in his view was a primary partner* in that 'conspiracy'. 
It is the position of the Islamic RepubJic of Iran that 
the victims of Zionist aggression should not fall into the 
trap set by the American-Zionist alliance and wait passively 
for the Security Council to gain their rights for them. He 
remarked. He further added that "It gives us great 
satisfaction to see that the Muslim people of South Lebanon 
are well aware of the various consequences of the on going 
Zionist aggression against them and are prepared to make the 
necessary sacrifices in order to abort this aggression. They 
have our support in their heroic struggle to regain their 
freedom and their dignity with the limited resources and 
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capabilities that they actually have. They must be confident 
that the path they have chosen is the path of Allah and it 
Is only this path that is going to lead them to victory, 
with his blessing".^2 
On March 7, 1985, the Permanent Representative of Iran 
Mr. Rajle-Khorrasanl again represented the case of Lebanon 
in the Security Council. He said that Lebanon has been 
victim of Zionist air-raids, acts of aggression, crimes and 
atrocities even long before Its occupation by the Zionist 
army. Representing to the failure of Security Council to 
adopt any concrete resolution in this regard he said: 
"Moslem people of Lebanon - absolutely disappointed with all 
the labels of such paralysed International bodies as the 
Security Council of the United Nations, and Knowing that the 
Council Is no less a victim of Zionist infiltration and 
hegemony than Lebanon itself - have decided to defend 
themselves both against Internal default elements which have 
been collaborating with the aggressor enemy and against the 
aggressor Zionist army, all at the same tlme",^ *' He further 
added that: "Since the Security Council is supposedly so 
committed to the maintenance of international peace and 
security the Council must have been following the 
development of such events in Lebanon with serious concern 
and moment by moment. Therefore, to quote much more of the 
42. United Nations Documents, S/PV.2554 dated 31, August 
1984. 
43. Speech of Rajael Khorrasanl in Security Council, U.N, 
Documents, S/PV.2570 dated 7 March 1985. 
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criminal record of the Zionist entity in this Chamber is 
unnecessary and redundant, it is particularly so because 
some conscientious States members of the Security Council 
know pretty well that their own hands too are deep up to the 
elbows in the blood of the Lebanese Muslims."*^ 
Then he urged the Security Council to pass a strong and 
straight-forward resolution condemning the Zionist aggressor 
for its 'crimes', as well as for its illegal occupation of 
Lebanese territory. He also demanded the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of all Zionist forces from al] the 
occupied territories.^^ 
The American Air raids on Libya in April 1986 was 
strongly criticised and condemned by the Iranian government. 
In his message to the leader Libya, the President of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran said: "The United States air 
attacks on Libyan cities were not the first aggression by 
the United States against the Islamic world; nor will be the 
last. The United States aggression against Libya is 
aggression against the Islamic world and a link in the chain 
of planned United States and Zionist aggression against the 
Islamic community". 
On 17th April, Iranian Representative to United 
Nations, Mr. D. Kamali in the meeting of the Security 
council strongly condemned this act and urged the worJd 
44. Jbid. 
46. Ibid. 
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coniDunity to condemned this act of aggression and take 
appropriate action to prevent further aggression.*^ 
On 15 August the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran issued the following statement:*® 
"Reaction to this inhuman and illegal act cannot be 
limited to verbal condemnation. An extensive political and 
economic boycott of the United States must be implemented. 
All countries and international organizations, partJcuJarly 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the League of 
Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization 
of African Unity, must adopt practical measures in the face 
of these barbaric United States crimes. 
"United States aggression against a Muslim Arab nation 
is a violation of all laws and human principles, and taKes 
place on the eve of the non-aligned Foreign Ministers' 
meeting. The order to attack Libya opens a new round of 
aggression against. an Islamic country, aimed at. the 
suppression of all opposition to United states and Zionist 
expansionism in the region. 
"There is no doubt that the attack on the Libyan 
Republic and the massacre of innocent people is a clear of 
example of State terrorism; it will not be the last". 
The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran on 
December 23 1986, Condemned the apartheid South African 
regimes invasion of Angola and Lesotho and called for an 
46. United Nations Documents S/PV.2678 dated 17.4.1986 
48. KayJian International, Tehran, 17 August J986. 
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immediate withdrawal of the apartheid usurping forces from 
the soil of these two countries. 
The spokesman of the foreign ministry reiterated the 
Islamic Republic backing for the just struggle of the 
oppressed African nation against racist South African 
49 regime. 
President Ali Khanamini's trip to Angola in 1986 
emphasized Iran's solidarity with the African Frontline 
states. Angolan President, Jose Eduardo does Santo expressed 
his countries support to the Libya and Nicaragua during 
stock with president Khameini. In response Khamejnj 
expressed his happiness to have visited Angola and added 
that the historic struggle of the Angola people was similar 
to the struggle of the Iranian nation. The Iranian nation 
which upholds its responsibility towards its revolutionary 
values cannot keep indifferent towards the aggression of the 
South African regime", he further added.^^ 
Under its policy of supporting the oppressed and 
importing relations with the countries of the third World, 
Iran established diplomatic relations with SWAPO (South West 
Asia People's Organization) in 1986. During the visit of 
President Khameini to the African countries in 1986, he met 
the SWAPO leader, Sam Nujoma at Luanda, Angola on June 2J, 
1986. The Iranian President reiterated the support of his 
country for Namibia's National struggle against the Pretoria 
49. Tehran Times, Tehran 24 December 1986 
50. Kayhan, February 9, 1986. 
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regime and called for the implementation of the U.N. 
Resolution No.435 in this regard. President Khameini told 
the SWAPO leader that the Islamic Republic of Iran followed 
the issue of SWAPO closely and stressed that racism was an 
insult on humanity. Condemning the occupation of Namibia, he 
said that unfortunately governments which are claiming to be 
the supporters of human rights are in fact backing the 
racist regime. President Khameini strongly rejected any 
compromising solution to the issue of Namibia.^ -' On 
international forums Iran strongly supported the NamJbian 
struggle. In the Ministerial meeting of the Non-alJgned 
countries at New Delhi in 1986 Iran gave official 
recognition to SWAPO. 
In the case of Chad Iran strongly condemned the French 
intervention in Chad and blamed both France and United 
States for generating problem in Chad. The Iranian 
representative to United States Rajaie Khorrasani speaking 
in the security council on the problems in Chad described it 
a family problem which should be solved with in the famiJy 
of African countries. He did not find any justification of 
the deployment of armed forces of other countries in Chad to 
suppress a group of its own population who threatened to 
overthrow the government and he questioned the legitimacy of 
that regime which was unable to control the domestic 
problems by its own. He also questioned the direct 
51. President Khameini's Statement, cited in Kayhan, 
February 9, 1986. 
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involvement, of France in Chad and considered it as a part of 
the conspiracies of the Western Countries who had colonised 
the countries of the Asia, Africa, and Latin America for 
years and now wanted to change colonialism to neo-
colonialism. ^ ^ 
The American intervention in Nicaragua and El-Salvador 
was also strongly criticised and condemned by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. The Iranian Representative to 13.N. Rajaie 
Khorrasani described the situation in Nicaragua as threat to 
peace and stability in the region. He blamed the United 
States for creating problem to the third World countries 
and for generating puppet regimes in those countries. He 
said that if security council passed a strong resolution 
against America it would not even solve the problem because 
the probJem was not simply a political problem. It was a 
•cultural, religious, economic, social and historical 
problem' created by a 'particular imperialist country that 
is causing trouble for the whole world.'^ ^^  
The United States allegation on Nicaragua for 
interfering in its internal affairs after the non-approval 
of U.S. Congress of a $14 billion appropriate bill, was 
described as baseless and regretful by Iran and the action 
of the US congress was appreciated by the Islamic Republic. 
52. United Nations Documents, S/PV.2466 dated 12, August, 
1983. 
53. Speech of Rajaie-Khorrasani, Iran'jPermanent 
Representative to the United Nations, U.N. Document. 
No.S/PV 2339 dated 29 March 1982. 
Rajaie-Khorrasani said in his speech at Security 
Council that "United States foreign policy is inconsistent, 
haphazard and absolutely devoid of any moral principle. They 
just plan it and implement it simply because they have the 
physical ability to do so. They impose sanction against 
Nicaragua but violate the internationally recognised 
sanctions against South Africa. They boldly and 
unjustifiably obstruct the recommended sanctions against the 
Zionist base occupying Palestine".^^ 
He charged United States and specially C.I.A. for their 
'overt and covert activities' and creating economic 
difficulties for Nicaragua. He said that the economic 
sanctions, the mining of Nicaragua's borders, the attack on 
tiny and simple economic resources of Nicaragua were all the 
'ill-omened insurgency plots of the United States to break 
the infrastructure of Nicaraguan economy'.^^ 
Then he demanded to the United States government to 
stop interfering in Nicaragua and give respect to the wishes 
of the world people which were reflected in the speeches of 
many representatives of the Security Council. He advised 
that United States Administration should avoid aJl 'abrasive 
and acrimonious' policies towards the revolutionary people 
of Nicaragua. He emphasized that the local differences 
between Nicaragua and its neighbours should be resolved 
through the good offices of the Contadora Group, which had 
54. U.N. Document No.S/PV2580 dated 10 May 1985. 
55. Ibid. 
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the confidence of all the parties concerned. The United 
States was requested, allow that Group to perform its jobs 
without coercion or intervention, ^  
In June 1980 Iran established diplomatic relations with 
the Democratic Arab Republic of Sahara, the government 
proclaimed by the Polisario guerilla movement.^' 
Iran also reacted over the death sentence of several 
leaders in Egypt and Bahrain and warned them for severe 
consequences. Musavi said that Islamic Republic could not be 
indifferent to the fate of the Muslims around the Wor3d and 
any kind of harshness towards the Muslims would entai.l 
responsibilities for Iran.^° 
56. Ibid. 
57. CeyJon Daily News, 23 June, 1980. The phosphate rich 
territory of former Spanish Sahara wasd^vided between 
Morocco and Mauritinia after the withdrawal of Spain in 
1976. In 1979 Mauritinia renounced its claim over 
Sahara. Armed struggle continued between Morocco and 
Algerian backed Palisario guerillas. 
58. Kayhan, March 8, 1982. 
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Chapter VII 
FOREIGN POLICY OF IRAN AFTER KHOMEINI 
The death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khoaieini on June 3, 1989 
left many speculations about the future of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran as well as its foreign and domestic policies 
Till 1988-89 the foreign policy of the country was influenced 
by two factors; 1. Iran-Iraq war; 2. Ideology and thought of 
Imam Khomeini. Through out the Iran-Iraq war Iran determined 
its friends and enemies on the basis of the respective stand 
on Iran-Iraq war. Those who supported Iraq were regarded as 
the enemy of Iran and Iran decided not going to extend any 
concession to such countries in its relations. On the other 
hand those countries who favoured Iran were considered to be 
the friends of Iran. Those countries who declared and 
maintained their neutrality in the war were appreciated and 
relations were maintained on the basjs of mutual interests. 
Imam Khomeini's direct involvement in the framing of the 
foreign policy and in maintaining the foreign relations 
continued till his death. Imam Khomeini who declared American 
as 'Great Satan* and number one enemy of Iran also tried to 
maintain distance from the former Soviet Union under the 
policy of 'Neither East nor West.^  
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After the death of Imam Khomeini the foreign and 
domestic policy of Iran was mainly based on who were going to 
dominate and capture the power in Iran. If power had gone into 
the hands of radicals who looked at Imam Khomeini's son Ahmad 
as leader then there was hardly any change of chance in Iran's 
policy; But if the moderate groups led by Rafsanjani came into 
power then changes in foreign policy and approach of dJpJomacy 
as well as a change in economic policy was expected. Thus many 
persons speculated that after the death of Imam Khomeinj there 
would be a power struggle in Iran. But despite the dire 
predictions of many, the smooth transition of power jn Iran 
surprised the world as Iranian leadership and people displayed 
unexpected unity and alacrity in filling the political vacuum. 
Immediately after Khomeini's death, the 80 member 
Assembly of Experts, empowered to select hjs successor, 
elected President Hojatolislam Sayed Ali Khameini as Iran's 
new spiritual leader by a two-thirds majority. Khameini 
received pledges of allegiance from the cabinet, the 
parliament and the military. In a show of unity, the reguJar 
defense forces and the Revolutionary Guards jointly did 
likewise. 
Meanwhile, Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani emerged as 
Iran's prospective executive. His presidential aspirations had 
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become quite clear by the fall of 1988. He advocated for a 
constitutional reforms and strong presidency. Initially the 
radicals were expected to oppose both Rafsanjani's candidacy 
and constitutional reforms due to the Rafsanjani's long 
support for private enterprise, his misgivings about Soviet 
intentions, his willingness to improve Iran's relations with 
the West and his periodical remarks about the possibility of 
resolving U.S. Iranian differences. 
Despite the apparent intensification in the struggle 
for power within the Iranian leadership in the months 
preceding Ayatollah Khomeini's death both 'conservatives' and 
'liberals' gave their support to the candidacy of Hashemi 
Rafsanjani for the Presidency. The presidential election, held 
on 28 July 1989 was contested by only Rafsanjani and Abbas 
Sheibani, a former minister who was widely regarded as a 
'token' candidate. According to official figures, Rafsanjani 
received some 15.5 m. (95.9%) of a total 16.2m. votes cast. 
Abbas Sheibani received 632,247 (3.9%) of the total votes 
cast. A total of 24m. people were eligible to vote. At the 
same time, 95% of those who voted approved the 45 proposed 
amendments to the Constitution, the most important of which 
1. Shireen T. Hunter, Post Khomeini Iran, Forc'S^n Affairs, 
vol.68, winter 1989-90 pp.137-149. 
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was making the President as Chief Executive and the abolition 
of the post of Prime-Minister. Rafsanjani was sworn in as 
President on 17 August 1989. On 29 August, following a three 
day debate, the Majlis approved Rafsanjani's 22 ministerial 
nominations. The Council of Ministers was regarded as a 
balanced coalition of 'conservatives', 'liberals' and 
technocrats, and its endorsement by the Majlis was viewed as a 
mandate for Rafsanjani to conduct a more conciliatory foreign 
policy towards the West, in particular with regard to the 
Western hostages held captive by pro-Iranian Shia groups in 
Lebanon; and to introduce reforms designed to stimulate 
economic reconstruction. 
While the amendments to the Constitution increased the 
power of the presidency, it was anticipated that Rafsanjani's 
leadership would be challenged by several factions, including 
Ahmad Khomeini, son of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and by 
the Minister of the Interior, Ali Akbar Mohtashami, and the 
Minister of Intelligence, Muhammad Muhammadi Reyshahri, both 
of whom were Known to be advocates of a doctrine of 'permanent 
revolution's. Both Mohtashami and Reyshahri were excluded from 
the council of Ministers that the Majlis endorsed in August 
1989, but political tension between 'conservatives' and 
'liberals' remained high throughout the remainder of the 
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year. 
Also important was the removal of Mir Husain Moussavi, 
whose office of Prime Minister was eliminated Mousavi can best 
be characterized as a hard-line technocrat who advocated a 
static economy. In foreign relations he had been supporting 
the expansion of ties with the Soviet Union and other 
countries of Eastern bloc and Third World, while opposed the 
normalizing of relations with the United States. 
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati was retained in 
the new government. Vellayati a pragmatic realist, as well as 
a shrewd politician had survived with many twists and turns of 
Iran's politics. Vellayati had proved his competence since his 
injunction in 1984 adopting some measures of normalcy into the 
conduct of Iran's foreign relations. He had also worked hard 
to improve the quality of the foreign ministry staff by 
educating and training the inexperienced revoJutionary 
youths, who had replaced the old diplomatic personnels. A few 
hard-liners were included in the cabinet, but even these were 
not particularly extreme. 
The difficulties facing Rafsanjanj in framing Iran's 
foreign policy into a new direction were evidence even before 
he became president during the crisis generated by Israel's 
2. ThG tliddle^ Eas^t artd North Afri-ca, 1994, p. 423. 
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abduction of Sheikh Obeid and Hezbollah's assassination of 
Colonel Higgins. To Rafsanjani's conciliatory remarks directed 
to the United States, not only Hojatolislam Mohtashami but 
also Ahmad Khomeini responded by warning against any departure 
from Imam Khomeini's uncompromising stand. Even Ayatollah 
Khameinei, declared that he might oppose Rafsanjani in case of 
any deviation from the Imam's revolutionary principles. Th.is 
verbal assault on Rafsanjani's position reflected the fact 
that the transition in Iran was still in a stage when every 
issue was discussed in the context of the Ayatollah Khomeini's 
3 
political legacy. 
Foreign policy is the area where the unity of Iran's 
political leadership is to be roost severely tested. It is 
also the area where the radicals are likely to put extensive 
pressure on Rafsanjani. Although the radical faction had lost 
ground since the death of Khomeini, it would be a mistake to 
interpret their official eclipse as evidence of lack of 
influence. Although their most prominent representative were 
excluded from the new cabinet or refused to serve in the new 
system. But their point of view is still represented within 
the bureaucracy and in the military, especially the 
Revolutionary Guards, as well as in major segments of the 
3. Shireen T. Hunter, op.ait, p. \-^-7_i,g 
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population. 
Thus, while Rafsanjani had a chance to shift Iran in a 
more moderate direction. But he could face serious 
difficulties if he tried to move too far, too soon, beyond the 
agreed consensus. Although he had emerged as the most powerful 
figure in Iran, his authority was not uncha.1 Jenged 
Particularly in the parliament. Rafsanjani resigned as 
commander in chief of the m.ilitary after his electaOB as 
president, explaining that he wanted to concentrate on 
economic issues. After his resignation AyatoJlah Khane.inj 
assumed that position. His resignation, as it was viewed by 
many observers, came under the pressure from his opponents and 
allies who never wanted to see him to become too powerful. 
The broad consesus that allowed the smooth transition 
of power in Iran was reached in the spring of 1989 after a 
remarkably open debate for nearly a year and some interesting 
gyrations following Iran's acceptance of a cease-fire in its 
war with Iraq. The principal points of the debate was the 
destruction of Iran's economy, worsening living conditions and 
growing public disaffection during the last three years of the 
war. This situation demanded concrete and swift decisions and 
would no longer permit a policy of drift and paralysjs. 
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The question of economic principal was centered on the 
respective roles of government and the private sector, plus 
the acceptable level of foreign financing of Iran's post war 
reconstruction and thus the acceptable level of its foreign 
borrowing. Closely related was the question of the relative 
importance of p>rofessionalism and revolutionary commitment in 
economic management. Further the contention was the choice of 
Iran's economic partners and its impact on Iranian policy. 
In social policy, meanwhile, debate centered on the 
rigidity of application of certain Islamic moral codes and 
even, to some extent, their interpretation. 
In foreign relations, the basic principle of 
non-alignment, illustrated by the slogan "neither East nor 
West" was not challenged. But there was sharp debate on the 
choice of Iran's principal partners, especially the extent to 
which Iran should improve relations with the West. The issue 
of Iran's ties with the United States was particularly 
controversial --whether there should be any effort to 
4 
normalize relations. 
The terms moderate and radical were frequently used an 
connection of Iranian politics. Those Iranian who are called 
moderates have a traditional interpretation of Islam that 
4. Ibid. 
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emphasizes such principles as the sanctioning of priifate 
property. Thus, they are opposed to government control of the 
economy and support a central role for the private sector. Tn 
social matters, they favour a less rigjd application of 
Islamic moral codes a more liberal interpretation of Islamic 
rules. They emphasized competence and professionalism jn the 
running of the country and, with certain exceptions, they 
favor the return of Iranian technical experts living jn ex-iJe. 
In foreign policy, the moderates favour an attitude 
towards the outside world that is less confrontational than 
the radical's view. They favoured improving Iran's ties with 
the West, including, the United States. Initially the 
moderates were quite suspicious of Soviet interventions and 
did not favour close relations with the Soviet Union. But 
later on their views were altered because of changes in Soviet 
policy on a number of issues important to Iran, such as 
Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq dispute, and because of 
consistent Soviet efforts to improve relations with Iran. ' 
By the spring of 1989 a more moderate consensus was 
emerging on the broad outlines of Iran's economic policy. 
Economic reconstruction and some alleviation of the people's 
financial hardship surfaced as the government's first 
5. Ibid, 
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priority. And it became clear that economic reconstruction 
would require harnessing the domestic base of capital and some 
foreign borrowing. There is, indeed, a fair amount of Iranian 
capital that could be invested -- provided the government were 
to give the private sector a freer hand and create a safer 
environment for business: curbing the activities of of 
revolutionary committees, developing lega] safeguards and 
increasing the confidence of the business community the there 
would not be sudden changes in government po.l.icy. Thus jt was 
agreed that the private sector should play large role and that 
some foreign financing is inevitable. Given the Iranians' 
bitter memories, going back to the nineteenth century, of the 
loss of political independence through foreign indebtedness, 
it was decided that this borrowing should be limited to 
specific projects with a capacity to generate foreign exchange 
earnings. 
In exchange for concessions on economic policy, the 
radicals seemed to have exacted a price in foreign policy. 
This trade-off was reflected in the severing of Iran's 
diplomatic relations with Britain in March 1989, in strains in 
Iranian-West German ties, in the radicals change in Soviet-
Iranian relations and in the expansion of Iran's economic and 
trade relations with other East European countries and China. 
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Of these developments, the dramatic improvement is 
Soviet-Iranian relations is particularly noteworthy. It has 
concluded far-reaching economic agreements with that country, 
including joint exploration for oil in the Caspian Sea and in 
northern Iran. It was a departure from Iran's historical 
aversion to Russian involvement in oil exploration in Iran's 
northern province. In exchange the Soviet Union called for the 
with-drawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory and 
supported an ultimate resolution of the Shstt al-ArBb dispute 
along the lines of the 1975 agreement. 
What was important in the new Soviet-Iranian 
relations was that this policy had the blessing of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini who met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze in February 1989, and thus a closer relation 
could not be challenged as being against his wishes. Even 
Rafsanjani, despite his earlier misgivings, had to regularize 
his relations with Moscow by visiting the Soviet Union in June 
1989 shortly after Khomeini's death. 
With the post-Khomeini transition, the Rafsanjani-
Khameini team has emphasized the urgency of economic 
* In 1975 an agreement was signed in Algeria between Iran and 
Iraq which provide a relief to their prolong dispute over 
Shatt-8i~Arab. According to the agreement Sh^itt stl-Arsb was 
divided between the two on the basis of rhaiw^g line 
principle. This agreement was unilaterally abrogated by Iraq 
in 1980. 
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reconstruction, as reflected in Rafsanjani's speech to 
parliament at the time of siibmitting the list of his cabinet 
for approval. He asked the Majlis whether Iran could be 
independent without productivity and he answered his own 
question: so long as Iran had to import its wheat, neat, 
machinery and even skilled manpower from abroad, it would 
have neither economic nor political independence. Rafsanjani 
also said that economic reconstruction would require socia.1 
reforms-including cultural regeneration, respect for law, 
educational excellence, greater freedom of expression and 
more equal treatment for women. He called on those exiled 
experts who were not "traitors" to return home under "his 
personal guarantee."^ 
While Western support was regarded as vital to Iran's 
economic reconstruction by Rafsanjani and his supporters. 
Many Iranian leaders had fear that it would lead to the 
erosion of Islamic values and the betraya.1 of the 
Revolution. Rafsanjani's fundamental problem on assuming the 
Presidency was to find a way of gaining Western support 
without alienating the 'conservative' faction within the 
Jeadership, which remained too powerful to be directly 
confronted. The urgency of the need for economic reform was 
demonstrated by increased incidence of popular protest 
against food shortages and high prices in early J990. In May 
1990 an 'open • 1 etter* was addressed to Rafsanjani by 90 
6. Jbid. 
262 
pronJnent c3 erics, professJonaJs and retired soJd.ierE 
associated with the Liberation. Movement of Iran. The 'open 
letter' criticized government politics, compJained of 
massive corruption an regretted Iran's international 
isolation. It Jed to widespread arrests, which appeared to 
indicate that Rafsanjani was unable to control his 
'conservative' opponents. Divisions within ruling circles 
were exemplified by the dispute between Rafsanjani and his 
opponents over whether to accept western aid following an 
earthquake in Gilan and Zanjan provinces in June 1990, in 
which more than 40,000 people died. After some initial 
hesitations. Western aid was accepted which was regarded as 
an important victory for Rafsanjani^ 
It was difficult to resolve Iran's economic problems 
without changes in its foreign policy. Although Eastern-bloc 
countries, China and some other countries could afford Iran 
a small range of choice, ultimately the economic and 
technological backwardness of these nations and their 
financial difficulties make them unappealing partners. Thus, 
Iran's economic recovery required access to Western capital 
and technology, which was not possible without some prior 
political understanding with the West because, in the face 
of Western opposition, even the Soviet Union might not be 
willing to sell Iran the arras it desperately needs to match 
7. The Middle Past and North Africa, 1994, op.cit, p.424, 
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its neighbors but Iran's relations with the West couJd not 
improve too the point of allowing significant financiaJ 
transfers and rearmament without a break through in jts 
relations with the United States. The moderates recognized 
this fact, but this was also the area where they were most 
vulnerable to radical pressure and censure. There was also 
the bitter memories of the Western hostages. 
How the United States would regard the post-KhoroeinJ 
Iran, while the moderate alternative was more than a mere 
possibility or a vision for a far distant future ? As 
moderates were limited by the dynamics of Iran's domestic 
politics from taking bold actions to improve relations with 
the United States, Domestic politics also imposed some limit 
on the U.S. ability to make gesture towards Iran that would 
strengthen the moderate trend and enable jt to resist 
radical pressure and reciprocate by meeting U.S. concerns. 
The most significant constraint on the United States 
was of course, the unresolved hostage problem. Morally as 
well as politically, the United States found it difficult to 
take any positive steps towards Iran as long as its citizen 
were held captive by pro-Iranian factions in Lebanon. Yet 
this reluctance create much more difficulties for Iranian 
moderates to gain support for a policy of ending hostility 
with the United States. 
It could be argued that the West's cool response to 
Iran's overtures in the past, especially during the summer 
and fall of 1988, helped weaken the moderates position even 
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before the outbreak of the Rushdie affair. For exaropJe, Iran 
was disappointed in its expectation that, after it accepted 
the cease-fire and improved its relations with Bost GuJf 
states, the West would be less favourable towards Iraq. Iran 
soon discovered that it could not hope for any preferential 
credit facilities from the West, including West Germany, 
which, among European countries, had the best relations with 
Iran. 
The basic U.S, attitude toward Iran throughout 1988-89 
has boiled down to a single proposition: in the post cold 
war era Iran was no longer important and if the United 
States waits long enough the Iranians will have no choice 
but to come back on American terms. The changes in Tehran 
created new opportunities for U.S. to end hostility with 
Iran. But Washington did not response positively.® 
The experience of the last several years offered some 
guidelines for a balanced U.S. approach that would stand a 
better change of encouraging moderation in Iran and of 
helping to end U.S. - Iran hostility. The following points 
are fundamental. First, the United States cannot hastJ3y 
dismiss Iran as an unimportant element in the Middle F.ast. 
Its size, population, resources, and ethnic, reJigious and 
cultural links in the Persian Gulf and South and Centra] 
Asia make it important. The great-power competition in that 
area long predates the cold war. In this context Iran's 
policies will have an impact in either helping or hindering 
8 Ibx<i. 
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U.S. regional interests. As the changes in Iran's Afghan 
policy created some difficulties for United States-
Second, the United States should not be too confident 
that economic difficulties and military needs will force 
Iran to return on Americans terms. There are other Western 
countries with whom Iran can develop economic reJations. The 
North and South Korea, China, Japan and other third world 
countries may also meet the Iranian needs. 
Third, the expectations of a collapse of the Islamic 
regime after the Ayatollah Khomeini's death had a3so 
disappointed U.S. and the prospects of one of the opposition 
groups gaining power is not possible. Yet there is a 
moderate alternative in Iran, and the country's acute needs 
and the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini have strengthened 
its hand. During the last few months, Iran has been working 
to create conditions in Lebanon that could facilitate the 
release of hostages, especially by curbing the most extrene 
members of Hezbollah. It has, for example, improved its ties 
with the more moderate Shia organization in Lebanon -Aroal-
and it has been reported that 70 of the most extreme 
Hezbollah members are being held in Iran under the pretence 
that they are pursuing religious studies in the holy city of 
Ouro. Under these circumstances, it was difficult for the 
moderates to gain support for their policy without offering 
some concrete and tangible benefits. 
Given the lack of other realistic and more palatable 
options, the continuation of President Rafsanjani's 
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pragmatic evolution could be of value to the United States. 
For example, in view of the radicals's determination to 
undermine to Rafsanjani or at least to censure him, it is 
inappropriate for the West to demand bold actions from him 
without offering much in exchange. 
A return to the artificial intimacy that the Shah's 
Iran enjoyed with the United States is neither possible nor 
desirable for either country. But there is no sound reason 
why normal and fruitful relations cannot be restored, based 
on mutual respect. A measured and cautious policy that tries 
to help the moderates of Iran can do U.S. interests no harm, 
and may hold the potential of yielding positive results.^ 
RELATIONS WITH U.S.A. 
Iran-US relations remained at a low ebb during 1989 and 
early 1990 despite some show of gesture and good efforts to 
normalise relation by both the sides. Continued antj-US 
feeling in Iran and the associated strength of the radical 
Islamic political forces resulted from the US refusal to 
make a more comprehensive effort to compensate Iran for the 
shooting down of an Iranian airbus in the Gulf by the United 
States Vincennes warship in July 1989 and delay in releasing 
some $12,000 million Iranian assets frozen since the 1979 
Iranian revolution. On May 17, 1989, Iran formally applied 
for the aircraft compensation case to be referred to the 
International Court of Justice (ICI) at The Hague. The 
9. Shireen T. Hunter, op. cit. pp. 137-49. 
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application called for a ruling to order US payment of 
compensation "in accordance with the injuries suffered by 
the Islamic Republic and the bereaved f amilies" .^ *^ 
In a surprise announcement on July 17, the US State 
Department offered to pay compensation of between US 
$100,000 and US $ 250.000 for each of the 290 peopJe kilJed 
in the shooting down by the US cruiser Vincennes of an 
Iranian Airbus over the Gulf on July 3, 1988. The USA had 
justified the cruiser's action, claiming that the Airbus had 
behaved like a hostile Iranian jet fighter. However, a 
Pentagon (Defence Department) inquiry leaked to the press in 
early August 1988 acknowledged that inexperienced members of 
the Vincennes crew were responsible for the shooting down of 
the airliner. A State Department spokesman said on Ju.ly 17 
that the compensation was offered "in accordance with the 
humanitarian traditions of our nation" and did not imply US 
liability for the "accident". In addition payments would not 
be made through the Iranian government. But onJy through an 
"appropriate intermediary". An IRNA report on JuJy 21 said 
that the Iranian government will consider the acceptance of 
the compensation only after Washington is 'judicially and 
legally condemned for its crime'.-'^ -^  
In the meantime, reliable and authoritative sources 
placed further blamed on the Vincennes for the shooting down 
of the airbus. An unpublished but widely quoted UN 
10. Kayhan International, Tehran, May 18, 1989, 
11, Keesing's News Digest, July 1989, p-36834. 
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International Civil Aviation Organisation report of May 19B9 
referred to the involvement of the Vincennes in a series of 
provocative incidence in the Gulf before and after the 
Iranian incident. Commander David Carlson of the US frigate 
John H. sides, which was in the Gulf at the same time as the 
Vincennes, wrote in the September issue of the US Naval 
Institute journal Proceedings that the airbus was shot down 
"for no good reason" and referred to "pathetic post-incident 
attempts to place the blame (for the incident) on the 
victims."-^^ 
A letter by 200 US members of Congress on September 5 
calling for the Bush administration to abandon hopes for a 
moderate leadership in Iran and instead to recogni2e the 
country's resistance groups, was condemned by the, Majlis 
Speaker, Ayatollah Mehdi Karrubi, who said that the US 
administration would "take the wish of overthrowing the 
Islamic Republic to their graves".^"^ 
Reports in early September indicated that the Bush 
administration had been conducting an ongoing but indirect 
correspondence with the Iranian regime. 
The Majlis on October 31 approved a draft bill 
authorizing the Iranian President to take measure for the 
arrest and punishment anywhere in the world of US citizens 
found guilty by the Iranian judiciary of anti-Iran terrorist 
activity. The bill, which was rectified by the Council of 
12. Tehran Time's, Tehran , J u l y 22 1989. 
13 . A'eeslr/13's Recat-ds of l-Jorlcf Ev^i-nts, Vol.. 36 , No.4„ 
P . 3 7 4 2 3 . 
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Guardians two days later, followed approval of US 
legislation allowing US forces to arrest "terrorists" 
anywhere in the world.-^ ^^  
Negotiations at the. United States-Iran Claims Tribunal 
in The Hague (Netherlands) on November 2-3 ended with a US 
agreement to pay over to Iran US $567,000,000 of the money 
it was claiming. Announcing the decision at a White House 
press conference of November 7 the US President. George Rush 
expressed the hope that "Iran would use what influence it 
has" to secure the release of US hostages held by pro-
Iranian groups in Lebanon. Bush dismissed speculation that 
the payment was connected to the hostage issue, however, 
saying that it was intended to "clear out the underbrush" of 
financial claims between the two countries and was in the 
light of "some positive statements" made by the Iranian 
government in the recent period.-^ ^ 
It was revealed that the US $567,000,000 was part of a 
US $810,000,000 sum held by the USA to guarantee US bank 
claims against Iran. The remaining US $243,000,000 was to be 
transferred to a Netherlands account to settle outstanding 
claims filed by the two countries with the International 
Court of Justice (ICI) which sat in The Hague. Responding to 
the US decision on November 9 the Tehran Tiroes stated that 
"Iran held assured the US that it (would) use its good 
offices with Islamic groups in Lebanon to do all it (could) 
14. Ibid, 
15. Keesing Nevs Digest, November 1989, P-37053, 
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to help free the hostages, provided (the US) showed good-
will". However, there appeared to be "little sign of genuine 
goodwill Yet". The Deputy Foreign Minister for Euro-American 
Affairs. Mahmud Va'ezi, declared on the same day that the US 
government should "release the Iranian assets which have 
been illegally frozen for over 10 years" if it wished to 
demonstrated its "good-will"-^^ 
On May 13, 1990, after months of sporadic negotiations, 
Iran and the United States signed an agreement to settle 
more than 3,100 US financial claims arising from the 1979 
Iranian revolution. The agreement was reached by the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal in The Hague (Netherlands), established in 
1981 under an accord which ended the imprisonment of 52 US 
embassy personnel in Tehran, which constituted the only 
formal diplomatic link between the two countries. 
Under the terms of the settlement Iran agreed to pay 
$550,000 to settle individual US claims each of less than 
$250,000, for property seized, contracts voided or debts 
unpaid since 1979. The Iranians would also pay a further 
$55,000 to cover 15 outstanding loans made by the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) to finance Iran's 
foreign currency needs prior to 1979. Tentative agreement 
was also 108 Iranian small claims, mostly by naval cadets 
forced to leave the US after the revolution. 
16. Tehran Times, Tehran, November 9, 1989. 
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The agreement opened the way for negotiations on Iran's 
claim for $11,000 million arising from US military contracts 
which were abrogated after the revolution. 
Both the sides rejected that the agreement had been 
influenced by Iranian assistance in securing the release of 
two US hostages in Lebanon in April, Most observers hoped 
that the slight improvement in Iranian-US relations embodied 
by the deal was a positive development for the six US 
hostages who remained in captivity.-^^ 
The US State Department announced on February 8 that it 
was concerned about the possibility of a terrorist attack 
directed against US citizens or installations to mark the 
February 11 anniversary of the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
Later the same day an Iranian spokesman rejected the warning 
as a "baseless" attempt to discredit Iran.-^ ^ 
In March 1991, US President Bush told Arab Journalists 
in Washington that as a "big country" Iran "shouJd not be 
forever treated as enemies by all the countries in the 
region". Reported US efforts to seek direct talks and a 
limited rapprochement with Iran were highlighted by Bush's 
comment that his country wanted "better relations" and "no 
animosity". Furthermore, in December 1990 a decision by the 
US administration to allow US oil companies to purchase 
Iranian oil was officially announced in detail on March 14 
1991.19 
17. Keesing's News Digest, May 1990, P-37471. 
18. Tehran Times, Tehran, February 9, 1991. 
19. Keesings Records of World Events, March 1991, P-38119. 
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In May 1991 an US State Department spokeswoman saJd 
that "norinal relations between the USA and Iran would serve 
the interests of both countries". The comment was reportedJy 
prompted by conciliatory statements made by government 
ministers during an international oil conference held in 
Isfahan on May 27-29 and attended among others by 
representatives from US oil companies.^® However, on June 3 
the Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected 
the prospect of normal relations with the USA, saying that 
it could "never take place" while "the US continues to 
impose its will upon other people and nations".^ -^  
Iranian oil sales to the United States, which ceased in 
1989 were officially resumed on June 11 following approval 
by the US Treasury for US oil companies to purchase 
2,500,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil worth an estimated US 
35-40,000,000. Iran's earnings from oil exports worldwide 
rose by 28 percent to US $16,500 million in the year ending 
March 20, 1991.22 
On October 7 the Iranian government released Jon PatJJs 
54, an engineer who had been sentenced to 10 years on spying 
charges in 1987. Patlis, an employee of a US engineering 
company, had worked at Iran's main satellite ground station 
at Assadabad. It was claimed that he had confessed to be 
spying for the US Central Intelligence Agency, but the US 
20. Kayhan International, Tehran, May 30, 1991 
21. Tehran Times. Tehran, June 4, 1991. 
22. Keesing'B Nevs Digest, June 1991, P-38309. 
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authorities had always denied that he had any officjaJ 
connections.2^ 
On December 2 the United States paid to Iran US 
$260,000,000 in compensation for Iran by the USA following 
the 1979 revolution. A further US 18,000.000 was paid by the 
USA into a security account in The Hague from which payments 
could be made as arbitrated by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
Press reports noted that both sides denied that the December 
2 settlement, which had been under negotiation for 18 
months, had any connection with the recent releases of US 
hostages in Lebanon.^^ 
RELATIONS WITH U.K. 
Diplomatic relations with the UK were severed in 
February 1989 following the imposing of a fatwa by the ]ate 
Ayatollah Khomeini which called on Muslims to kill the 
Indian-born British writer, Salman Rushdie. This development 
took place at the time when relations between the two 
countries had only just been normalized after almost a 
decade of tension. The UK, along with other FC members, had 
first imposed trade sanctions on Iran and reduced diplomatic 
representation in protest against the taking of US hostages 
in November 1979. 
The UK government expelled a number of Iranians in 
relation to their alleged involvement in anti-Rushdie 
23. Kayhan International, Tehran, October 8, 1991, 
24. Keesing's News Digest, December 1991, P-38697, 
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activities in the UK. Three Iranians were expelled in June, 
two more in December and further nine at the beginning of 
February 1990. 
The Rushdie affair continued to present obstacles till 
September 1990 to the restoration of diplomatic relations 
with the United Kingdom, despite statement by both sjdes 
indicating their willingness to restore relations. The 
Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for Euro-American 
affairs, Mahmud Va'ezi, offered on August 22, 1989, to 
restore relations if the UK government convinced Jran that 
Its intentions were "genuine" and that if would "respect 
Islamic principles and values". A UK Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson responded on the same day by saying that it was 
for Iran to make the first gesture and that the UK would 
"not accept Iranian intervention in (its) internal 
affairs".25 
On November 20, 1989, the UK Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Douglas Hurd, expressed 
his desire to "have a better relationship with Iran" and 
said that a decision by the relationship with Iran" their 
influence in the release of hostages in Lebanon would be a 
great help.^^ 
Mr. Kourosh Fouladi, an Iranian citizen, was sentenced 
a 10 years prison for the charge of a failed car bomb in 
London in 1980. Mr. Fouladi was released after passing seven 
25. Kayhan International, Terhran, August 23, 1989, 
26. The Times, London, November 21, 1989. 
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years of imprisonment in September 1989. However after hjs 
released he claimed that he had been "subjected to various 
forms of brutal, physical and psychological torture' by the 
U.K. police and security forces. The suggestion of the 
leading Iranian political figures and head of the judiciary, 
Hojatolislam Mohammad Yazdi that Roger Cooper, a British 
businessman, who was in prison in charges of spying, should 
be released, received a negative response from Iranian press 
and from the Majlis.^^ 
On February 1, 1990 nine Iranians were ordered to leave 
the UK by February 9, on the grounds that their conduct was 
"not conducive to the public good". Among them was the 
London bureau chief of the Iranian state news agency, JRNA. 
In reaction the Iranian government announced on February 20, 
1990 that it was "closing the British Broadcasting 
Corporation office" in Tehran.^^ In the same month, however. 
President Rafsanjani described the fatwa that had been 
pronounced against Rushdie as an exclusively Islamic issue 
and it should not to interfere with the re-establishment of 
normal relations between Iran and the United Kingdom. Whjje 
trade between the United Kingdom and Iran was reported to be 
increasing. In may 1990 it was reported that the United 
Kingdom was involved in indirect contacts with Iran 
concerning four United Kingdom nationals held hostage by 
pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon, and the United Kingdom 
27. Keesings Records of World Events, Vol.36, No.4, P.37423, 
28. Kayhan International, Tehran, February 21, 1990. 
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announced that it was prepared to resume direct talks with 
the Iranian Government. In June 1990 however, Ayatollah 
Khamenei declared that the fatwa could never be repealed.^^ 
A joint statement issued by Iran and the United Kingdom 
in New York on September 27, 1990 announced that full 
diplomatic relations between the two countries had been 
resumed "on the basis of mutual respect". The statement 
which was issued shortly after a meeting between the UK 
Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd and the Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Ali Akbar Vellayati in New York, came after months 
of intense negotiations between officials of the two 
countries.^^ The main reason behind it was that due to the 
Gulf crisis U.K. wanted to improve relations with the 
countries neighbouring Iraq. 
In a statement on September 27, 1990 the Iranian News 
Agency (IRNA) said that the decision to renew diplomatic 
relations with the UK was based on Iran's acceptance of 
"remarks by British officials announcing respect for Islam, 
Moslem values and sanctities". The statement was believed to 
have been a reference to a letter written by Hurd on August 
1, 1990 to the British Conservative MP, Sir Peter Blaker, 
underlining the UK government's respect for Islam and adding 
that" we understand that the novel. The Satanic Verses, was 
found deeply offensive by people of the Islamic faith". It 
was also understood that the Iranian government's 
29. The Middle East, and North Africa., op.cit., P-423, 
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willingness to resume diplomatic relations and to end Iran's 
diplomatic and political isolation vis-a-vis Western states 
also paved way for the restoration of relations.^ •'^  
Although the UK government had insisted that fuJl 
diplomatic relations would only be resumed after the 
withdrawal of the death sentence on Rushdie and the release 
of the British businessman Cooper, imprisoned in Iran. But 
the restoration of relations did not involve any formal 
undertaking on either of these issues by the Iranian 
government-. 
One of important development in UK-Iranian relations 
which took place in 1991 was the release of Roger Cooper, a 
British businessman on April 1, 1990.-^ 2 
The United Kingdom Foreign Secretary DougJas Hurd 
welcomed Cooper's release as "an important step" in UK-
Iranian relations. Reports suggested that a visit to Iran by 
a high-ranking European Community (EC) delegation might have 
facilitated Cooper's release. Two weeks earlier, on March 
15, 1991 Mehrdad Kowkabi, an Iranian student held in the UK 
for 15 months, had been deported after a court dropped 
charges of arson against him. The government's decision to 
release Cooper was criticised by a sections of the Iranian 
press with close links to radicals. The daily newspaper 
Jomhuriye Eslami of April 3 reproached the judiciary for the 
31. Tehran Times, Tehran, September 28, 1990 
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unexpected released" of Cooper and "the failure to provide 
the public with information"''^ 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Immediately after the pronouncement of death sentence 
against Rushdie, the countries of the B.C. imposed economic 
sanction against Iran and announced to severe diplomatic 
relations with Iran. Unfortunately this development took 
place at a time when there was a clear chance of the 
improvement in the prolong tense relations of Iran with 
these countries. After the end of Iran-Iraq war^ these 
countries had a good chance to improve economic links with 
Iran and contribute in the reconstruction process of Iran. 
Since this decision was taken in haste the situation 
compelled these countries to reconsider the decision. The>H' 
on 20 March 1989, in a meeting of the European Community 
Foreign Minister, it was agreed to relax sanctions against 
Iran and members should be allowed to re-install their 
ambassadors in Tehran. Among the first diplomats to return 
to Tehran were those from Italy, Ireland, Spain, Greece, 
France and Denmark.''^  Consequently Iran's relations with 
most of the Western countries began to improve. Although 
Rafsanjani's statement in May 1989 advocating the killing of 
five Westerners for every Palestinians killed in occupied 
territories drew a strong criticism from the ministers of 
33. Keesing's Records of World Events, April 1991, P-38169, 
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the European Community. An official statement of E.C. on May 
8, 1989 stated that the call "violated the most elementary 
principles and obligations governing the relations between 
sovereign states".^^ 
A decision by the governments of France and West 
Germany to return their ambassadors to Iran in early June 
1989 was welcomed by the Iranian press, with Kayhan saying 
that Iran would "give a positive response to this positive 
political move".-^^ 
A break through in Franco-Iranian relations was 
represented by a visit on September 17-18 1989 to Iran by 
the secretary-general of the French Foreign Ministry, 
Francois Scheer, who held talks with Mahmud Va'ezi, the 
Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran. According to Tehran radio, 
Va'ezi emphasized to resolve the political problems between 
the two governments and to normalize and expand relations". 
He also wished the French government "to make every effort 
to settle the financial difficulties between the two 
countries as soon as possible". This was a reference to the 
Iranian demand for the return of a $1,000 million loan made 
by Iran to France in 1974. Although France had already 
repaid $630 million, Iran was claiming an extra $1,000 
million in interest payments.^^ 
35, TJie Times, London, May 9, 1989. 
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A joint Italian-Iranian memorandum of understanding 
signed on January 22, 1990, included an agreement by Italy 
to suspend limitations imposed on financial and capital 
guarantees for projects and transactions with Iran. ° 
West Germany announced on January 27, 1990, that it 
envisaged the granting of special credits for short-term and 
"semi-long-term" transactions and that West German companies 
were prepared to finance Iranian capital projects. " 
The economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by E.C. 
on Iran in February 1989 after the issuing of fatwa for the 
death sentence of Salman Rushdie, was lifted 22 October 
1990. The decision of lifting the economic and diplomatic 
sanction was taken In a meeting of the Foreign Minister of 
the European communities in Luxemberg on 22 October 1990. 
Remember that sanction were relaxed on March 20, 1989 when 
Iran refused to how before the threat of western countries. 
This time the mean of economic sanctions against a third 
world country was totally failed. Iran which had earJier 
experienced the economic sanction in the wake of hostage 
crisis, this time again refused to accept any condition of 
the western countries. The Western Countries who thought 
that a after the end of prolong Iran-Iraq war, Iran needed 
the technical and economic help from them for the 
reconstruction of Iran. But Instead of accepting their 
conditions Iran decided to fulfil Its needs with other 
38 . Kayhan International, January 2 3 , 1990 
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countries and compelled the E.C. states to withdraw the 
sanction unilaterally.^^ 
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati visited France on 
December 5-8 1990 and held talks with President MJtterand 
and the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. 
At a news conference on December 8, 1990 Vellayati and 
Dumas reaffirmed their governments communities to recent 
U.N. resolution on the Gulf Crisis, although Vellayati added 
that Iran would not participate in any war against Iraq or 
another country in the region, here efforts were again made 
to resolve a financial dispute concerning the repayment by 
France of a US $ 1,000 million loan made jn 1974 by Iran's 
pre-revolution's government. Although France had agreed to 
repay $630 million, it refused to repay the outstanding 
balance, claiming that it was the equivalent of losses 
incurred by French companies as a result of broken 
contracts.*^ 
In April 1991, Foreign Minister of Italy, Luxemburg and 
the Netherlands accompanied by a delegation of E.C. visJted 
Tehran and held talks with Velayati. At a press conference 
afterwards, Vellayati said that" an understanding was 
reached on the expansion of economic ties between Iran and 
the EC". He said that minister had in addition addressed the 
internal situation in Iraq; the problems of Afghanistan and 
Lebanon were also reportedly discussed^^ 
40. The Times, London, 23 October, 1990, 
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In the first weeK of May 1991, Ali Akbar Velayatj 
visited France. On May 5, 1991, Velayati and his Geman 
Counterpart Demans said in a press conference that thejr 
talks had been very positive and expressed the hope that 
discussions aimed at resolving the financial dispute between 
the two countries would end with the positive results.^-' 
A major set back to France-Iranian relations were 
observed when negot.iations aimed at settling Iran's long 
standing financial dispute with France was suspended after 
the Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, who visited France 
on July 2-4, 1991 refused to sign a formal agreement.^^ 
A memorandum signed on December 29, 1991 by Deputy 
Foreign Minister of Iran Mahmud Va'ezi and the director 
general of the French Foreign Minister Francois Scheer 
resolved a 12-year financial dispute between the two 
countries. The origins of the complex dispute lay in a loan 
made in 1974 by Iran's pre-revolution government to the 
French Atomic Energy Commission. Under the December 
agreement, the French government agreed to repay $1,000 
million to Iran, additional to the $630,000,000 it had 
already repaid. Restrictions on co-operation in various 
commercial fields was agreed to be lifted. In a parallel 
agreement three French nuclear power construction companies 
resolved their counter-claims against Iran for contracts 
broken in 1979. There remained unresolved issues in 
43. Keesing's Records of World Events, May 1991, P-38212, 
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connection with the Iranian state's share in Eurodif (a 
uranium enrichment company) and Iran's request for the 
supply of nuclear fuel by that company.^^ 
RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION 
Relations with Soviet Union Started improving during 
1988-89. Soviet Union was no longer as objectjonable for 
decision makers in Iran as United States. The important 
thing was that this change in the policy of Iran towards 
Soviet Union had the blessing of Imam Khomeini who approved 
the forth coming visit of the then speaker of Maj]is 
Rafsanjani to Soviet Union in June 1989. 
On May 1, 1989 statement by the Iranian First Deputy 
Foreign Minister, All Mohammad Besharati, confirmed that 
"extensive talks" had been held between Iran and the Soviet 
Union on arms purchases from the latter and that "all 
related issues had been finalized". He also said that Iran 
was soon to acquire fighter-bomber aircraft from countries 
other than the USA and the Soviet Union. These countries 
were believed to be Romania and Yugoslavia.^^ Rafsanjani 
visited the Soviet Union on June 20-30 1989. He was treated 
by his hosts as a visiting head of state. He was the most 
senior Iranian leader to visit the Soviet Union since the 
1979 Islamic Revolution. Rafsanjani and Gorbachev signed a 
"declaration on the principles of relations" between Iran 
45. Kayhan International, Tehran, December 31, 1991, 
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and the Soviet Union on June 22, following three days of 
talks.'*'' 
It was also agreed to extend co-operation in the 
economic trade, technical and industrial fields including 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. At the same tjme, 
ministers accompanying Rafsanjanj signed a number of 
agreements. The Soviet Union agreed to provide US $?.,000 
million as part of an agreement involving at least USS6,000 
million worth of projects over the next 10 years. The 
projects included (i) the construction of power plants and 
dams designed to double Iran's electricity-producing 
capacity; (ii) the construction of a rail link between 
Tedzhen (Turkmeniya), near the Iranian border, via Sarakhs, 
and the electrification of existing lines; (iii) joint oil 
exploration in the Iranian section of the Caspian Sea; and 
(iv) the resumption of the supply of Iranjan natural gas to 
the Soviet Trans-Caucasus.^^ 
Prior to Rafsanjani's visit, commentators had 
speculated that Afghanistan, where Iran staunchly supported 
Shia mujaaheddin guerrillas, would prove to be the most 
contentious issue between the two sides. However, in a joint 
communique issued on June 23, both sides announced their 
support for an "independent, non-aligned and Islamic 
Afghanistan", and in an interview on the same day Rafsanjani 
47. Kayhan International, June 23, 1989. 
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claimed that the two sides were m "complete agreement" on 
Afghanistan. 
Rafsanjani had extended his stay in the Soviet Union 
until June 23 in order to visit Baku, the capital of the 
Southern Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. During a Friday 
Prayers address to Shia Muslims in Baku, Rafsanjani 
reportedly praised Gorbachev as a great Soviet and world 
leader.^^ A bilateral tourist exchange agreement was signed 
by the two countries on January 5, 1990, allowing tourist 
visas to be issued within 15 days of application. A Tehran-
Baku (Azerbaijan) air link was inaugurated on January 18, 
2990.50 Soviet President Gorbachev's special envoy Yevgeny 
Primakov visited Tehran on 17-18 September, 1991 and held 
talks with Rafsanjani and Vellayati. Tehran Radio reported 
that the talks had centred on the solution of the Afghan 
problem and on recent trilateral meetings in Islamabad and 
Tehran.^^ 
IRAN AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL ASIA 
The disintegration of Soviet Union and emergence of new 
Independent Muslim countries of Central Asia attracted the 
attention of decision makers in Iran. Iran was more keenly 
observing the situation in its neighbour. Iran who had just 
established friendly relation with a neighbourly superpower 
also witnessed its collapse. With the Collapse and 
49. Ibid. 
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disintegration of Soviet Union Iran tried to maintain good 
relation's specially with the newly independent Muslim 
Countries. The emergence of these states was we3corned in 
Iran as someone in Iran believed that with the cooperation 
of these states Iran may be able to form a strong Islamic 
bloc. Thus, Iran, from the very beginning, took keen 
interest in the development of these state and tried its 
best to bring them closer to each other and to adopt a 
common stand towards Soviet Union. During the visit of 
President Ayaz Mutalibov of Azerbaijan to Iran in August 
1991, a memorandum of understanding was signed by President 
Rafsanjani and President Ayaz to improve bilateral reJations 
between two states.^^ In the same month Iran expressed its 
willingness to organise a conference of leaders from the 
Soviet Muslim Republics to adopt a common stand against 
Soviet authority. ^-^  
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar VeJlayati, 
arrived in Moscow on December 24, 1991 for a 10-day visit to 
the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union. After talks in 
Moscow with Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Shevandnadze, Ve]3ayati 
went to the Republic of Kazkahstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Memorandums of 
understanding were signed with all the repubJics, except 
Uzbekistan. The agreements mainly covered transport and 
communication links, including an agreement to link the 
52. Kayhan International, Tehran, August 19, 1991 
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autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan through 
Iranian territory. 
Vellayati said that Iran's relations with the repubJics 
would be formulated "through Moscow". Rivalry for influence 
in the area between Turkey and Iran was noticed by many 
observers during that period. Turkey also extended its 
recognition to the newly independent countries on December 
16, 1991.S'* 
Fighting started during February 1992 around the 
regional capital Stepanakert, in Nagorny Karabakh, the 
disputed and mainly Iranian-inhabjted area within the 
territory of Azerbaijan. 
A CSCE (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe) mission was nevertheless permitted to visit Nagorny 
Karabakh on February 12, 1992 and on February 17, Hassan 
Hasanov, the Azerbaijani Prime Minister, arrived Brussels to 
attend a session of the European Parliament and a meeting of 
NATO's Political Council, where he spoke about the 
background of the conflict. 
On February 20, 1992 Raffi Hovhannesyan and Hussein 
Sadikhov, respectively the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, held peace talks in Moscow. They called for a 
cease-fire in the region and for access to humanitarian aid 
deliveries. However, Azerbaijani President, Ayaz Mutalibov, 
could not, attend the talks scheduled on the same day with 
54. Keesing's Record of World Events, December 1991, 
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Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Armenian President, 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Multalibov faced increasing pressure as 
demonstrators in Baku, the Azerbaijani capital, called for 
his resignation, and the republic's parliament refused to 
endorse his proposed peace plan to grant cultural autonomy 
for Nagomy Karabakh within Azerbaijan.^^ 
Iran also tried to resolve the problem through it 
mediation. On February 25 the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali 
Akbar Vellayati flew to Baku for talks with both sides as a 
prelude to mediation.^^ 
Meanwhile on February 25 Armenian troops had taken the 
village of Khodzhaly, north of Stepanakert. Azerbaijani 
sources claimed that these troops had murdered more than 
1,000 of the town's Azerbaijani inhabitants. The attack came 
in response to massive Azerbaijani attack by rockets and 
weapons of mass destruction against Armenian populated 
villages of Stepanakert in the north-east. Several Common 
wealth of Independent States (CIS) servicemen were also 
killed in those attacks. On February 28 the CIS C-in-C. 
Marshal Yevegny Shaposhnilov, ordered the immediate 
withdrawal of all remaining CIS troops from the region,^' 
Iran was worried with all these developments but could not 
get any tangible result of its effort to resolve the crisis. 
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On March 9, 1992 Iran called on the UN to impose an 
arms embargo on the two states. Iran was siisplcjous of 
Turkey's aims in the region and had criticised its call for 
US involvement.^^ An agreement between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, envisaging a cease-fire and the lifting of 
economic sanctions, was signed in Tehran on March i5, 
1992.^^ 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi, 
supervising the cease-fire, began a visit to the two 
republics on March 17.^^ However, Nagorny Karabakh accused 
Azerbaijan of breaking the week-old cease-fire by shelling 
Stepanakert on March 29.^ -'^  
The admission of five newly independent Moslem 
republics of Central Asia into the Economic Co-operation 
Organisation (ECO) in February 1992 gave new significance to 
this grouping. The ECO was created in 1965 consisting of 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Iranian government considered FCO 
as the basis for a future Islamic common market which might 
ultimately embrace some 300 million people - a quarter of 
all Muslims of the World.^^ 
A memorandum to improve friendship and cooperation and 
for the development of closer political economic and 
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cultural ties was signed between Iran and Turkestan on 
February 20, 1992.^^ 
The governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Muhammad 
Hossein Adeli, visited Turkmenistan on March 4-5 199?. where 
the signed on agreement to improve trade between the two 
countries including the establishment of a joint Tehran-
Ashkhabad chamber of commerce.^^ 
On March 8, 1992 Ovlyakuli khojakov. Minister of 
Agriculture of Turkemenistan announced an agricultural 
agreement with Iran under which the two countries agreed to 
exchange experts and students. ^  
The heads of the state of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
KIrgizstan, Uzbekistan and Iran, and the heads of government 
of Pakistan and Turkey, met in Askhabad (Turkmenistan) on 
May 9-10 1992. Iran established diplomatic relations with 
Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan and signed memorandum of 
understanding with Turkmenistan. The participants adopted a 
joint statement to expand economic and political co-
operation and to initiate discussions on transport links and 
a gas pipeline. The former Soviet Central Asian leaders 
emphasised that the meeting was not attempting to undermine 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)*^^ 
Nabiyev of Tajikistan completed a two-day visit to Iran 
on June 30 1992. During his visit many agreements were 
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signed. Which included a US$50,000,000 loan to purchase 
Iranian industrial goods and Broadcasts of Iranian radio and 
television to Persian-speaking Tajikistan started on July 
21, 1992.^ '' 
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ 
Letters from the Iraqi government in May 1990, which 
called for direct talks with Iran, received positive 
responses by Iran, but the initiative was overtaken by 
renewed controversy following the Arab League on May 28-30 
1992 in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital. Iranian leaders in early 
June reacted adversely to a resolution passed at the summit 
on May 29, which supported Iraq's long standing claim to 
full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Saddam 
Hussain had written a letter on May 1, 1990 to Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, calling for a direct meeting between the two 
heads of the states."" Rafsanjani declared on June 6, 1990 
in a press conference in Tehran that the Iranian government 
had not responded negatively to Iraq's approach and that 
when Iraq sent the Letters we were hopeful that Saddam 
Hussain had serious intentions but what he did at the 
Baghdad Summit shook out his confidence.^^ 
In a speech on June 7, 1990 Irani Foreign Minister 
Velayati described the Arab Summit resolution as a contract 
to the Iraq's claims that it wanted peace. Iraqi proposal of 
67. Keesing's Record of World Events, July 1992, P-39010. 
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the issue of the prisoner of war should be conducted 
outside the framework of the peace negotiation, was 
described as illogical by Velayati. He reaffirmed that 
direct talks under mediation should be based on the 1975 
accord and UN Security Council Revolution 598 of August 
1987.^^ In July 1990, the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Iraq 
conferred at the UN's European headquarters in Geneva. It 
was the first direct meeting between them since the cease-
fire in the war had taken effect. This breakthrough in the 
peace process was quickly overtaken by the consequences of 
Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. On 
16 August 1990 Saddam Hussain abruptly sought an immediate, 
formal peace with Iran by accepting all the claims that Iran 
had pursued since the declaration of a cease-fire, including 
the reinstatement of the Algiers Agreement of 1975, dividing 
the Sfiatt al-AraJb, These offers were welcomed by Iran, 
although it insisted that the issue of peace with Iraq was 
separate from that of Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Exchanges 
of an estimated 80,000 prisoners of war commenced on 17 
August, 1990 and on 18 August Iraq began to withdraw troops 
from the central border areas of Ham, Meymak, Mehran and 
Naft Shahr. On 11 September, 1990 Iran and Iraq re-
established diplomatic relations.^-^ 
It was reported on October 22, 1990 that Iraq had 
expelled members of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq, based in Baghdad 
70. Tehran Tines. Tehran, June 8, 1990. 
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and the largest and most important dissident group opposed 
to the Iranian regime. Observers believed that the move, as 
requested by Iran, expressed the new understanding between 
Iran and Iraq.^^ 
In a separate development, it was. reported on October 
18 that anti-Iranian radio station using Iraqi facilities 
were no longer permitted to broadcast their programmes. -* 
The Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Vellayati, 
visited Iraq on November 14-15 1990 for talks with Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister TarJq Aziz. It 
was the first time that a senior Iranian official had 
visited Iraq since the Iranian revolution of 1979. 
Describing the contacts between the two countries as a 
"positive development" Vellayati also said that the exchange 
of prisoners of war between the two countries, abruptly 
suspended by Iraq in September would resume shortly. After 
the last exchange of prisoners in mid-September, Iran had 
refused to release an estimated 17,000 Iraqj prisoners, 
claiming that Iraq still held 20,000 Iranians. Iraq 
maintained that there were no more Iranian to free. A 
spokesman for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry said on November 
19, 1990 that following the agreement reached during 
Vellayati's visit Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council had 
72. Keesing's Records of World Events, October 1990, 
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decided to pardon all convicted Iranian prisoners and those 
a total of 239 whose cases vere referred to the judiciary.''^  
The withdrawal of all armed forces to the 
internationally recognized boundaries was verified and 
confirmed as complete on 20 February 1991 by the UNIIMOG, 
whose mandate was terminated on 28 February 1991 by the UN 
security Council Iran and Iraq subsequently initiated a 
'confidence-building' process of reducing the levels of 
troops and military equipment in the border areas. Exchanges 
of prisoners of war continued until 16 January 1991, when 
the multinational force commenced military operations to 
expel Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait. At this time Iran 
still held 30,000 Iraqi prisoners of war. Preliminary 
negotiations on the full implementation of Resolution 598 
were also curtailed. Relations between Iran and Iraq again 
deteriorated after March 1991, when Iraqi ShJa Muslims 
participated in a rebellion against the Baath regime in the 
aftermath of Iraq's decisive military defeat by the 
multinational forces.'^ 
Relations between Iraq and Iran deteriorated seriously 
during March 1991 as the Iraqi government accused the 
Iranians of supporting the southern rebellion. Relations 
deteriorated further in late March as hundreds of thousands 
of Iraqi Kurdish refugees headed for the Iranian border. 
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On March 4, 1991 Tehran Times, published an editorial 
which contained strong backing for the Iraqi rebels. Overt 
statements of support for SAIRI and the rebellion were not 
tempered by March 5-6 visit to Tehran by the then Iraqi 
Deputy Prime Minister Saadoun Hamnadi. During his visit 
Hammadi reportedly attempted to persuade Iran to press SAIRI 
into accepting some form of power-sharing deal. " 
Iran marked 18 as a day of national mourning for the 
"massacre of the Iraqi people" and the "desertion" of the 
holy shrines in Najaf and Kerbala. The presiding board of 
the Majlis (the Iranian legislature) held an extraordinary 
session on March 24 1991 to discuss the situation in Iraq. 
The board condemned the Iraqi government for its aJ.leged 
mistreatment of the Shia religious leader in Najaf, Grand 
Ayatollah Abou Qassim al-Khoei, and concluded that Iran 
fully supported "the uprising of the Iraqi Muslims.^^ 
On March 20 Saadi Mahdi Saleh, the Speaker of the Iraqi 
National Assembly, accused Iran of sending armed forces 
across the border to attack Iraqi cities, a claim firmly 
denied in Tehran.^^ 
The publication in August 1991 of the report of a U.N. 
delegation sent to Iran in accordance with the terms of 
Resolution 598 to assess the level of human and materia] 
damage caused by the war with Iraqi seemed to indicate that 
the U.N. was once again considering the need for a 
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comprehensive peace settJement. The Iranian Government, 
released its own assessment of the damage caused by the war 
with Iraq. It estimated that during the war Iran experienced 
direct damaged amounting to 30,8.13.000m. Iranian rials; that 
50 towns and 4,00 vi]3ages were destroyed or badly damaged; 
and that 34,000 civilians were kiJJed and .1.25m. peopJe 
displaced.^^ 
IRAN AND THE CONFLICT OVER KUWAIT 
While Iran condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
August, 1990 and offered to defend other Gulf states from 
Iraqi aggression, it welcomed Iraq's offer of a formal 
settlement of the Iran-Iraq War on Iran's terms. While Iran 
stated that it would observed the economic sanctions imposed 
on Iraq by the U.N. Iraq tried to persuade Iran to trade oil 
for food. When it .was reported that traders had smuggled 
supplies across the Iran-Iraq border the Iranian Government 
assured to implement economic sanctions with the condition 
to supply food and medicine to Iraq on a humanitarian 
ground. 
As the deployment of a multinational force (assembled 
in accordance with ArticJe 51 of the U.N. Charter) for the 
defence, of Saudi Arabia gathered pacer-Iran simultaneously 
demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Western and U.S.-
armed forces from the Gulf region as well as Iraqi armed 
forces from Kuwait. In September 1990 Ayatollah Khameini 
79. Middle Fast and North Africa, op.cit., p.425. 
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almost endorsed the demands of 'conservat.ives * such as 
Hojatoleslam Alj Akbar Mohtashemd, to cooperate with Iraq 
in a Jjhad against Western forces in the Gu.lf. President 
Rafsanjani's position was that the presence of these forces 
was tolerab-le on condition that they withdrew as soon as the 
conflict in Kuwait had been resolved.^^ 
FoJJowing the outbreak of miJitary hostiJities between 
Iraq and the multinationaJ forces in January .1991, Iran 
attempted unsuccessfulJy, to intercede. After having 
consulted with Africa. Yemen, France, the UJ5SR and the Non-
aligned Movement (NAM), Iran urged an 'Islamic solution* to 
the conflict. 
On January 31 the Iranian News Agency IRNA reported 
that Iran was hosting talks between Iraq. Algeria, France 
and Yemen on "ways to end the war". The Secretary of the 
French Foreign Ministry. Francios Scheer was in Tehran on 
January, 31 to February 3, 1991 a period coinciding with 
Hammadi's visit and the presence of the Algerian and Yemeni 
Foreign Minister, but the claim that Iran hosting peace 
talks was described by French Foreign Ministry officials as 
"absurd".8^ 
On February 4, 1991 Iranian President Hashemi Ali Akbar 
Rafsanjani told a press conference in Tehran that he had 
sent "an idea" for peace to Sadam Hussein, that he was 
awaiting a reply, and that he was prepared to hold direct 
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81. Keesing's Record's of World Event. February 1991 
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talks with Iraqj and U.S. Jeaders jn an effort to end the 
war. He refused to elaborate on has message except to 
confirm that it feJJ within the framework of U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, and that it had been delivered to an 
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Sa'adoun Hammadi, who had 
visited Tehran on February 3-3, 199.1. Although he 
acknowledged that there had "been no sign of flexibility" 
during his talks with Hammadi, Rafsanjani asked 
theoretically why he should not meet Saddam Hussein" if 
there is hope for the salvation of the Iraqi Nation", and 
added that it would be "logical" to talks to the U.S. 
administration if the pursuit of peace made it necessary. He 
revealed that there had been several Iranian-U.S. contacts 
"in the last few days" through the Swiss embassy in 
Tehran.^^ The Iranian Peace Plan proposed an immediate 
cease-fire followed by the simultaneous and complete 
withdrawal of Iraqi armed forces from Kuwait, and of a^} 
foreign forces from the Gulf region. In deference to Iraq's 
insistence on the 'linkage' of the conflict in Kuwait with 
other conflicts in the Middle East (in particular the 
continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip), Iran also urged the immediate cessation of new 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. 
The Rafsanjani initiative was welcomed by the Soviet 
Union, by U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez De Cuellar, 
and by French and Turkish spokesmen, but a U.S. State 
82. Tehran Times, Tehran, February 5, 1991. 
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Department Official said that "the Iranians are not directJy 
involved In this conflict and our interest is in getting 
Iraq out of Kuwait", while Bush said that "we have to go 
forward and prosecute this (the war) to a successful 
conclusion".^^ 
On February 10, 1991 at a press conference in Amman, 
Hammadi dismissed the Iranian peace proposals, saying: "We 
have told Iran that what is taking place is unrelated to 
Kuwait. The question now is American aggresion (imperialist 
aggression) which is intended to destroy Iraq and delivered 
a letter from Saddam Hussain to Rafasanjanl in Tehran on 
February 8 containing the Iraqi President's formal reply to 
the latest Iranian proposals. A broadcast speech by Saddam 
Hussein on February 10 made no reference to peace 
initiative, but stressed that every hour for which the war 
continued was a fresh defeat for the "unbelievers" ranged 
against Iraq.^^ 
There was no clear expression of support for the 
Iranian peace proposal at a closed session of the NAM, hejd 
in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on 11-32 February 1991 and 
thereafter Soviet diplomacy came to the fore in attempting 
to find peace terms which might avert a ground war. 
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vellayati was among 
Foreign Minister from 15 countries of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM), and a representative from the Palestine 
83. Middle East and North Africa, op.cit, p.424, 
84. Ibid. 
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Liberation Organisation (PLO), who »et in closed session in 
Belgrade on February 11-12 1991, Iran and India sought to 
put forward a six-point peace plan, based on Traqj 
withdrawal from Kuwait followed by the pull-out of Western 
forces froiB the region. Vellayati said afterwards, however, 
that "if has been impossible to propose any plan as each 
attempt has been rejected by one side or the other". The 
meeting had been convened at the initiative of Yugoslavia as 
current chairman of the NAM, and the Yugoslav Foreign 
Minister Budimir Lonear sajd at a press conference 
afterwards that "the foreign ministers could not agree on a 
joint statement, but opted instead for a plan of action to 
prevent the war's escalation starting with the rapid 
deployment of a mission of three to four ministers to 
Baghdad within a few days". He added that "at the same time 
we will send a delegation in the opposite direction, to 
Kuwait as well as to members of the coalition, the USA and 
the European Communities". It was reported that several pro-
U.S countries, including Yugoslavia, Egypt, Venezuela, 
Argentina and Cyprus, had resisted attempts to link Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait with the resolution of other Middle 
Eastern problems, in particular the Palestinian Issue.^^ 
Iran claimed some of the credit for the concessions 
offered in an Iraqi peace proposal on 15 February 1993, and 
urged the multinational force not to initiate hostilities on 
the ground until the limits of Iraq's flexibility had been 
85. Kayhan International, Tehran, February 14, 1991. 
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deternined. However, the countries contributing to the 
nultinational force were unwilling, by this stage, to a]low 
Iraq the opportunity to procrastinate.®^ 
The experience of Gulf war proved that neither Turkey 
nor Iran can be ignored in attempts to construct an 
effective security system for the Gulf region. In effect, 
both states have become the intrusive face of a new 
dimension to the Middle East that now stretches a further 
1,000 miles eastwards and is dominated by non-Arab peoples. 
It seems likely that the new centres of influence in the 
Gulf will be Tehran or Ankara, rather than Riyadh, as in the 
past. Furthermore, this new Middle Eastern World is not 
limited to Central Asia, but will soon involve Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, with all the adverse implications for regjonal 
stability. 
In effect, therefore, both Turkey and Iran have the 
potential to become new regional powers. Turkey is currently 
better placed to do so, but Iran has been powerfully aided 
by developments in Afghanistan. None of this was foreseen in 
the strategic projections that went into the planning of the 
war between the multinational force and Iraq, NearJy aJJ 
these development profoundly undermine the assumptions on 
which that war was predicated. The result, therefore, is a 
new source of regional instability that directly affects the 
Gulf region itself, despite all the assumption behind 
President Bush's New World Order*. 
86. Middle East and North Africa, op.cit, pp.424-25. 
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RELATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES 
The expectation that after the death of laam Khomejnj 
the relation between Saudi Arabia and Iran will improve Jn 
the newly emerging situation of Middle East after the end of 
Iran-Iraq war. Many efforts were made to normalise the 
relation by the countries friendly to both Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. At some time it was noticed that both the countries 
would come closer and forget the bitterness of reJations 
during last decade. But clashes between Iranian pilgrims and 
Saudi Security forces during Haj and Saudi's accusation on 
Iran for backing terrorist and disruptive activities in 
Saudi Arabia was the main hindrance in the normalization of 
relations. 
Two bombs exploded on July 10, 1989 near the Grant 
Mosque in Mecca, killing a Pakistani pilgrim. The bombings 
occurred on the second anniversary of the death of severa3 
hundred Iranian pilgrims during clashes with Saudi Security 
Forces outside the Grand Mosque in JuJy 1987. After that 
Saudi Arabia reduced Iran's pilgrim quota, provoking the 
Iranian government into ordering a boycott of the Haj in 
1988 and 1989 Saudi Arabia did not officially accuse Iran of 
involvement in the bombings, preferring to play the incident 
down and reduce tension. Iran, however, claimed that the 
attack had actually been carried out by the Saudi government 
in collaboration with the United States and was intended to 
Implicate the Iranian government. After the bombing, the 
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Saudi government received messages of support from most Arab 
countries, including Iran's sole Arab ally, Syria. In 
Beirut, a previously unknown group calling itseJf the 
Generation of Arab Anger, claimed responsibility for the 
attack in a message sent to a Western News Agency on JuJy 
11.87 
On September 21, 1989 Kuwaiti Shia Muslims were 
publicly beheaded by sword in Saudi Arabia after being found 
guilty of involvement in a bomb attack in the ho3y city of 
Mecca in July. The Saudi action was wideJy condemned in 
Iran, where the executed Kuwaitis were acclaimed as martyrs. 
Although Iran denied any involvement in the July bombings. 
In total 29, Kuwaitis were tried for the bomb one of whom 
received a 20 years of prison sentence and 3 50 3 ashes of the 
whip. Three others received sentences of 15 years and 3 03 
lashes and the remaining nine were acquitted.8® 
Apart from all these misunderstanding, mistrust and 
accusation, attempt to improve relations were continued. 
Consequently diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia were renewed on March 26 1991, three years after 
their breach following the July 1987 Haj clashes in Mecca 
involving Iranian pilgrims and Saudi Arabian security 
forces. The March 26, Joint Iran-Saudi Communique announcing 
the restoration of full ties followed a meeting between 
87. Keesing'B Record of World Events, July 1989, p-36835. 
88. Kayhan International, Tehran, September 22, 3 989. 
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foreign minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Vellayati and Prince aJ-
Faisal of Saudi Arabia in Muscat (Oman).^^ 
Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saud al-FaisaJ 
visited Iran on June 5-6 1991. He was the first senior Saudi 
Minister to visit Iran since the resumption of diplomatic 
relations in March, 1991. The Iranian Foreign Minister, AJi 
Akbar Vellayati, who had met King Fahd in Riyadh in April, 
visited Saudi Arabia again on June 15-24 1993 to perform 
Haj. Tehran Radio reported on June 6, 1991 that President 
Ali Akbar Rafsanjani had welcomed "the new page in bilateral 
relations", and it quoted Prince Saud as saying that the 
rapprochement would "have important effects for the Islamic 
community". Relations between the two countries were 
criticized by Iranian hardliners. As former Minister 
Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi strongly opposes the 
90 
However, the relations between the two were somehow 
normal after that till March 1994, Iran's spiritual leader, 
Ayatollah Ali Khameini, on March 15, 1994, accused the Saudi 
government of obstructing Iranians wishing to perform Haj. 
Relations between the two countries had also deteriorated 
amid Iranian claims that the alJegedJy Saudi-backed 
extremist Sunni group, the Anjuman Sipha-i-Sahaba, 
implicated in a number of anti-Shia attacks in neighbouring 
89. Kayhan International, Tehran, September 22, 1989, 
90. Tehran Times, Tehran, June 7, 1991. 
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Pakistan, had been responsible for recent disturbances 
between Shlas and Sunnis In the roaln town of Zahedan.^ -' 
The Ministerial Council composed of Foreign Ministers 
from the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) held its 
40th session in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on September 14-3 5, 
1991. The Ministers affirmed their eagerness in the meeting 
to find a common basis for constructive cooperation between 
the GCC member countries and the Islamic RepubJic of Iran, 
Tension between the GCC and Iran had reportedly been fuelled 
by Iran's increasing isolation from regional security 
arrangements. The Omani Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs Yusuf al-Alami Abdullah had visited Iran on 
September 12-13, 1991 for talks with senior leaders 
including President All Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and on 
September 28 1991 the GCC. Foreign Ministers met Iranian 
Foreign Minister, All Akbar Vellayati in New York, after 
which the GCC Secretary General Abdulah Yacoub Bishara of 
Kuwait referred to a very hopeful prospects of 
cooperation.^^ 
Iran reestablished and improve diplomatic relations 
with many countries of the region. It established fuJ] 
fledge diplomatic relation with Kuwait in September 3 989. 
The first Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, after five year, 
Hussain Sadaqi took his charge on September 29, 3 989.^^ 
9 1 . Ibid., March 7, 1994. 
92 . Keesing's Record of World Events, September, 1991 
9 3 . Tehran Times, Tehran , September 30, 1989. 
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Diplomatic relations of Iran with Bahrain was upgraded 
in November 1989 when Iran appoint Husain NaraghJa as 
Iranian Charge d' Affaires to Bahrain on November 3, 1988.^* 
After that exchange of visit by the ministers and offJcJaJs 
of both the countries took place. On June 6-9, 1990 Bahrain 
Minister of Municipal Affairs and Agriculture Shajkh Hamad 
bin Jabr visited Iran and held talks with President 
Rafsanjani who stressed Iran's willingness to cooperation 
extensively with its neighbours. The visit marked the 
improvement in relations between the two countries.^^ 
However with United Arab Emirats (UAE) reJations were 
quite good but in September-October 1992 controversy broke 
out over the possession of three Gulf Islands. Abu Musa, 
Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb. Attempt to resolve the dispute 
through direct negotiation was failed on September 28, 3 992. 
After that through out October efforts were continued to 
find a peaceful solution of the dispute. In October some 
news papers reported that matter was likely to place before 
U.N. Security Council and expressed the view that Gulf Arab 
Government which backed the UAE's case increasingjy 
perceived Iran as a threat to their security and as an 
argument in favour of continued U.S. military presence.^^ 
In March 1991, Iran and Egypt was one step forward to 
improve bilateral relationships and to estabJish diplomatic 
relations when it announced on March 12, that both had 
94. Ibid., November 4, 1988. 
95. Kayiian International, Tehran, June 10, 1990. 
96. Keesing's Record of World Events, October 1992, p.39365. 
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decided to set up an "interest office' in each others 
capitals as a first step towards the restablishment of full 
diplomatic relations. 
President Hafez al-Assad of Syria paid his first visjt 
to Iran on September 22-25 1990, during which he held talks 
with the Iranian President, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, and Iran's 
spiritual leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khameini. A communique 
issued at the end of the talks stressed that "the 
establishment of a regional security system with 
participation of all the states of the region is the best 
and most successful method to provide security and stability 
to the regional states and people". However, it could not 
change the position of the two sides on the Gulf crisis. 
While both agreed on condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, they could not agree on any common stand regarding 
the deployment of Western troops in the Gulf, which was 
supported by Syria strongly opposed by Iranian hardliners. 
The Syrian President's visit was also followed by the 
signing of bilateral agreements on economic and cultural co-
operation between Iran and Syria.^^ 
An Iranian delegation led by Vellayati aJso visited 
Damascus on March 7-8 1991 and was assured by Syrian 
President Assad that Iran would have a significant role in a 
post war Gulf Security order. Iran had expressed concerns 
about the involvement of non-Gulf countries - Egypt and 
97. Keesing's Record of World Events, September 1990, 
p.37727 
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Syria-ln the so-called "six plus two" regional co-operatJon 
pact with the six Saudi-led Gulf Co-operation Councjl 
countries.^® 
President Rafsanjani visited Syria on April 27-28 199.1 
on his first trip abroad since assuming the presidency, 
Rafsanjani and Syrian President Assad discussed historical 
relations, the consequences of the Gulf war, Lebanon, and 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. They also stressed thejr 
conuDitment to Iraq's territorial integrity.^^ 
The Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Akbar 
Vellayati visited Damascus on June 1, 1992 and Beirut on 
June 2-3, 1992. He declared that the Lebanese, Syrian and 
Iranian governments will continue to support resistance to 
Israel. On June 25 Iran, reportedly at the request of "the 
leadership council of Lebanese Hezobollah" released 40 
Lebanese taken as prisoners of war during the Iran-Jraq 
war.100 
Diplomatic ties between Jordan and Iran, severed in 
1981 after the start of the Iran-Iraq war in September 3 980, 
were restored on January 14, 1991, in the midst of 
diplomatic activity by the two countries to bring an end to 
the Gulf crisis. Al-Masri's visit to Tehran in late January 
for talks with the Iranian Foreign Minister. Ali Akbar 
Vellayati, was followed in early February by reports of 
Jordanian support for new Iranian proposals to end the Gulf 
98. Keesing's Record of World Event mar ch, 1991 , p. 38119 
99. Keesing's Record of World EventsJune 1992. 
100. Keesing's Record of World EventsJune 1992. 
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conflict King Hussein had himself undertaken a tour of major 
European capitals from January 2, 1991, in a final attempt 
to prevent the outbreak of war with Iraq.-'^ -^'^  
The Algerian ambassador to Iran was recalled on January 
18, 1992 after protesting over the attack of Iranian Media 
on Algerian regime which was described by the Algerian 
Foreign Ministry as a threat to "the sovereignty and unjty" 
of the Algerian people. It was also declared that the 
Algerian embassy in Washington would cease to represent 
Iranian interest in United States. On January 23, 3 992 
Ghazali said that he had evidence of Iranian interference jn 
Algerian affairs which "was not confined to making a 
financial contribution". "^ A government's spokesman Jn Iran 
announced on March 12, 1991 that Pakistan, rather than 
Algeria would henceforth represent Iranian interest in 
United States. The main reason of the deterioration in 
relations with Algeria was the present regimes denial to 
electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in January, 
1992 and arrest of its leaders and workers by the Algerian 
government while Iran extended its open support to IsJamic 
Salvation Front.^^^ 
A 157-merober Iranian delegation headed by President 
Rafsanjani visited Sudan on December 13-3 5, 1991. Rafsanjani 
was accompanied by the Foreign Minister, A3i Akbar 
101. Tehran Times, Tehran, January 15, 1991. 
102. KeeBing's Record of World Events, January 3 992, 
P-38703. 
103. Tehran Times, Tehran, March 13, 1992. 
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Vellayati, Commerce Minister, Abdol-Hossein Vahaji and 
Defence and Armed Forces Logistics Minister, Akbar Torkaij. A 
co-operation agreement covering areas which included oil, 
trade exchanges and the "training of technical cadres" was 
signed. Rafsanjani told in a press conference in Khartoum on 
December 16, 1991 that his visit had allowed him to see a 
country "advancing towards islamization". He rejected Arab, 
American and European reports that upto 2,000 Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards stationed in camps in Sudan were 
training Sudanese military personnel. The Arab pres had also 
referred to a deal by which Iran was said to be funding the 
purchase by Sudan of Chinese weaponry worth US $300 million 
over two years.-^ ^^  
The Tunisian government announced on September 24, 3 993 
that diplomatic relations had been restored with Iran 
following talks held in Bahrain in conform.ity with "the 
principles of Islamic solidarity and the provisions of the 
UN charter". Relations between the two had been severed in 
March 1987 following Tunisian accusations that Iran was 
supporting Islamic groups opposed to the then President 
Habib Bourguiba.-*^ ^^  
RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 
Iran's relations with Turkey improved noticeably by the 
end of 1989. The Iranian government expressed satisfaction 
104. Keesing's Record of World Events, December 1991, 
P-38666. 
105. Ibid., Vol.37, No.2, 1991, p-38071. 
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at the lifting of the ban on headscarves at Turkish 
universities. On February 27, 1990, AkbuJat pa.id an officja.l 
visit to Iran following which an agreement was signed on 
March 1, 1990 to double the bilateral trade between the two 
countries to $2,000 million.-'^ ^^  But the relation between the 
two was somehow strained during the invasion of Kuwait 
followed by the Gulf war between Iran and U.S. Jed 
multinational forces. While Iran was against the stationing 
of multinational forces in Gulf region tried to resolve the 
problem through peaceful mean and gave a peace formula for 
the same. Turkey was in favour of the stationing of 
multinational forces. Another reason of tension was that 
there was an struggle between two to acquire the position of 
leader in the region as both Turkey and Iran has the 
capabilities to become the regional power in the aftermaths 
of the Gulf crisis. However, in early 1991 the relations 
again started to improve as both showed the gesture of 
recognizing each others importance. On March 3 0, 1991 during 
the visit of Iran's first Vice-President Hasan Habibi, 
Turkish President Turgut Ozal expressed the views that any 
attempt to Safeguard regional Gulf Security would be 
'meaningless' with out Iranian participation.-*^ "^  A joint 
economic protocol was signed on February 27, 1993, between 
the two countries, which envisaged the construction of 
natural gas pipe line from Iran to Europe via Turkey.-"" 
106. Tehran Times, Tehran, March 2, 1990. 
107. Kayhan International, Tehran, March 11, 3 990. 
108. Keesing's Records of World Events. Vol.37, No.9, 
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President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani visited Turkey on April 
29-May 2 on the second leg of his first tour abroad as 
President. It was the first officJal visit of Turkey by an 
Iranian head of the state since 1975. 
At the press conference on May 1 after talks with 
President Ozal of Turkey, Rafsanjani said that Iran and 
Turkey shared the view that there should not be a KurdJsh 
state in Northern Iraq. Rafsanjani also met the Turkish 
Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut and concluded an agreement 
on the sale of Iranian oil and gas to Turkey.•'^ "" 
On January 4, 1992 Turkey blamed Iran along with Syria, 
Iraq, and three unnamed countries from outside the region, 
as being responsible for encouraging separatist activity 
among Turkish Kurds. The Iranian authorities countered that 
they had repeatedly asked the Turkish government to present 
evidence for such claims. Continuing tensions in relations 
with Iran also focused on the impounding by the Turkish 
authorities of a cargo ship, the Cape Maleas, as it was at 
anchor in the Bosphorus on October 22, 1991, On January J3, 
1992 a court in Ankara began a hearing on the matter. The 
Foreign Ministry of Turkey claimed that the ship, which was 
flying the Greek-Cypriot flag and had sailed from the 
Bulgarian port of Vama, was found to be carrying arms 
including grenade launchers and mortars, which were not 
registered in its documentation and were probabJy destined 
(Supplement), 1991, p.38499. 
109. Keesing's Records of World Events, May 1991, p.38212 
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for "terrorist groups". It was suspected that they might 
reach Turkey through Syria and Iran. The Iranian government 
said that the seizure was illegal and claimed the ship as 
property of the Iranian army. But this incident could not 
prevent the two countries from reaching an agreement, on 
October 31, 1991, on cross-border co-operation and on the 
control of guerilla activities.-^ ^^ ^ 
However, in, September 1992 it looked that continued 
tension and mistrust was minimising when during the visit of 
Turkish Interior Minister, Ismat Sezgin on September 12-15, 
1992 an agreement was signed between him and his Iranian 
counterpart Abdollah Nouri, on border security and drug 
trafficking. It was also decided that a 10 member committee 
would be set up, primarily to discourage the activities of 
the PKK in Iran and of the People Mujahedeen in Turkey.^ -^'^  
Thus the main orientation of the foreign and domestic 
policies of Iran, during this period, have been to 
reconstruct the already shattered economy of the country. 
For this purpose Iran concluded a number of agreements with 
a number of countries including the countries of the Western 
Europe. Iran tactfully refrain herself to indulge in the 
global controversies. Iran adopted a reasonable approach 
towards the Gulf crisis followed by the invasion of Kuwait 
110. Keesing's, Records of World Events, September 1992, 
pp.38739-40. 
111. Keesing's Records of World Events, September 1992, 
pp.39114-15. 
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by Iraqi forces. While, on the one hand, Iran denounced the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanded for the immedjate 
withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, on the other hand, 
Iran also opposed the stationing of multinational forces in 
the region. Iran tried hard to resolve the crisjs by 
peaceful means through negotiations and in the regional 
context without the involvement of any out side power. The 
Iraqi offer to normalise the relations was accepted and 
progress in this direction could be noticed. 
In the case of the newly formed states of Central Asia 
Iran tried its best to establish and maintain close ties 
with these states. A proposal to form an economic alliance 
including the Muslim countries of the Central Asia, Pakistan 
and Iran was also given by Iran. However, this proposal 
could not get the practical shape but no doubt it was a 
remarkable idea to form an economic alliance in order to to 
fulfill their needs without the help and conditional support 
of the developed countries. 
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CONCLUSION 
CONCLUSION 
The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
largely based on the following considerations: (i) To follow 
the aims and principles of the revolution in the framing of 
the new foreign policy; (ii) to diminish the super power 
domination and interference in the decision making; (iij) To 
adopt a policy of real non-alignment under the motto of 
'Neither East Nor West' and to maintain equidistance from both 
the superpowers; (iv) To give emphasis on regional cooperation 
and security; (v) Neither to act as policeman of the region 
nor to permit any one to act like that; (vi) To export the 
revolution and its principles to other parts of the world 
specially to the muslim countries and peoples; (vii) To unite 
the muslims all over the world; (viii) To show concern for the 
problems of muslims in any part of the world both practically 
and morally; (ix) To oppose all types of oppression and 
exploitation; (x) To improve economic and political relations 
with the countries of the third world; (xii) and, above all, 
to create a new just world order free from exploitation, 
domination and oppression, based on the principJes of 
equality, justice, mutual co-existence, non-interference, non-
aggression and respect for each other's sovereignty and 
integrity. 
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Iran, which was under the direct influence and domination 
of the United States for many decades during Reza Shah 
Pahelvi, experienced one of the successful Revolution of human 
history which was mainly guided by the religious clerics and 
followed by the middle and poor class of the society. The 
revolution which promised a new Islamic Iran opposed to 
Imperialism, domination and exploitation compelled the 
decision makers of the new regime to toe its line.in policy 
making inorder to fulfill the aspirations and hopes of the 
people. Similarly, the Islamic Republic of Iran adopted a 
foreign policy in tune with the broader objectives of many 
third world countries, in consouance with Islamic spirit. 
The revolutionary tirade against superpowers, 
particularly the United States, was a natural reaction of 
Iran's long experience of exploitation under jmperja.1ism and 
superpowers domination. The direct influence of U.S. over the 
decision-making of Iran since 1953, Shah's role as the 
policeman of the region on the behest of the United States, 
granting of diplomatic immunity to American citizens working 
in Iran, introduction of 'White Revolution', permission to CTA 
to setup its network in Iran were naked truths of the United 
States infringement in Iran's internal affairs. The British 
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and the American control over the economy, speciaJly oil and 
Russian record of intervention in Iran throughout the 19th 
century as well as during the two world wars are still alive 
in the memories of Iranian people. 
As historical factors exercise considerable bearing over 
the decision making of the foreign policy, the above factors 
influenced Iran to adopt a policy which can help to prelude 
from such experience. Thus, immediately after the proclamation 
of Islamic Republic, Iran declared that it wilJ follow a 
policy of 'Neither East Nor West'. The basic objective of this 
policy are as: (a) not to play into the hands of any super 
power; (b) adopt an independent economic and foreign policy 
free from any outside domination and fear; (c) To support al] 
the people and countries who have been sufferers of 
superpowers exploitation and imperjalism. The policy of 
'Neither East Nor West' is very close to the aims, objectives, 
and principles of the Non-aligned Movements, which a]so 
started as a reaction of the superpowers domination, opposing 
all types of exploitation, oppression, ImperJaJism, 
colonialism and Neo-colonialism. Thus in order to give 
practical shape to its policy of 'Neither East Nor West' Iran 
joined the Non-aligned Movement. Though there were differences 
of opinion among the leaders in Iran about the meaning and 
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concept, of Non-alignment, Khomeini claimed that Iran was the 
only true non-aligned country. Khomeini and other leaders of 
the Islamic Republic on several occasions criticised the 
members of the non-aligned countries for not remaining true to 
the basic principles of the movement al3owing the temeseJves 
to be exploited by either of the superpowers. Yet Iran's 
decision to join the NAM helped it to come closer to many 
third world countries like India, Indonesia and play an 
important role in the movement. 
In order to achieve the goals of 'Neither East Nor West' 
Iran, beside joining the Non-aligned Movement also withdrew 
itself from CENTO, released herself from the clutches of the 
United States, refused to play the American game in the 
region, cancelled its many contracts with the United States 
and other countries of the Western bloc, it renounced the 3 959 
treaty with the United States and 1921 treaty with the Soviet 
Union and also maintained reasonable distance from the Soviet 
Union. It also urged upon other countries of the world to 
follow the policy Iran had adopted and to reduce their 
dependence on the superpowers. Leadership in Iran strongly 
criticised those countries who were allies of super powers 
particularly the United States and refrain from improving 
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relation's with theme. Its strained relations with Egypt and 
Saudi Arbia were mainly due to their close alliance with the 
United States. 
The antagonistic relations with United States whJch 
resulted into the severance of diplomatic relations had been 
motivated, by several factors. First, were the prjncjpjes, 
ideology and experiences of Islamic Revolution that did not 
permit Iran to maintain close relation's with the U.S. The 
continuous support to Shah by the United States through out 
the Revolution as well as its encouragement to antj-
revolutionary forces with the aim of subverting the revolution 
were the main causes of bitterness between the two. The strong 
anti-American sentiments of Iranian people was also one of the 
reasons of anti-American stand. 
The seizure of American Embassy in Iran which was 
obviously against the basic principles and norms of 
International Law was mainly aimed at reducing the American 
interference in Iran and crushing the anti-revoJutionary 
forces. This move also satisfied the sentiments of Iranian 
people and generated confidence in them as they were so 
powerful as they could challenge one of the superpowers. The 
seizure of American Embassy and hostage crisis was one of the 
unique experiences of modern world. Iran set an example that a 
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small country with so many internal problems could challenge 
the super power if it had will to do so. The economic 
sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations with Iran by many 
countries which brought Iran into a situation of tota.l 
isolation could not exercise any influence over the Iranian 
leadership to deviate from the path they had chosen. Above all 
Iran considered the 'isolation' as a boon rather than a 
problem or a threat Imam Khomeini had said on one occasion 
that by living in isolation for some time would be good for 
Iran as it will help Iran to differentiate between its 
friends and foes and in re-establishing stable relations with 
like minded and friendly countries. 
Many observers speculated that after severing relations 
with the United States, Iran would fall into the Soviet Camp. 
But this speculation proved wrong when Iran equally criticised 
the Soviet Union and decided to maintain equidistance from 
both the super powers. The main reason of maintaining distance 
from the Soviet Union was that Iran did not want to comprom.ise 
with its policy of 'Neither East Nor West*. The main 
hindrances in coming closer to the Soviet Union were: (J) 
Russia's long record of Imperialism throughout the 19th 
century particularly during the two World Wars; (jj) its 
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continuous support to Iranian leftists and ethnic minorities; 
(iii) In post revolutionary period Soviet Unions arms 
intervention in Afghanistan which was considered a direct 
threat for Iran's sovereignty and integrity; and (iv) charges 
of Iranian leaders on Russia for assisting and cooperating 
with Tooth party and ethnic insurgency groups in different 
parts of Iran. 
Iran's strong attitude towards Soviet Union had surprised 
the world as there were many reasons to come closer to the 
Soviet Union such as Iran's long common boundary w.ith the 
Soviet Union. Antagonising both the super powers at the same 
time was also not considered reasonable and above all the 
Soviet Union was a neighbouring Superpower with its growing 
economic importance and its emergence as an important suppjy 
route to Iran. Despite these factors Iran did not change its 
attitude towards Soviet Union. But one thing can be noticed 
that relations between the two improved after the revolution. 
Even some Iranian leaders did not hesitate to describe Soviet 
Union as a 'friendly country'. The Soviet Union's balanced 
attitude towards Iran and its continued attempt to improve 
relation's was also one of the basic reasons in softening of 
Iran's attitude towards it. The soviet diplomacy not to 
involve directly in the American embassy and hostage crisis 
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issue also softened Iran's attitude. On Iranian charges of 
Soviet support to ethnic minorities, Soviet Union not only 
denied the charge but also adopted a reasonable approach to 
temporise the Iranian anger. On Afghanistan Soviet Union 
repeatedly assured Iran of withdrawing its forces as soon as 
possible. As such there was no major issue and differences 
between the two which could obstruct normal relationship 
except Afghan problem. Actually it was the Russian 
intervention in Afghanistan that created too many problems in 
bilateral relation's between the two. 
Iran's regional policy was directed by many 
considerations: it continue to give priority to regional peace 
and stability, it asked the governments of the regional mus.l.im 
states not to act as the lackeys of the superpowers in the 
region, advocated for the unity of the muslims and muslim 
countries under its policy of unity of Ummah- Its basic 
criticism towards many countries of the region, particularly 
Saudi Arabia, was that the governments in these states were 
not according to the principles of Islam and they were acting 
as lackeys of super power in the region. Thus it called the 
people to the overthrow the present rulers in order to 
establish Islamic governments in their respective countries 
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taking example of the Islamic Republid. " The exporting of 
revolution and basic ideology and principles of Islamic 
Republic was also one of the objectives of Iran's foreign 
policy that threatened most of the muslim countries. The winds 
of the revolution were noticed in many cnuiitries especiaJly in 
those countries where Shias were living in sizable numbers 
such as Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain. The threat of an Iran Ijke 
revolution in Iraq was also considered to be one of the 
reasons of Iraqi attack on Iran. For : this purpose Iran 
launched a propaganda campaign through out the world 
especially in the muslim countries through'different means and 
also used the occasion of Hajj to awarei the people about the 
ideology, principles and achievements of thee Islamic Republic. 
The use of the occasion of Haj for politdcal means became one 
of the important cause of worsening Iran"s relations with 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi's argued that Ishe occasion of Haj is 
only for religious purpose while Iranian clergymen argued that 
Haj does not mean only to come and perform the rituals but 
this occasion should also be utilised to' solve the socio-
political and other problems of the musldraB through out the 
world. Imam Khomeini also demanded for the joint 
administration of the Haj in which muslim tbroughout the world 
should be represented. 
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Tehran's relations, with most of the countries 
particularly with the regional states was influenced by Iran-
Iraq war. Its weak relations with the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council was due to laters economic and political 
backing to Iraq in its war with Iran. On the other hand its 
improved relation's with the states of Steadfastness Front was 
mainly due to their support to Iran in the War. Thus, during 
the prolong Iran-Iraq war where Iran's relations with most of 
the regional countries deteriorated, its relation's with 
Steadfastness Front continued to be normal and friendJy. 
Despite many differences with Syria and P.L.O., (all members 
of Steadfastness Front) which surfaced later on in its 
relation with these states, the relations continued to improve 
through out the war. There were many points of agreements and 
disagreements between Iran and these countries. The points of 
agreement are as follows: their opposition and condemnation of 
American Imperialism in the region, support to Palestinian, 
cause, there common urge that all the countries of the region 
should be free of outside domination, and should adopt a 
common stand on economic and political issues. They also 
jointly advocated that regional problems should be solved in 
regional perspective without any outside interference. 
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Relation's with Libya was somehow problematic. Qaddafi's 
regime, his personal image and ideology and his action 
programme as an Islamic Revolution had disturbed Iran. 
However, many stands which were taken by Khomeini's regime had 
been earlier taken by the Qaddafi, such as negating the 
superpower domination (Qaddafi from the very beginning had 
adopted an anti American line), demand for joint 
administration of the Haj and unity of the Muslim and Muslim 
states. The main issue between Qaddafi and Khomeini was over 
the question of acquiring global Islamic leadership. Despite 
many similarities in ideology and approach of both the 
leaders, no one was going to accept the other as the so.le 
leader. 
After the culmination of the Islamic Revolution relation 
between Turkey (a member of NATO and CENTO) and Iran improved, 
particularly after the beginning of Iran-Iraq War. Officials 
of both the countries used every opportunities to call for 
closer and more comprehensive ties in the political, economic 
and commercial fields. Turkey became one of the important 
trade partner of Iran, and a trade route to Iran during the 
prolong Iran-Iraq War. A number of trade and economic 
agreements were signed between the two countries during thjs 
period. Despite closer economic ties between Turkey and Iran, 
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tension also persisted between the two due to Iran's 
allegation that Iranian dissidents were operating from bases 
in Turkey. However those allegations were denied by the 
Turkish government but the Turkish authorities were not 
successful in satisfying the Iranians. With regards to Iran's 
relations with Turkey it may be pointed out that Iran 
compromised with its ideology by coming closer to a country 
which is the member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and one time member of Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) beside being a close allie of the United States. 
Actually the national interest of the country dictated to come 
closer to Turkey at a time when its relation's with most of 
the countries of the Western bloc and the region were tense. 
Another neighbouring country with whom Iran's relations 
have been cordial is Pakistan. It was also unnatural as 
Pakistan did not fit in the ideological frame-work of Iran. 
Pakistan which has been playing as an American stooge in the 
region was undoubtedly to be placed by Iran in the line of 
Egypt and other regional countries who were under the direct 
influence of America. Thus in the post revolutionary period 
cordial Iran-Pakistan relations were unlikely but Russian 
intervention in Afghanistan compelled Iran to come closer to 
327 
Pakistan. 
Afghanistan which is a neighbouring Muslim state became 
one of the source of tension for Iran for over a decade due to 
Russian intervention. The Russian intervention in Afghanistan 
severely disturbed the Iranians. The leaders in Iran 
unequivocally condemned the intervention and demanded the 
immediate pull out of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Iran 
also did not approve the American involvement in Afghan crisis 
and advocated to solve the problem in regional perspective 
without any interference from any power from out side the 
region. Iran also gave a peace formula in 1981 for the 
solution of the Afghan problem. Iran continuously pressurised 
the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan and put complete 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan as one of the 
main conditions of normalising relation's with the Soviet 
Union. 
With regard to Arab-Israel conflict there was a major 
shift in Iran's policy compared to its policy in the pre-
revolutionary period. Shah maintained cordial relation with 
Israel and advocated for a peaceful solution of the conflict 
through American mediation. The maintenance of diplomatic and 
economic ties with Israel by Shah was one of the issues for 
which Imam Khomeini always criticised Shah. Imam Khomeini 
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always considered Israel as an enemy of Islam and Muslims and 
an agent of super powers to create disturbances and fulfill 
the interest of imperialist powers in the region. He tactfu]]y 
used the Israeli card against Shah arguing that by maintaining 
relations with Israel Shah was doing an unislamic work as he 
declared that maintaining any type of relations with Israel 
was un-Islamic. Here Imam Khomeini very cleverly tried to get 
the support of Iranian people and muslims of the world by 
exploiting their sentiment on the issue of Israel and ZionJsm 
as muslims through out the world are strongly in favour of the 
liberation of Jerusalem. The anti-Israel stand which had been 
taken by Imam Khomeini long before the establishment of 
Islamic Republic continued to be one of the objectives of 
Iran's foreign policy. Immediately after the culmination of 
Islamic Republic Iran declared to severe dJpJomatdc reJatJon's 
with Israel. The PLO leader Yaser Arafat was given a warm 
welcome in Iran on the next day of the proclamation of Islamic 
Republic and the place which was earlier occupied by the 
Israel embassy was given to PLO to open its embassy. Imam 
Khomeini also urged upon the Muslim countries and muslims all 
over the world to unite for the cause of the liberation of 
Palestine. He advocated for a full fledged war against Israel 
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in order to Liberate Jerusalem. He announced that last Friday 
of Ramzan will be celebrated as Quds (Jerusalem) Day In order 
to mobilise the World muslim's public opinion to prepare and 
to unite for the liberation of Quds (Jerusalem). But the 
Iranian support to PLO was only verbal and moral not 
practical. Leaders in Iran declared that they were not going 
to help PLO materially but only diplomatically on 
international forums and in international organization like 
U.N.O. The relations with PLO and Yaser Arafat did not last 
long as Iran started backing and supporting other groups who 
were involved in Palestinian liberation movement and were 
dominated by Shias. Iran also challenged the validity of Yasar 
Arafat as the sole leader of Palestinian. It also criticised 
the PLO. The anti-Israeli stand which was taking by Imam 
Khomeini in pre-revo]utionary period gradually lost its 
emphasis as Iran did not support PLO in the same manner as was 
expected by the Palestinians. However Iran condemned the 
Israeli aggression and demanded for the rights of Palestinian 
people to have a Palestinian states in UNO repeatedly and 
forcefully. 
Under its policy of supporting liberation movements and 
to oppose all types of oppression, Iran beside Afghanistan and 
Palestinians also extended its support to Lebanon in the 
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region. The Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon was strongly 
condemned by Iran. The Iranian representative in the U.N. 
while strong condemning the Israeli invasion demanded for the 
just solution of the crisis. In 1981, the Foreign Ministry of 
Iran described the Israeli invasion as an imperialist plot to 
disintegrate Lebanon. In March 1985 again the Iranian 
representative in United Nations demanded for a clear 
resolution on Lebanon crisis condemning the Israeli aggression 
and its illegal occupation of Lebanese territory. 
The American air attack on Libya in 1986 was also 
strongly condemned by Iran. The President of the Islamic 
Republic described the attack not only on Libya but an 
aggression against the Islamic world and Islamic community. 
Iran also demanded for the economic and political boycott of 
the United States and urged the world community and 
international organization to adopt practical measures to face 
such type of further barbaric attempts. 
Islamic Republic of Iran also repeatedly condemned the 
Apartheid in South Africa and stopped selling oil to South 
Africa. It also expressed its support and backing to the 
struggle of African people against racialism. In Africa Iran 
also established diplomatic relation's with SWAPO and extended 
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its support to the organization. 
In case of Chad Iran criticise French intervention and 
described it as a part of the imperialist conspiracy to impose 
neo-colonialism on the third world countries. 
American intervention in Nicaragua and El-Salvader was 
also described as threat to regional peace and stability and 
extended its full support to Nicargua in United Nations. Iran 
demanded that local differences between Nicaragua and its 
neighbour should be solved through the good offices of the 
Contadora Group. 
Another important objective of Iran's foreign policy has 
been to improve relations with the countries of the third 
world. Actually after severing dependence on superpower and 
its allies it was obvious to improve relations with the 
countries of the third world in order to fulfill it's needs. 
With third world countries Iran has the advantage of 
maintaining relations on its own conditions or 
unconditionally. Under this policy Iran improved its relations 
with a number of third world countries of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. It also established fresh diplomatic relations 
with a number of countries. Iran considerably improved its 
economic relations with third world countries. Many , contracts 
with the United States and Western countries were either 
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cancelled 03~ Stopped. In concluding the new contracts Iran 
decided to give priority to friendly and non-aJigned 
countries. However a number of contracts with Western 
countries especially with Germany which had been a potential 
economic partner of Iran since long, were signed after the end 
of Iran-Iraq war during the process of the reconstruction 
movement. 
Since 1979 the foreign policy of Islamic Republic of Iran 
may be divided primarily in to two periods: (a) Khomeini era 
(1979-89) and (b) post Khomeini era (since 1989) . The Khomeini 
era can further be divided into three stages: (a) period of 
uncertaintity, (b) period of isolation, and (c) period of war. 
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic Imam 
Khomeini's personality, his ideology, thought, will, harsh 
wordings and strong stands continued to exercise influence 
over the decision-making of foreign policy till his death in 
1989. There was no decision of foreign and domestic policies 
which could be implemented without the approval and permission 
of Imam Khomeini. 
After the success of the revolution and overthrow of Shah 
there was political instability in Iran and many countries of 
the world were reluctant to adopt a definite attitude towards 
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Iran. Thus, most of the countries who were not going to be 
directly affected by the Iranian revolution either kept silent 
or spoked tactfully. The hostage crisis followed by the 
economic sanctions and seveiance of diplomatic relations with 
most of the countries brought Iran into a stage of isoJation. 
The prolonged war with Iraq had also a strong bearing on the 
foreign policy of Iran. As during the period of war Iran 
defined its friends and enemies according to the country's 
stand on the war. Those countries who helped and supported 
Iraq were branded as enemy of Iran and received strong 
criticism from Tehran. On the other hand those countries 
extended their support to Iran were considered to* be best 
friends while those who declared and maintained their 
neutrality were dealt accordingly-
After the death of Imam Khomeini many speculation that 
with the coming of moderate groups in power Iran's relations 
with the United States will improve and a major shift in its 
policy will take place worst confronted. In the post Khomeini 
era, Iran continued to follow by and larged the same policies, 
as were adopted during Khomeini regime. Since there is still a 
strong anti-American lobby active in Iran which do not permit 
the decision-makers to refrain from softening their altitude 
towards the United States. However the intensity of bitterness 
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which was noticed during Khomeini regime has considerably 
weakened. 
On Kuwait crisis Iran adopted a reasonable and neutra] 
stand. While on the one hand it condemned the occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq and demanded for the immediate withdrawal of 
Iraqi troops from Kuwait, on the other hand it opposed the 
stationing of multinational forces in the region. 
With regard to West European countries the Rushide affair 
continued to dominate as an irritant in the relations which 
resulted in severance of diplomatic relations with the United 
Kingdom and other countries of the Economic Community. But due 
to the strong economic interest of many European countries, in 
Iran, the relations were soon normalised after the European 
Economic community lifted economic sanctions on Iran in 
October 1<590. Since then a number of economic agreements have 
been signed with many West European countries. 
The expectations that Iran-Saudi relations will improve 
after the Iran-Iraq war in post Khomeini period were behind 
owing in the wake of clashes between Iranian pilgrims and 
Saudi forces during the Haj of 1989, the bomb explosion near 
Grant Mosque in Mecca and the Saudi allegation of the Iranian 
involvement in the bomb blast. But apart from many mistrusts, 
misunderstandings, suspicion, and accusations, efforts to 
335 
improve relations were continued by both the states and by 
many mediators. Consequently in March 1991 after a three years 
gap diplomatic relations were re-established between Saudi-
Arabia and Iran. 
Iran re-established and improved diplomatjc relations 
with many countries of the region such as with Kuwait Jordan 
Egypt and diplomatic relations with Bahrain upgraded to C/,:.,r0c 
d' afliji, '.s . However some differences with UAE broke out on 
the question of the possession of three islands in the Gulf. 
Relations with India improved in a dramatic manner with 
the visit of Indian prime-minister P.V. Narsimha Rao to Iran 
in September 1993. A number of agreements were signed during 
his visit. 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that the post 
revolutionary Iran successfully withstood the imperialist 
onslaught and emerged as a strong force to be reckoned with in 
the global political scenario. The U.S.A. looks at Iran as a 
political threat with her Islamic appeal in the third world 
countries in general and the CIS countries in particular, to 
the imperialist designs of global hegemony and dominance. It 
may again be no exaggeration if Iran is credited for raising 
Islam to the position of a potential ideoJogy to counter 
imperialism particularly after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, in global politics. 
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